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Executive summary
Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention on Nuclear Safety which was 
adopted on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was 
ratiﬁed on 5 January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. The ﬁrst 
two review meetings were organized in 1999 and 2002. This report is the Finnish National 
Report for the Third Review Meeting in April 2005.
There are two nuclear power plants in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The 
Loviisa plant comprises of two VVER units, operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, 
and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units, operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oy. The Loviisa 
units were connected to the electrical network in 1977 (unit 1) and 1980 (unit 2) and the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 1978 and 1980, respectively. The nominal reactor thermal power 
of the Loviisa units is 1500 MW and of the Olkiluoto units 2500 MW. At both sites there 
are interim storages for spent fuel as well as ﬁnal repositories for medium and low level 
radioactive wastes.
In the report, latest large safety reviews and plant modernization programmes are 
explained in detail including safety assessment methods and key results based on the 
Articles of Convention and related Finnish regulatory requirements. Safety performance 
of the Finnish nuclear power plants is also presented by using representative indicators. 
Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety 
assessment, inspection and enforcement are also covered in detail. The Summary Report 
of the Second Review Meeting presents a list of topics where additional information is 
wished. These wishes have been taken into account in the report.
The major developments in Finland since the Second Review Meeting are as follows: 
continuation of safety assessment and enhancement of Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant units after the large modernization programmes at the end of 90’ies, 
development of regulatory practices such as development and updating of safety guides, 
and Decision-in-principle for a new nuclear power plant unit, Olkiluoto 3. The report also 
reﬂects operational safety issues and the recent developments in design, such as defence in 
depth and severe accident management issues. Latest development in the various topics of 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described.
The issues requiring further development to enhance safety have been covered in Chapter 
3 of the report including provision for plant ageing, qualiﬁcation of non-destructive testing, 
and reliability of digital automation and management of competence.
Finnish report on nuclear safety. Finnish 3rd national report as referred to in Article 5 of  
the Convention on Nuclear Safety. STUK-B-YTO 234. Helsinki 2004. 107 pp.
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In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 4 and 6 to 19 of the Convention is 
separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation it can be concluded that
• The Finnish regulatory infrastructure including nuclear and radiation regulations is 
in compliance with the Convention obligations.
• The regulatory practices comply with the Convention obligations.
• The licensee practices in provision of good safety performance and in modernization of 
old nuclear power plant units comply with the Convention obligations.
• There are some issues requiring further development to enhance safety as discussed 
in the report.
In conclusion, Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention and also / 
therefore the objectives of the Convention are complied with.
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Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety which was adopted on 17 June 
1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The 
Convention was ratiﬁed on 5 January 1996, and it 
came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. The 
ﬁrst two review meetings were organized in 1999 
and 2002 and respective national reports have been 
provided. This report is the Finnish National Report 
for the Third Review Meeting in April 2005.
The fulﬁlment of the obligations of the Convention 
is evaluated in this report. The evaluation is based 
on the Finnish legislation and regulations as well 
as on the situation at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants. The reference is made to the IAEA Safety 
Requirements and other safety standards as ap-
propriate.
Finland is a Member State of the European 
Union. The regulations of the Union are in force in 
Finland. The EU regulations relate e.g. to radiation 
protection, but there are no regulations pertaining 
directly to nuclear safety. When necessary, the 
Finnish legislation is modiﬁed to take into account 
the EU Directives.
In Finland, there are two nuclear power plants: 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant 
comprises of two VVER units, operated by Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy, and the Olkiluoto plant two 
BWR units, operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oy. 
The Loviisa units were connected to the electrical 
network in 1977 (unit 1) and 1980 (unit 2) and the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 1978 and 1980, respec-
tively. The nominal reactor thermal power of the 
Loviisa units is 1500 MW and of the Olkiluoto units 
2500 MW. The booklet Nuclear Energy in Finland, 
Reference 4, provides an overview on the use of 
nuclear energy in Finland.
A Decision-in-principle to construct a new NPP 
unit was made by the Council of State and con-
ﬁrmed by the Parliament in 2002. Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy has ﬁled an application for a Construction 
1 Introduction
License at the beginning of 2004 to construct a 
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) unit of nominal 
reactor thermal power 4300 MW at the Olkiluoto 
site (Olkiluoto 3).
There are intermediate spent fuel storage facili-
ties and ﬁnal disposal facilities for low and medium 
level radioactive waste at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa 
plant sites. The disposal facility at Olkiluoto was 
taken into operation in 1992 and at Loviisa in 
1998.
For taking care of the spent fuel ﬁnal disposal, 
a joint company Posiva Oy has been established by 
Fortum and Teollisuuden Voima Oy. Research, devel-
opment and planning work for spent fuel disposal is 
in progress and the disposal facility is envisaged to 
be operational in early 2020. The repository will be 
constructed in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto NPP site. 
To conﬁrm the suitability of the site, construction 
of an underground rock characterisation facility 
was commenced in mid-2004. Finnish Parliament 
has endorsed a Decision-in-principle made by the 
Government for the implementation of Finnish 
Disposal Facility to the Olkiluoto site.
Finland observes the principles of the Convention, 
when applicable, also in other uses of nuclear energy 
than nuclear power plants, e.g. in research reactor. 
In Finland, there is one TRIGA Mark II research 
reactor (250 kW) situated in Espoo. The reactor was 
taken into operation in 1962.
In the report, latest safety reviews and plant 
modernization programmes are explained in detail 
including safety assessment methods and key 
results based on the Articles of Convention and 
related Finnish regulatory requirements. Safety 
performance of Finnish nuclear power plants is 
also presented by using representative indicators. 
Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, provision 
of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspec-
tion and enforcement are also covered in detail. The 
Summary Report of the Second Review Meeting 
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presents a list of topics where additional informa-
tion is wished. These wishes have been taken into 
account in the report.
The major developments in Finland since the 
Second Review Meeting are as follows: continuation 
of safety assessment and enhancement of Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units after the 
large modernization programmes at the end of 
90’ies, development of regulatory practices such 
as development and updating of safety guides, and 
Decision-in-principle for a new nuclear power plant 
unit, Olkiluoto 3. The report also reﬂects opera-
tional safety issues and the recent developments in 
design, such as defence in depth and severe accident 
management issues. Latest development in the 
various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
is explained.
In Chapter 2 of this report, the implementa-
tion of each of the Articles 4 and 6 to 19 of the 
Convention is separately evaluated. At the end of 
Chapter 2, a concluding summary on the fulﬁlment 
of the obligations of the Convention is presented. 
Main issues requiring further measures to enhance 
safety are discussed in Chapter 3.
STUK-B -YTO 234
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2.1 Article 4. Implementing measures
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the 
framework of its national law, the legislative, 
regulatory and administrative measures and 
other steps necessary for implementing its 
obligations under this Convention.
Main regulations in the ﬁeld of nuclear energy 
are the Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the 
Radiation Act and Decree, and the Decisions of the 
Council of State as well as the Regulatory Guides 
(YVL Guides) issued by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK). The most essential safety 
regulations and guides are listed in Annex 1.
The legislative and regulatory measures to fulﬁl 
the obligations of the Convention were discussed 
in detail in the ﬁrst and second reports. It was 
concluded that the Finnish regulatory framework 
fulﬁls the obligations of the Convention, and also 
the objectives of the Convention are complied with. 
The approach in Finland is a continuous fulﬁlment 
of the criteria presented in the Articles of the 
Convention. Also, the approach of a continuous 
improvement of safety is manifested in the Finnish 
nuclear legislation (VNP 395/1991). This third 
report concentrates on the activities of licensees to 
fulﬁl the obligations of the Convention.
2.2 Article 6. Existing 
nuclear installations
Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that the safety of 
nuclear installations existing at the time 
the Convention enters into force for that 
Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as pos-
sible. When necessary in the context of this 
Convention, the Contracting Party shall ensure 
that all reasonably practicable improvements 
are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade 
the safety of the nuclear installation. If such 
upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should 
2 Compliance with Articles 4 and 6 to 19 
– Article–by–article review
be implemented to shut down the nuclear in-
stallation as soon as practically possible. The 
timing of the shut-down may take into account 
the whole energy context and possible alterna-
tives as well as the social, environmental and 
economic impact.
2.2.1 Nuclear installations in Finland
In Finland, there are two nuclear power plants: 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant 
comprises of two VVER units that are operated by 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy, and the Olkiluoto plant 
comprises of two BWR units that are operated by 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy.
The Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
units were connected to the electrical network 
as follows: Loviisa 1, February 8, 1977; Loviisa 2, 
November 4, 1980; Olkiluoto 1, September 2, 1978; 
and Olkiluoto 2, February 18, 1980.
The nominal thermal power of both of the 
Loviisa units is 1500 MW (109% as compared to the 
original 1375 MW). The increase of the power level 
was licensed in April 1998. The Operating Licenses 
of the units are valid until the end of 2007.
The nominal thermal power of both Olkiluoto 
units is 2500 MW, which was licensed in August 
1998. The new power level is 115,7% as compared 
to the earlier nominal power 2160 MW licensed in 
1983. The original power level of both units was 
2000 MW. The Operating Licenses of the units 
are valid until the end of 2018. According to the 
conditions of the licenses, the licensee shall carry 
out an intermediate safety assessment by the end 
of 2008.
At both sites there are fresh and spent fuel 
storage facilities, and facilities for storage and treat-
ment of low and medium level radioactive wastes. 
Other existing nuclear installations in Finland are 
the ﬁnal disposal facilities for low and medium level 
radioactive waste at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plant 
sites. The disposal facility at Olkiluoto was taken 
10
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into operation in 1992 and at Loviisa in 1999.
In 2002 the gross production of Loviisa 1 was 
3988 GWh (gross) and the load factor was 89.3%. 
The annual refuelling and maintenance outage 
lasted 26 days. The gross production of Loviisa 2 
was 3674 GWh, the load factor 82.2% and the length 
of the refuelling outage was 49.5 days. Loviisa 2 had 
an extended inspection outage, which is performed 
every eighth year. The annual collective radiation 
doses were 1.04 manSv and 1.57 manSv for Loviisa 
1 and Loviisa 2 respectively.
In the year 2003 Loviisa 1 produced 4129 GWh 
(gross), the load factor was 92.4% and the refuelling 
and maintenance outage lasted 23.5 days. In 2003 
the gross production of Loviisa 2 was 3929 GWh, 
the load factor was 87.9%, and the refuelling outage 
lasted 16.5 days. The collective radiation doses in 
2003 were 0.61 manSv for Loviisa 1 and 0.33 manSv 
for Loviisa 2.
In 2002 net production at Olkiluoto 1 was 6998 
GWh and the load factor 95,3%. The annual outage 
and refuelling of Olkiluoto 1 was performed in May 
and lasted 13 days. The net production of Olkiluoto 
2 was 7109 GWh and the load factor was 96,6%. 
The annual outage and refuelling of Olkiluoto 2 was 
in May and lasted 7 days. The collective radiation 
doses in 2002 were 0,81 manSv for Olkiluoto 1 and 
0,31 manSv for Olkiluoto 2.
In 2003 net production at Olkiluoto 1 was 
7127 GWh and the load factor was 97,0%. The 
annual outage and refuelling of Olkiluoto 1 was 
performed in May–June and lasted 10 days. The 
net production of Olkiluoto 2 was 7027 GWh and 
the load factor was 95,5%. The annual outage and 
refuelling of Olkiluoto 2 was in May and lasted 15 
days. Inspections made during the annual outages 
showed that the plant units are in good condition 
and that any faults or defects were minimal. The 
company policy is to keep the plant units as good 
as new. The collective radiation doses in 2003 were 
0,27 manSv for Olkiluoto 1 and 0,76 manSv for 
Olkiluoto 2.
Figure 1 shows the load factors of Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPP’s during the last ten year period. 
Load factor describes the energy produced in com-
parison to the energy that could have been produced 
if the unit had operated at the nominal power dur-
ing the whole period.
The latest comprehensive overall safety reviews 
of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants were carried 
out by the licensees and independently by STUK 
in 1996–1998 in connection to the renewal of op-
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Figure 1. Load factors of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units.
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erating licenses of nuclear power plant units. The 
safety documentation, including safety assessments 
done by both licensees, was submitted to STUK at 
the end of 1996. In addition to the review of the 
licensing documents such as Final Safety Analysis 
Report, STUK also made an independent safety 
assessment. The statements of STUK were given to 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry in March 1998 
(Loviisa) and in June 1998 (Olkiluoto). As regards 
radiation and nuclear safety, the main conclusions 
in the statements were that the conditions of the 
Finnish nuclear energy legislation are complied 
with. The next periodical safety reviews will be car-
ried out 2006-2008 when the Loviisa NPP applies 
for a renewal of operating license and Olkiluoto 
NPP provides an intermediate safety review report 
for STUK evaluation.
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment 
and enhancement approach is presented in the 
nuclear legislation (Council of State Decision 
(395/1991) where it is stated that operating experi-
ence from nuclear power plants as well as results of 
safety research shall be systematically followed and 
assessed. For further safety enhancement, actions 
shall be taken which can be regarded as justiﬁed 
considering operating experience and the results 
of safety research as well as the advancement of 
science and technology. The implementation of 
safety improvements has been a continuing process 
at both Finnish nuclear power plants since their 
commissioning and there exists no urgent need to 
upgrade the safety of these plants in the context of 
the Convention. Recently implemented and ongoing 
safety upgrading measures, mostly related to the 
mitigation of severe accidents at the nuclear power 
plants, are described in this report.
In addition to the regulatory safety assessment, 
there have been independent safety reviews con-
ducted by International organizations such as IAEA 
and WANO. IAEA OSART (Operational Safety 
Review Team) missions have visited both of the 
Finnish nuclear power plants, Olkiluoto in March 
1986 and Loviisa in November 1990. WANO safety 
reviews at both Finnish nuclear power plants were 
carried out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant at 
the end of 1999 and Loviisa nuclear power plant at 
the beginning of 2001.
In the following, the latest large plant moderni-
zation and power uprating projects in the Finnish 
nuclear power plants are described.
2.2.2 Modernization and power 
uprating of Loviisa NPP
The project for the modernization and power uprat-
ing of Loviisa NPPs gave an excellent possibility 
to take advantage of the latest development in the 
nuclear power plant technology. The key aspects 
were to verify the plant safety, to improve produc-
tion capacity and to give a good basis for the exten-
sion of the plant’s lifetime to at least 45 years (later 
strategic goal is at least 50 years).
Feasibility study and project objectives
In the ﬁrst phase, before starting the project, a 
feasibility study for uprating of the reactor thermal 
power was carried out. The main result was in short 
that no technical or licensing issues could be found 
which would prevent the raising of the reactor 
thermal output up to 1500 MW from the original 
level of 1375 MW.
The carefully prepared feasibility study gave a 
good picture of the necessary plant modiﬁcations as 
well as essential areas in the analysis work, which 
was of use in planning the critical works and the 
time schedule of the project. The feasibility study 
focused on the following tasks:
• the optimisation of the power level and deﬁnition 
of the new parameters of the main process
• reactor core and fuel studies, including RPV 
irradiation embrittlement
• safety analyses and licensing
• the main components and systems
• project planning and risk assessment.
The main objectives for the project were based on 
the feasibility study:
(1) Plant safety level as a whole will be checked and, 
if needed, improvements will be made.
(2) Plant units will be licensed for 1500 MW reactor 
thermal output.
(3) Gross electric output of the plant units will be 
raised to about 510 MW.
(4) Assistance to the life time extension of the plant 
units.
(5) The long-term availability of the plant is not 
impaired.
(6) Increase in the expert knowledge of staff.
Time schedule and project organisation
The feasibility study concerning the reactor power 
upgrading and improvements of the turbine efﬁ-
12
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ciency was started in spring 1994. After good results 
from the study, the preparation of the project plan 
began in summer 1995. Critical works in the time 
schedule, such as the revision of the Final Safety 
Analysis Report and the preparation of certain 
plant modiﬁcations, were started immediately.
The ﬁrst step of the trial run at 103% reactor 
power could be started in January 1997. Test runs 
continued step by step during the year, and the 
last transient test at ﬁnal reactor power 109% was 
completed successfully in December 1997. Measures 
to improve the efﬁciency of the steam turbines 
continued in the annual maintenance outages until 
the year 2002.
The implementation of the project was car-
ried out in co-operation between Loviisa NPP 
and Fortum Nuclear Services (former Fortum 
Engineering). In addition, many other organisations 
such as the Technical Research Centre of Finland 
(VTT) participated in the work. Special attention 
was paid to the QA routines in the project as well 
as to the co-ordination of the work in several or-
ganisations. One example of this was the particular 
subject-speciﬁc specialist groups which were estab-
lished to overview essential sections such as nuclear 
safety and commissioning.
The work was divided into the following ten 
sub-projects each having a responsible person from 
the organisations of both Loviisa NPP and Fortum 
Engineering:
(1) Operating licenses
(2) Other licenses
(3) Safety analyses and basic data management
(4) FSAR revision and comparison of the plant with 
regulatory body guidelines
(5) PSA (including level 2 PSA)
(6) Modiﬁcation of the turbines
(7) Electricity systems
(8) Reactor and fuel
(9) Process systems and automation
(10) Commissioning and revision of instructions.
Technical implementation and 
experience of the trial operation
Increasing the electrical output by about 50 MW 
at each unit was part of the Loviisa modernisation 
programme. After completing the uprating of the 
reactor thermal output in April 1998, more than 
80% of the total increase in the electrical output 
was fulﬁlled. The rest of the power increase was 
available when the measures to improve the steam 
turbines were completed in 2002.
The reactor power uprating from 1375 MW to 
1500 MW was planned on the basis of optimising the 
need for major plant modiﬁcations. In the primary 
side and the sea water cooling system, the mass 
ﬂow rates were not affected, but the temperature 
difference has been increased in proportion to the 
power upgrading. In the turbine side, the live steam 
and the feedwater ﬂow rate were increased by about 
10%; the live steam pressure was not changed.
The reactor fuel loading was considered on the 
basis of the previous limits set for the maximum fuel 
linear power and fuel burn-up. The increase in the 
reactor thermal output was carried out by optimis-
ing the power distribution in the core and the power 
of any single fuel bundle was not increased above 
the maximum level before power upgrading. In par-
allel with this work, more advanced options related 
to the mixing rate of the cooling water in the fuel 
subchannels and the increasing of fuel enrichment 
were investigated. The dummy elements installed 
on the periphery of the core in Loviisa 1 and 2 were 
preserved to minimise irradiation embrittlement of 
the reactor pressure vessel.
The VVER 440 design margins in the primary 
side are rather large and the hardware modiﬁca-
tions needed there were quite limited. Replacement 
of the pressuriser safety valves was indicated 
already during the feasibility study as a necessary 
measure because of the power upgrading. Most of 
the other substantial measures in the primary side 
were carried out on the basis of the continuing effort 
to maintain and raise the safety level of the plant, 
and they were not directly included in the power 
upgrading.
It was necessary to carry out more extensive 
measures in the turbine plant and to the electrical 
components. Steam turbines were modiﬁed to a 
higher steam ﬂow rate. Because of these measures, 
also the efﬁciency and operation reliability has 
improved. Certain modiﬁcations were carried out in 
the electrical generators and the main transformers 
to ensure reliability in continuous operation with 
the upgraded power output.
The last step in the process to uprate the reactor 
thermal power was the long-term trial run to verify 
the main process parameters as well as plant opera-
STUK-B -YTO 234
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tion in both steady state and transient situations. 
The trial run was carried out at gradually uprated 
reactor power with a power level of 103%, 105%, 
107% and ﬁnally 109%. Transient tests deﬁned in 
the test programme were performed with a reactor 
thermal power of 105% and 109%. The test results 
correspond very well with all analyses and calcula-
tions. All the acceptance criteria for the tests were 
fulﬁlled.
Licensing procedure and safety analyses
The modernization programme as a whole was 
started from the basis of the positive safety 
progress. This was applied by taking advantage 
of the latest development in calculation codes and 
technology as well as feedback of the operating 
experience, expertise in the ageing processes and 
safety reassessment coupled with the evolution of 
safety standards.
STUK was closely involved at every stage of 
the project, from the early planning of the concept 
to the evaluation of the results from the test runs. 
STUK examined all the modiﬁcation plans that 
might be expected to have an impact on plant safety. 
Individual permits were granted stage by stage, 
based on the successful implementation of previous 
work.
The renewal of the operating license for the 
increased reactor power was carried out in the fol-
lowing steps:
• permission from the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to make plant modiﬁcations and test 
runs with upgraded reactor power under the 
existing operating license and under the control 
of STUK
• assessment of the environmental impact (EIA-
procedure) of the project
• STUK's approval of the Final Safety Analyses 
Report (FSAR), the safety-related plant modiﬁ-
cations, test programmes and results.
• the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the respon-
sible authority for the NPP operating licenses, 
received a statement from several local and 
national organisations
• The operating license was prepared by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Council 
of State awarded the license in their session on 
2 April 1998. The license is awarded to 1500 MW 
nominal reactor thermal power until the end of 
the year 2007.
The environmental impact has been assessed in the 
EIA Report, which was completed in December 1996. 
This was the ﬁrst time in Finland (parallel with 
TVO plant having a corresponding modernisation 
programme) the EIA Procedure has been applied to 
a nuclear power plant. The law and the decree set 
certain procedures, including a public hearing for 
screening, scoping and the EIA statement, which 
are the stages of this procedure.
The result was that the reactor thermal power 
uprating has no other considerable environmental 
impact than a slight increase in the outlet tempera-
ture of the cooling water. This means that the maxi-
mum temperature increase of the cooling water in 
the main condenser, before released back to the sea, 
is about 1°C higher than the previous temperature 
increase, which was typically close to 10°C.
An extensive safety review and comparison 
of the plant with the latest national regulatory 
body guidelines (YVL guides) have been carried 
out. This work was performed taking into account 
many international standards, such as the IAEA 
report “A Common Basis for Judging the Safety of 
Nuclear Power Plants Built to the Earlier Standards 
INSAG-8”. As a result of the work, a particular 
safety review report has been completed.
A part of the safety review and the licensing 
process of the reactor power uprating was the 
renewal of the Final Safety Analysis Report. New 
accident analyses were made concerning the con-
tainment pressure, loss of coolant accident (LOCA) 
and main steam line break (MSLB), for example. 
In addition to the accident analyses, there are a 
large number of transient situations that were 
also analysed. The risk for a radioactive release to 
the environment was probabilistically considered 
(PSA level 2) for the ﬁrst time for Loviisa NPP. The 
analysis work carried out is described in more detail 
under Article 14.
2.2.3 Enhanced safety and 
improved production through 
modernization at Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 units have been in 
operation about 25 years. The performance indica-
tors have been favourable. For instance, the average 
capacity factor for the last ten years is well above 
90%.
Already before modernization the plant design 
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was reasonably modern due to the following ad-
vanced features included in the original design:
• internal main circulation pumps
• ﬁne motion control rod drives
• 4 × 50% redundant safety systems
• inerted pre-stressed concrete containment, back 
ﬁtted against severe accidents.
Numerous design modiﬁcations have been imple-
mented since the commissioning of the units. For 
instance, the containments were back ﬁtted against 
severe accidents at the end of the 80’s. TVO’s 
policy has been to keep the plant continuously 
up-to-date.
It would be imprudent to take favourable 
performance for granted. Therefore, TVO started 
pro-actively a modernization program in 1994. It 
was recognised that there were many modiﬁcations 
to be implemented in the next years and a decision 
was made to include them in a program called 
“modernization”.
The operating licences of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
were renewed in 1998. The time schedule of the 
modernisation was established so that the outcome 
of the program could be utilised in the operating 
licence renewal.
Principles and goals
From the beginning, the following principles were 
followed in the program:
• technical development was exploited
• new safety requirements
• advanced design solutions
• operational experiences were utilised
• own experiences
• experiences from other plants
• own staff was used as much as possible
• losses in electricity production were avoided
• plant modiﬁcations presupposing shutdown were 
implemented during normal refuelling and 
maintenance outages
• cost/beneﬁt approach was applied.
The main goals of the modernisation were as fol-
lows:
• reviewing safety features and enhancing safety, 
when feasible
• improving the production related performance,
• ﬁnding factors limiting the plant lifetime and 
eliminating them, when feasible
• enhancing the expertise of the own staff and 
improving productivity.
The goals supported each other. For instance, it is 
easier to license the reactor uprating if safety is 
simultaneously enhanced. On the other hand, the 
cost of safety improvements can be compensated for 
by the additional output working for lower produc-
tion cost.
Safety enhancement
In order to achieve the safety goal, the existing 
plant design has been reviewed and compared 
by the TVO to the present and foreseeable safety 
requirements. The most important requirements 
are included in the YVL Guides issued by STUK 
for new nuclear power plants. Compliance with the 
European Utility Requirements (EUR) has also 
been reviewed.
The feasibility of fulﬁlling new requirements set 
for the new nuclear power plants has been consid-
ered case by case. The living PSA model of the plant 
has been utilised in this context.
The most important safety related modiﬁcations 
included in the modernisation program are listed 
below:
• Reactor pressure relief system has been diversi-
ﬁed by installing two additional relief valves.
• ATWS behaviour has been improved by modify-
ing some trip signals and making boron injection 
automatic and more effective.
• Additional severe accident mitigation measures 
have been implemented.
• Earthquake resistance of the plant has been 
checked and related modiﬁcations have been 
made.
• Partial scram function has been strengthened.
• Generator breaker was replaced with a new 
one, which is able to break also short circuit 
current.
• Protection against frazil ice at the seawater 
intake has been improved.
• Protection against snowstorms at the air intake 
of the emergency diesels has been improved.
The modernization program as a whole reduced the 
severe core damage frequency estimate by a factor 
of seven.
The radiation exposure of the population was 
reduced in accordance with the ALARA principle. 
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Liquid releases have been reduced by a factor of ten 
by improving the liquid waste handling systems. 
Also occupational doses have been reduced. In 
practice, this means minimising the cobalt content 
in the primary circuit.
Production improvement
Four ways were followed to increase the electricity 
production:
Reducing the unplanned capacity loss factor
There have not been many operational disturbances 
until now, but there will be more due to the ageing 
of equipment and components. Replacement of 
the components helps in itself. In addition to that, 
favourable system solutions have been realised 
that tolerate more component failures without an 
adverse impact on the plant operation. For instance, 
the original one out of two turbine protection and 
control systems have been replaced by new two out 
of three systems.
Shortening refuelling and 
maintenance outages
Olkiluoto outages have not been very long in the 
past. However, there is still room for improvement. 
For instance, the refuelling machine has been 
speeded up by modernising its instrumentation.
Improving thermal efﬁciency
The low pressure turbines have been replaced and 
in that way about 30 MW additional production 
capacity in each unit has been achieved.
Uprating the reactor thermal power
The following facts made power uprating possible:
• development of the BWR technology
• margins revealed by operational experience
• plant modiﬁcations due to other reasons.
The most important development in this respect has 
taken place in fuel technology. The operation was 
started with 8×8 bundles and now 10×10 bundles 
are used. The new bundles have 40 percent lower 
average linear heat rating than the old ones.
The reactor uprating is a sensitive matter that 
must be treated with extreme care. The following 
criteria have been applied:
• safety level after the modernisation program at 
least the same as before
• no adverse effect on long-term availability
• no shortening of plant life-time
• additional electricity production economically 
justiﬁed.
The thermal power was uprated from 2160 MW 
to 2500 MW (15.7 percent). Some design changes 
implemented due to the uprating are listed below:
• 10×10 fuel bundles are used instead of the 
original 8×8 bundles.
• Inertia of the main circulation pumps has been 
increased electrically.
• Steam separators have been replaced.
• High-pressure turbine was modiﬁed.
• High-pressure turbine valves were replaced.
• Feed water system has been modiﬁed.
• Capacity of the decay heat removal system has 
been increased.
• Generator has been replaced.
• Main transformers have been replaced.
Enhancing staff expertise
The modernization program continues TVO’s policy 
to maintain and enhance the expertise of the own 
staff by having challenging projects always in 
progress. The most important projects since the 
plant commissioning have been the previous reactor 
uprating, severe accident mitigation, training simu-
lator, PSA, interim storage for spent fuel, repository 
for reactor waste, investigation program for disposal 
of spent fuel, preparation of the speciﬁcations and 
evaluation of the bids for a new nuclear power plant 
in the beginning of the 1990’s and again in the 
beginning of the 2000’s.
Implementation
The modernisation program of the Olkiluoto plant 
was started in 1994 and completed in 1998. Some 
later installations were realised during outages 
in 1999. The modernization program consisted of 
about 40 separate projects. The installations were 
performed during the refuelling outages of the 
years 1996–1998. In spite of large modiﬁcations the 
refuelling outage times were reasonable, between 
15 and 20 days. The test program was quite the 
same as in the case of a new plant. In addition, the 
capacity factors of the power plant units have been 
satisfactory (well above 90%) during and after the 
modernisation. The total cost of the modernisation 
program was EUR 135 million.
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Licensing
Licensing steps related to the modernisation pro-
gram were as follows:
• An uprated Safety Analysis Report (PSAR, for 
example) and an uprated Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (level 1 PSA) were submitted to and 
reviewed by STUK.
• Design modiﬁcations and test runs were ac-
cepted by STUK before implementation.
• The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the 
related Topical Reports were rewritten. It means 
also that almost all transient and accident 
analyses were redone taking into account the 
uprated power level and modiﬁed plant design. 
The FSAR and Topical Reports were submitted 
to STUK at the end of 1996.
• An operating license renewal application, cover-
ing design modiﬁcations and the power uprating, 
was submitted to the Council of State at the end 
of 1996. The license was granted in 1998.
• The power uprating has been reviewed also 
according to the Environmental Impact Legis-
lation.
Results
The results were: ensured safety, additional produc-
tion capacity (over 260 MW in total), extended plant 
life time, and more competent and motivated staff.
After modernization
Modernization of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is a continuous 
process. Modernization and power uprating during 
years 1996–1998 in Olkiluoto 1 and 2 contained sev-
eral safety, ageing and efﬁciency remedies. Mostly 
inﬂuences of modiﬁcations have been positive. A 
negative ﬁnding has been a slight increase of steam 
moisture. To improve this in both units steam dryers 
will be replaced in outages 2005 and 2006. Another 
slightly negative ﬁnding was increase of condensate 
clean up temperature, which decreased the life cycle 
of clean up resins. To avoid this problem the location 
of condensate clean up system has been changed in 
the process. In this connection even the ﬁrst LP-
preheaters were replaced and modernized.
The modernization of turbine plant will continue 
with replacement of steam reheater moisture sepa-
rators (MSR). They will be replaced with modern 
two stage MSR’s. This replacement requires even 
modernization of HP-turbine. These replacements 
will be performed in outages 2005 and 2006. In the 
same outages the control system of the turbine will 
be replaced with a modern one.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 6.
2.3 Article 7. Legislative and 
regulatory framework
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish 
and maintain a legislative and regulatory 
framework to govern the safety of nuclear 
installations.
2. The legislative and regulatory framework 
shall provide for:
i. the establishment of applicable 
national safety requirements and 
regulations;
ii. a system of licensing with regard 
to nuclear installations and the 
prohibition of the operation of a 
nuclear installation without a licence;
iii. a system of regulatory inspection and 
assessment of nuclear installations to 
ascertain compliance with applicable 
regulations and the terms of licences;
iv. the enforcement of applicable 
regulations and of the terms of licences, 
including suspension, modiﬁcation or 
revocation.
2.3.1 Legislative and regulatory framework
In Finland, current nuclear legislation is based on 
the Nuclear Energy Act from 1987, together with a 
supporting Nuclear Energy Decree from 1988. The 
scope of this legislation covers e.g.
• the construction and operation of nuclear fa-
cilities; nuclear facilities refer to facilities for 
producing nuclear energy, including research 
reactors, facilities for extensive disposal of 
nuclear wastes, and facilities used for extensive 
fabrication, production, use, handling or storage 
of nuclear materials or nuclear wastes
• the possession, fabrication, production, transfer, 
handling, use, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear wastes 
as well as the export and import of ores and ore 
concentrates containing uranium or thorium.
The current radiation legislation is based on the 
Radiation Act and Decree, both of which are from 
1991 and take into account the ICRP Publication 
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60 (1990 Recommendations of the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection). Section 2, 
General principles, and Chapter 9, Radiation work, 
of the Act are applied to the use of nuclear energy.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act, the Council of 
State issued in 1991 the following regulations:
• General regulations for the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (395/1991)
• General regulations for Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Power Plants (396/1991)
• General regulations for Emergency Response 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(397/1991)
• General regulations for the Safety of a Disposal 
Facility for Reactor Waste (398/1991).
The Decisions 395/1991, 396/1991 and 397/1991 are 
applied to a nuclear power plant which is deﬁned to 
be a nuclear facility equipped with a nuclear reactor 
and intended for electricity generation, or if such 
or other nuclear facilities have been placed on the 
same site, the entity of facilities formed by them. 
The regulations are also applied to other nuclear 
facilities to the extent applicable. In 1999, a further 
Council of State Decision (478/1999) was issued to 
give the “Regulations for the Safety of Disposal of 
Spent Fuel”.
2.3.2 Provision of regulatory guidance
Detailed safety requirements are provided in YVL 
Guides. YVL Guides also provide administrative 
procedures for regulation of the use of nuclear en-
ergy. YVL Guides are issued by STUK, as stipulated 
in the Nuclear Energy Act. YVL Guides are rules 
an individual licensee or any other organisations 
concerned shall comply with, unless some other 
acceptable procedure or solution has been presented 
to STUK by which the safety level laid down in an 
YVL Guide is achieved. The procedure to apply new 
guides to existing nuclear facilities is such that the 
publication of an YVL guide does not, as such, alter 
any previous decisions made by STUK.
After having heard those concerned, STUK 
makes a separate decision on how a new or revised 
YVL guide applies to operating nuclear power 
plants, or to those under construction, and to licen-
see’s operational activities. To new nuclear facilities, 
however, the guides apply as such. 
Development in 2002–2004
• The earlier Amendment of Nuclear Energy Act 
has been set in force to implement the new 
additional protocols of the IAEA Safeguards 
Agreements under the International Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
for expanding the safeguards control.
• The Nuclear Energy Act was amended to es-
tablish The Nuclear Safety Research Fund. The 
objective of this Fund is to ensure the high level 
of national safety research and to maintain the 
national competence in the long run. A Fund 
for Nuclear Waste Safety Research was also 
established, respectively.
Some other minor amendments were also made in 
nuclear and radiation legislation to reﬂect changes 
of other legislation (labour safety, criminal code). 
Amendments in other national legislation have not 
caused essential changes to the regulatory control of 
NPPs nor to the safety requirements set for them.
As a result of the successful international 
negotiations to update the Paris and Brussels 
Conventions on Nuclear Liability also the Finnish 
Nuclear Liability Act has been under review by a 
special governmental committee. It is foreseen, that 
in near future the Act will be updated to reﬂect the 
modiﬁed conventions. Also setting an unlimited ﬁ-
nancial liability to licensees is under consideration. 
At the hierarchical level of regulations (e.g. Council 
of State Decisions) no changes are to be reported.
The regulatory guides prepared and issued by 
STUK are being continuously re-evaluated for up-
dating. After the Decision-in-principle was made in 
2002 for the new unit, STUK established a special 
plan to update the most relevant guides related 
to the design and construction of a new reactor. 
In 2002 10 new or revised guides were issued, in 
2003 12 guides were issued and in 2004, the same 
magnitude of over 10 revised guides are expected to 
be issued. Most of the planned YVL guide updates 
were issued during 2003 prior construction license 
application. The current list of regulations and 
regulatory guides is provided in Annex 1.
2.3.3 System of licensing
The licensing process is deﬁned in the legislation. 
The construction and operation of a nuclear facility 
is not allowed without a license. The licenses are 
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granted by the Council of State. The conditions for 
granting a license are prescribed in the Nuclear 
Energy Act. The Operating Licenses are granted for 
a limited period of time. This period has been at the 
beginning ﬁve years and then about ten years. The 
periodic re-licensing has allowed good opportunities 
for a comprehensive, periodic safety review. Current 
operating licenses of the Olkiluoto units are valid 
for about 20 years, but an intermediate safety as-
sessment is required as a condition of the licenses 
after 10 years.
Before a Construction License for a nuclear 
power plant, a nuclear waste disposal facility, or 
other signiﬁcant nuclear facility can be applied, 
a Decision-in-principle by the Council of State is 
needed. A condition for granting the Decision-in-
principle is that the operation of the facility in 
question is in line with the overall good for society. 
Further conditions are as follows:
• the municipality of the intended site of the 
nuclear facility is in favour of constructing the 
facility
• no factors indicate a lack of sufﬁcient prerequi-
sites for constructing the facility according to the 
Nuclear Energy Act: the use of nuclear energy 
shall be safe; it shall not cause injury to people, 
or damage to the environment or property.
The coming into force of the Decision-in-principle 
further requires that it will be conﬁrmed by the 
simple majority of the Parliament. The Parliament 
can not make any changes to the Decision, it can 
only approve it or to reject it as it is. The parties 
involved in the Decision-in-principle process and 
their tasks are described in Figure 2. This procedure 
was applied for the ﬁrst time during the period 
November 2000 – May 2002 when Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy applied a Decision-in-principle for the 
ﬁfth NPP unit in Finland and the Council of State 
approved it and the Parliament conﬁrmed the ap-
proval. This political process provided a thorough 
debate and review and the result was accepted as 
a democratic parliamentary decision. Since then 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has ﬁled an application 
for Construction License to the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry in January 2004 for a 4300 MWth 
PWR unit, Olkiluoto 3, to be located at the existing 
Olkiluoto NPP site.
For the Construction License application of 
Olkiluoto 3, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
asked STUK’s statement on safety by the end of 
2004, if possible. Construction License documents 
to be submitted to STUK for approval in this 
phase are deﬁned in Nuclear Energy Degree § 35. 
After receiving all statements for the Construction 
License application, the Council of State will make 
its decision.
Before loading fuel into the reactor, an Operating 
License has to be granted. For the Operating License 
application, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
asks STUK’s statement on safety. Operating License 
documents to be submitted to STUK for approval in 
this phase are deﬁned in Nuclear Energy Degree § 
36. After receiving all statements for the Operating 
License, the Council of State will make its deci-
sion.
Figure 2. Licensing of nuclear power plants in Finland.
PARLIAMENT
Acceptance/rejection of the decision in principle
of the Council of State
Information
GENERAL
PUBLIC Opinions COUNCIL OF STATE OTHER LOCAL AND
Statements STATE AUTHORITIES
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Acceptance/rejection AND INDUSTRY topics COMMITTEES
Information      of the application
Statement on safety
Application
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
APPLICANT STUK ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
Statement on
Regulatory safety
Control Experts’ opinions
VTT and other
expert bodies
Figure 1.  Licensing of nuclear power plants in Finland.
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2.3.4 System of regulatory 
inspection and assessment
The legislation also provides the regulatory control 
system for the use of nuclear energy. According to 
Nuclear Energy Act, STUK is responsible for the 
regulatory control of the safety of the use of nuclear 
energy. The rights and responsibilities of STUK are 
provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. Safety review 
and assessment as well as inspection activities are 
covered by the regulatory control.
The current periodic inspection programme 
of STUK for operating nuclear power plants was 
established in 1998 and consists of altogether 30 
separate inspections. This programme replaced the 
former programme that had been in place for about 
10 years. The current programme is focused on 
licensee main working processes and is considered 
to cover the most relevant areas of nuclear power 
plant safety. The new programme has three levels: 
safety management, main working processes and 
activities in different organisational and technical 
areas. The objective of the inspection process is to 
assess the safety level at the plants as well as the 
safety management. Possible problems at the plants 
and in procedures of the operating organisations 
are to be recognised. Special emphasis has been put 
on the management of the entire inspection pro-
gramme, including the timely conduct and accurate 
reporting of results. The experience of the current 
programme has been good. Some development areas 
such as enhancement of the longterm planning and 
reporting of the inspection programme were identi-
ﬁed during the IRRT mission 2003 and by self-as-
sessment. STUK is also developing Risk Informed 
Regulation practices. These include among others 
use of PSA for planning regulatory inspections to 
focus inspections on risk signiﬁcant areas. It also 
includes assessment of inspection ﬁndings by PSA.
In addition to the periodic inspection pro-
gramme, STUK conducts ad-hoc inspections if seen 
necessary. In the past, these have mainly related to 
operating event investigations (both domestic and 
international events), but also on the consequences 
of the development of science and technology.
Review of operational events by STUK is done 
basically at three different levels. First step is to 
perform a general review of all operational events, 
transients and reactor scram reports, which the 
licensees submit for information to STUK. The 
second level activities are related the clariﬁcation 
of events at site and entering of events’ speciﬁc data 
into the event register database of STUK. This is 
done for the events which meet the set criteria for 
the operator to submit a special report to STUK 
for approval. Numbers of operational events in 
different categories are followed by STUK’s plant 
performance indicator system. Risk signiﬁcance 
of operational events is followed by PSA based 
indicators. The ﬁnal step in operational event as-
sessment performed by STUK is to assign STUK’s 
own investigation team for events deemed to have 
special importance, especially when the licensee’s 
organisation has not operated as planned. It is also 
possible to nominate investigation team to investi-
gate a number of events together in order to look for 
possible generic issues associated with the events. 
In addition, investigations can be related to domes-
tic events and international events. These inspec-
tions are usually conducted by a leadership of the 
event investigation manager and an investigation 
team including 2–3 experts from STUK nominated 
on case-by-case basis. STUK has launched its own 
investigation once a year, on average.
In 2002, STUK investigated two events. At the 
beginning of 2002 STUK launched its own inves-
tigation team to address the course of events and 
the utility actions in connection with degradation 
of turbine control and fast shutdown valves at 
Olkiluoto 2. During this event the utility made also 
a temporary turbine protection system modiﬁcation 
at full power, which raised a concern by STUK. The 
investigation of the event was mainly targeted on 
the safety culture of the utility, including decision 
making and the relations and communication be-
tween different parts of the organisation. In October 
2002 STUK started its investigation to address the 
course of events and the utility procedures and 
actions in connection with neglected license applica-
tions for non-destructive testing organisations and 
their personnel, and non-compliances in approval 
applications for in service inspection programs as 
well as qualiﬁcation of inspection systems. In 2003, 
STUK did not start any new investigation into 
Loviisa or Olkiluoto plants.
2.3.5 Enforcement
The Nuclear Energy Act deﬁnes the enforcement 
system and rules for suspension, modiﬁcation or 
revocation of a licence. The enforcement system in-
cludes provisions for executive assistance if needed 
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and for sanctions in case the law is violated. The 
enforcement tools and procedures of regulators are 
considered to fully meet the needs. The repertoire of 
these tools together with some practical examples 
for implementing them has been presented in an 
internal policy document as part of STUK’s Quality 
System (2003).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 7.
2.4 Article 8. Regulatory body
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish 
or designate a regulatory body entrusted 
with the implementation of the legislative 
and regulatory framework referred to in 
Article 7, and provided with adequate 
authority, competence and ﬁnancial and 
human resources to fulﬁl its assigned 
responsibilities.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure an effective 
separation between the functions of the 
regulatory body and those of any other 
body or organization concerned with the 
promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the overall 
authority in the ﬁeld of nuclear energy is the re-
sponsibility of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
The Ministry prepares matters concerning nuclear 
energy to the Council of State for decision-making 
and, to some extent, grants import and export li-
cences for nuclear equipment and materials. Among 
other duties, the Ministry of Trade and Industry is 
responsible for the formulation of a national energy 
policy.
STUK is an independent governmental organi-
sation for the regulatory control of radiation and 
nuclear safety. No Ministry can take for its decision 
a matter that has been deﬁned by law to STUK. The 
current Act on STUK was given in 1983. According 
to the Decree on STUK, STUK has the following 
duties:
• regulatory control of safety of the use of nuclear 
energy, emergency preparedness, physical secu-
rity and nuclear materials
• regulatory control of the use of radiation and 
other radiation practices
• monitoring of the radiation situation in Finland, 
and maintaining of preparedness for abnormal 
radiation situations
• maintaining of national metrological standards 
in the ﬁeld
• research and development work for enhancing 
radiation and nuclear safety
• informing on radiation and nuclear safety issues, 
and participating in training activities in the 
ﬁeld
• producing expert services in the ﬁeld
• making proposals for developing the legislation 
in the ﬁeld, and issuing general guides concern-
ing radiation and nuclear safety
• participating in international co-operation in the 
ﬁeld, and taking care of international control, 
contact or reporting activities as enacted or 
deﬁned.
STUK is administratively under the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. Connections to ministries 
and governmental organisations are described 
in Figure 3. It is emphasised that the regula-
tory control of the safe use of nuclear energy is 
independently carried out by STUK. STUK has no 
responsibilities or duties which would be in conﬂict 
with regulatory control.
Figure 3. Co-operation / Interfaces between STUK and 
Ministries and other governmental organisations.
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Figure 2.  Co-op r tion between STUK and Ministries
and other governmental organisations
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STUK has the legal authority to carry out 
regulatory control. The responsibilities and rights 
of STUK, as regards the regulation of the use of 
nuclear energy, are provided in the Nuclear Energy 
Act. They cover the safety review and assessment 
of licence applications, and the regulatory control of 
the construction and operation of a nuclear facility. 
The regulatory control of nuclear power plants is 
described in detail in Guide YVL 1.1. STUK has 
e.g. legal rights to require modiﬁcations to nuclear 
power plants, to limit the power of plants and to 
require shutdown of plants when necessary for 
safety reasons.
STUK does not grant any construction or op-
erating licences for nuclear facilities. However, in 
practice no such licence would be issued without 
STUK’s statement where the fulﬁlment of the safety 
regulations is conﬁrmed.
STUK has adequate resources to fulﬁl its respon-
sibilities. About 80 professionals are working in the 
ﬁeld of nuclear safety. The expertise of STUK covers 
all the essential areas needed in the safety control 
of the use of nuclear energy. New personnel have 
been recruited during 2003 and 2004 for the review 
and assessment of the construction license applica-
tion of the new power plant unit Olkiluoto 3. First 
batch of the licensing documentation was submitted 
to STUK at the beginning of the year 2004.
Most of the professional staff of STUK conduct-
ing safety assessments and inspections has a degree 
of university level. During the years 2002 and 
2003 a competence analysis was made at STUK. 
This analysis is used as the basis for the training 
programmes. Preparedness and competence relat-
ing speciﬁcally to the new nuclear power plant in 
planning were developed. With this in mind STUK 
participated in the preparation and execution of 
a basic professional training course on nuclear 
safety with other organisations in the ﬁeld. The 
6-week course commenced in September 2003 and 
continued in 2004. About 50 junior experts and new 
comers in the nuclear ﬁeld from various organisa-
tions participated, eleven of which were from STUK. 
STUK has close connections with foreign regulatory 
bodies for exchanging information on important 
safety issues. The average experience of the staff is 
about 15 years in the nuclear ﬁeld.
The organisational structure and the responsi-
bilities within STUK are provided in the Quality 
Manuals of STUK. Also procedures for regulatory 
control and other activities of STUK are presented 
in the Manuals. The organisation of STUK is de-
scribed in the Figure 4.
STUK receives the main part of its ﬁnancial 
resources through the government budget. The 
costs of regulatory control are charged in full to 
the licensees. In the area of regulatory control, the 
strategy of ﬁnancing the work has been changed to 
Figure 4. Organisation of STUK. Numbers indicate the number of staff in the organizational unit.
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so call net-budgeting model. This means that the 
licensees pay the regulatory control fees directly 
to STUK. This approach to ﬁnance governmental 
regulatory activities became a common practice 
in Finland in the 1990’s. The change was carefully 
analysed and discussed among the parties involved. 
The conclusion was that considering the long 
traditions and stability of the amount of regulatory 
control no concern of loosing the required objectivity 
was foreseen. Also it was clearly recognised that 
the amounts charged would continuously be under 
the control of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health. Annually beforehand, tentative maximum 
amount of budget is authorized by the Ministry in 
the Result Agreement. The change in the ﬁnanc-
ing procedure has not changed the actual costs of 
regulatory control activities.
The annual report on the regulatory control of 
nuclear safety for 2003 is attached to this document, 
Reference 3. In 2003, the costs of the regulatory 
control of nuclear safety subject to a charge were 
7.2 M€. The total costs of nuclear safety regulation 
were 8.7 M€. Thus the share of activities subject to 
a charge was 83%.
An Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety has 
been established by a decree. This Committee gives 
advice to STUK on important safety issues and 
regulations. In addition, an Advisory Committee on 
Radiation Safety has been established for advising 
the Ministry for Health and Social Affairs. The 
members of these Committees are nominated by 
the Council of State.
The main technical support organisation of 
STUK is the Technical Research Centre of Finland 
(VTT). At VTT, about 200 experts are working in 
the ﬁeld of nuclear energy. There are research 
programmes related to the safety of nuclear power 
plants and waste management. The total volume of 
the research in this area in the year 2003 was 16 
M€. New funds have been established to ﬁnance the 
national research programmes on operational safety 
of nuclear power plants and nuclear waste manage-
ment. Also the Geological Survey (GTK) of Finland 
and University of Helsinki are important technical 
support organizations in the ﬁeld of nuclear waste 
research and, respectively, Lappeenranta University, 
in the ﬁeld of nuclear research.
The Nuclear Energy Act has been changed at 
the beginning of the year 2004 to ensure fund-
ing for a long term nuclear safety and nuclear 
waste management research in Finland. Money 
is collected annually from the licence holders to a 
special fund devoted to this purpose. The amount of 
money is proportional to the thermal power of the 
licensed plant or the thermal power presented in 
the Decision-in-principle. For the waste research, 
the payments are proportional to the payments 
to the Nuclear Waste Fund. The research projects 
are selected so that they support and develop the 
competences in nuclear safety. The key topics of the 
recent research program (SAFIR) are the behaviour 
of the reactor, the properties of the containment and 
the ageing management of the nuclear power plant. 
There are also research projects in the ﬁeld of the 
assessment of the safety culture of an organization. 
The amount of money collected in year 2004 has 
been 2.7 M€ for nuclear safety research. Similarly a 
national research programme in the area of nuclear 
waste management (KYT) to support the authorities 
is underway. The annual volume of KYT programme 
is 1.0 M€. The research projects have also additional 
funding from other sources. STUK participates to 
the steering of the programmes.
In addition to above mentioned research STUK 
ﬁnance independent analysis made by VTT or 
other technical support organizations related to 
ongoing licensing projects. The independence of 
STUK’s technical support has been evaluated in 
2000. The evaluation included quality audits to 
the ﬁve research units of the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland, VTT, the main technical support 
organisation of STUK. The audits were performed 
by Qualitas Fennica Ltd. The audits concentrated 
on activities and work processes that are essential 
to nuclear safety and safety related research. 
Independence problems were not discovered in 
these audits. On the other hand, one essential ele-
ment in this respect is STUK’s in-house expertise 
providing independence when drawing conclusions 
from research results. However, based on the audit 
results, the quality systems of these research units 
have been further enhanced taking into account 
STUK’s point of view concerning the required 
independence from utility driven research projects. 
Two follow-up audits conducted in October 2001. A 
similar quality audit carried out at the Geological 
Survey of Finland, GTK, at the end of 2001. This 
means that all main support organisations of STUK 
have been evaluated.
In addition to the government review of regula-
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tory activities, there have been independent regula-
tory reviews conducted by International Atomic 
Energy Agency, IAEA. IAEA IRRT’s (International 
Regulatory Review Team) have visited STUK 
providing full-scope IRRT mission in 2000 and 
IRRT Follow-up Mission in September 2003. The 
Review Team established that the majority of 
recommendations it had given in 2000 had lead to 
improved operations. The Team gave STUK two 
more recommendations and some proposals to con-
sider whether certain matters could be taken care 
of better, using the alternative method proposed. 
The team identiﬁed also some procedures worth 
pointing out to other authorities. STUK has found 
IAEA IRRT mission as an fruitful tool in developing 
its own functions.
STUK’s public communication is proactive, 
open, timely and understandable. Communication 
is a privilege and duty of all employees. Good 
cooperation with the media is emphasized in all 
communication. The general public and media can 
reach STUK’s experts any time, including nights, 
weekends and holidays. A prerequisite for success-
ful communication is that STUK is known among 
media and general public and the information given 
by STUK is regarded as truthful. Communication 
is always based on best available information. 
Even sensitive matters are openly communicated. 
STUK’s web page is an important tool in communi-
cation. It is very important that the web pages are 
professionally edited and updated regularly. The 
information on web pages must be easy to ﬁnd and 
understandable. Internal communication provides 
the personnel information about STUK’s activities 
and supports its capability in participating in the 
external communication.
STUK participates actively European and inter-
national co-operation in the ﬁeld of nuclear and radi-
ation safety. STUK directors have memberships and 
chairmanships in the OECD / NEA, IAEA and IRPA. 
STUK experts participate actively in the working 
groups of these organisations. STUK also partici-
pates in the work of European Commission through 
Atomic Questions Group, NRWG, CONCERT and 
RAMG-related PHARE- and TACIS- programmes, 
EBRD as well as through European regulators’ 
association WENRA. In addition, there are regu-
latory co-operation through Nordic co-operation 
programmes and VVER Regulators Forum. STUK 
also co-operates actively with Russian FNRA, Kola 
and Leningrad NPP’s concerning nuclear safety 
close to the Finnish borders. Finnish government 
ﬁnances this co-operation.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 8.
2.5 Article 9. Responsibility 
of the licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that 
prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear 
installation rests with the holder of the rel-
evant licence and shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that each such licence holder 
meets its responsibility.
The responsibility for the safety rests with the 
licensee as manifested in the Nuclear Energy Act 
according to which each licensee is responsible for 
the safety of his use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, 
the licensee is responsible for such physical protec-
tion and emergency preparedness arrangements 
and other necessary arrangements for limitation 
of nuclear damages, which do not belong to the au-
thorities. The licensee, whose operations generates 
or has generated nuclear waste, is responsible for all 
nuclear waste management measures and their ap-
propriate preparation. The licensee is furthermore 
responsible for depositing in advance for the costs 
of nuclear waste management in a special nuclear 
waste fund being operated under the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to 
verify that the licensees fulﬁl the regulations. This 
veriﬁcation is carried out through safety review and 
assessment as well as inspection programmes estab-
lished by STUK. In its activities, STUK emphasizes 
the commitment to the strong safety culture.
The ﬁnancial provisions to cover the possible 
harms of a nuclear accident have been arranged 
according to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. 
Finland has supported the international efforts 
to revise the Paris and Brussels Conventions for 
Nuclear Third Party Liability in order to raise the 
funds made available by the Contract Parties in 
case of accidents. Accordingly, the Finnish Nuclear 
Third Party Liability Act is currently under revision 
process.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 9.
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2.6 Article 10. Priority to safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that all organiza-
tions engaged in activities directly related to 
nuclear installations shall establish policies 
that give due priority to nuclear safety.
2.6.1 Regulatory approach to safety culture
Safety is emphasised in the general principles of 
the Nuclear Energy Act: the use of nuclear energy 
shall be safe; it shall not cause injury to people, or 
damage to the environment or property. Decision 
395/1991 provides that, an advanced safety culture 
shall be maintained when designing, constructing 
and operating a nuclear power plant. It shall be 
based on the safety emphasising attitude of the 
management of the organisation in question, and 
on motivation of the personnel for responsible work. 
This presupposes well organised working conditions 
and an open working atmosphere as well as the 
encouragement of alertness and initiative in order 
to detect and eliminate factors which endanger 
safety.
Safety is also emphasised in the Quality Manuals 
of STUK as well as in the framework contract be-
tween STUK and its technical support organisation 
VTT. STUK has updated its own Quality Policy in 
1999. The Quality Policy includes also STUK’s val-
ues that are engaged to every day work giving the 
highest priority to the prevention and mitigation of 
the harmful effects of radiation. STUK has taken 
an active role in this area and both developed its 
own culture and taken the initiative in the assess-
ment and development of the culture of the utility 
organisations. STUK has indicators in its indicator 
system to detect the development in plant safety.
Safety culture has also been an essential topic 
in STUK’s continuous interaction with the power 
plants. The top level inspection of the periodic 
inspection programme, called “Safety Management”, 
includes an assessment of safety culture issues 
and quality management. In addition, STUK has 
emphasised that the strengths and shortcomings 
of safety culture are determined in quality assur-
ance audits and event analyses. Findings related 
to safety culture from different inspections are 
analysed in STUK and discussed in a yearly meet-
ing between the senior managers of the nuclear 
power plant and the regulatory body. Attention has 
been paid to safety culture in the operation and 
maintenance of Finnish nuclear power plants. At 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants, 
actions have been taken to emphasise a high level 
of safety culture, and to further develop it. E.g. the 
rate of annual investment (Figures 5 and 6) shows 
a trend towards safety.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, a responsi-
ble director approved by STUK has to be appointed 
for the construction and operation of a nuclear 
power plant. The responsible director has a duty 
to see that the provisions of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the rules and regulations issued by virtue of it 
and the licence conditions concerning the safe use 
of nuclear energy, the arrangements for physical 
protection and emergencies and the safeguards 
control are complied with. The responsible director 
shall have real possibilities to take effectively care 
of this duty.
Organisational units for safety exist at the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. These units are 
independent of those units which are directly re-
sponsible for the operation of the plants. In addition, 
independent advisory bodies for safety issues have 
been established by both licensees. The licensees 
have also established written quality and safety 
policies.
2.6.2 Priority to safety at the Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa plant is headed by a General Manager 
(responsible director). The operating organisa-
tion is comprised of four units: Operation, Safety, 
Technology and Maintenance Units. The operating 
organisation is supported by the Nuclear Safety 
Committee of the Loviisa plant. Its members are 
experts in different ﬁelds. The majority of the 
members work at the headquarters of Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy. In addition, other organisation 
units of Fortum outside the plant also participate 
in the evaluation of safety and in the technical sup-
port to the plant. The duties, responsibilities and 
authorities of the various units of the plant operat-
ing organisation and of Fortum’s internal support 
organisation are presented in the Administrative 
Rules and Organisational Manual of the Loviisa 
plant.
The Loviisa plant and Fortum Nuclear Services, 
its supporting organisation, have made a co-opera-
tion agreement that is annually updated. One aim 
of the agreement is to assure that all the know-how 
within Fortum Group is utilised in connection with 
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the design of the plant modiﬁcations, as well as to 
the utilisation of modiﬁcation work experiences for 
the development of activities.
The minimum stafﬁng of the main control room 
and the plant site is presented in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations of the Loviisa plant. According to the 
plant duty system a person outside the shifts is con-
tinuously reachable for the control room staff. The 
person has the highest level operator competence 
(the level of shift supervisor). The system is aimed 
to ensure safety, when operator actions are made 
during emergency situations.
In addition to the normal operating organisation, 
an emergency preparedness organisation has been 
deﬁned to the plant for accident situations. The 
emergency preparedness organisation has been de-
scribed in the Emergency Plan. The activities of the 
emergency organisation are trained during annual 
emergency exercises. A security organisation has 
been deﬁned to the plant in the Security Plan. This 
organisation is responsible for the planning and 
maintaining of physical protection arrangements.
Developing safety culture
Fortum has a long tradition in power production. 
That has inﬂuenced on the development of the 
company’s organisational culture and reﬂected 
positively to the design, construction and operation 
of the Loviisa plant. A factor that has inﬂuenced 
on the development of safety culture at the Loviisa 
plant has been the inadequacy of operation proce-
dures received from the plant supplier. It caused a 
need to put effort in the design of the plant and to 
develop the functions of the operating organisation. 
This development process has given to the plant 
and the whole Fortum a strong expertise in several 
issues.
In the 1990’s Fortum internationalised in a 
strong way and with the acquisitions and incorpora-
tion Fortum has become a Group organisation. In 
the Group it has been considered appropriate that 
each independent company or unit develops its 
organisational culture from its own starting points, 
taking into account the principles of the Group man-
agement on common visions and values. It has been 
evaluated in Fortum that the attitude in the Group 
on the continuous development of activities gives 
a solid frame for maintaining an advanced safety 
culture in the operation of the Loviisa plant.
The concept of the advanced safety culture was 
added in the Administrative Rules of the Loviisa 
plant in 1991. The quality policy of the plant written 
in 1996 brings up the meaning of safety expressing 
good safety culture. Present quality and safety poli-
cies for Fortum’s nuclear power operations and for 
the plant address developed safety culture. Several 
measures have been implemented at the Loviisa 
plant for maintaining and developing safety culture. 
Related to this Fortum carried out a self-evaluation 
in 1994 using an interview method based on the 
IAEA-guidance. During the preparation of the ap-
plication for the operating licence the state of safety 
culture was evaluated using mainly the IAEA-guid-
ance as a point of comparison. Based on the evalu-
ation the procedures for maintaining safety and 
availability have been noted to be comprehensive 
and relatively well operative.
In the evaluation many good characteristics of 
safety culture were noted. Respectively, the most 
important areas have been identiﬁed, to which the 
development measures should be focused in the 
future for the continuous development of safety 
culture. By nature these issues are related to the 
activities of organisations and people. In 2002 safety 
culture in Loviisa Power Plant was observed during 
WANO Peer Review.
2.6.3 Priority to safety at the Olkiluoto NPP
TVO is headed by the President and CEO with 
the assistance of the Management Group. In ad-
dition to the President and CEO, the following 
members belong to the Management Group: Senior 
Vice President, Operation; Senior Vice President, 
Nuclear Engineering; Senior Vice President, Power 
Plant Engineering; Senior Vice President, Project; 
Executive Vice President, Corporate Resources; 
Senior Vice President, Finance and Senior Vice 
President, Corporate Social Responsibility. The 
activities of the company are divided into areas of 
responsibility that belong to the aforementioned 
directors. TVO has a Safety Committee that is 
composed of experts from different technical areas. 
The tasks, responsibilities and duties of units are 
clariﬁed in the TVO Administrative Rules and in 
the Organisational Manual. The Administrative 
Rules have been approved by STUK as a part of the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
The minimum crew required for the main control 
room and the plant area has been presented in 
the Administrative Rules of the Olkiluoto plant. 
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According to the duty system of the plant a person 
of the Shift Supervisor level has to be reachable for 
the control room personnel at all times, for a case of 
possible special situations at the plant.
In addition to the operating organisation, an 
emergency preparedness organisation has been 
deﬁned for the plant to prepare for accident situa-
tions. The emergency preparedness organisation is 
described in the Emergency Plan and its operation 
is exercised annually in emergency drills. To design 
and maintain security arrangements, a security 
organisation of the plant is deﬁned in the Security 
Plan.
Developing safety culture
An in-depth safety approach is essential for ensur-
ing the safety of a nuclear power plant. It means 
that malfunctions must be anticipated and the 
preparation for them must be in the form of multiple 
safety systems which are able, if necessary, to stop a 
power plant unit and prevent the malfunction from 
spreading. Safety measures are always planned 
on a conservative assumption that equipment 
malfunctions can occur and people operating them 
can make errors. On the basis of analysing such 
situations, the plant is equipped with appropriate 
and adequate safety systems. The plant has several 
parallel systems that ensure its reliability.
In accordance with the safety culture, a nuclear 
power plant also contains a number of structural 
protective zones within each other. In order to 
achieve operational reliability, different systems 
are built so that they can operate normally with an 
ample margin of safety in every situation. Reporting 
of errors, nonconformities, deﬁciencies and “near 
misses” is the basis of TVO’s safety culture. The 
reports are analysed and the analyses form the 
basis for corrective measures. All observations 
are discussed in an open manner so that as much 
as possible can be learned from them and the 
reoccurrence of any similar nonconformities can be 
prevented. In the planning of preventive measures 
probability based safety and reliability models, 
operational experience, “near-misses” and the result 
of “early warning” questionnaires are used.
TVO was originally founded as a nuclear power 
company. Its corporate culture was developed from 
approaches that have been available since the 
beginning of 1970’s for producing nuclear energy in 
a manner that emphasises safety factors. The tech-
nical personnel who was employed to the company 
immediately after its foundation and who has since 
then had a crucial role in developing the company, 
received its education and prior work experience 
within the area of nuclear technology. This back-
ground has signiﬁcantly promoted the emphasis on 
safety issues in all of their actions.
Asea-Atom AB (later on ABB AB), the supplier 
of the plant, had also a favourable impact on the 
improvement of the TVO’s safety culture. The 
responsibility for practical safety solutions in the 
development of nuclear technology, was clearly left 
to the industry in Sweden, and safety authorities 
set forth only general requirements. Asea-Atom 
AB acknowledged its responsibility for the safety, 
and developed many solutions that were later 
adopted in other countries as well. TVO received 
all essential approaches needed for safe operation 
of the plant from its plant suppliers and developed 
them further.
In 1995, TVO drew up a safety and quality 
policy document signed by the Managing Director. 
The document contains the principles of safe and 
high quality performance as well as the principles 
of the good safety culture. In the policy document 
the company management commits to create the 
means for maintaining and developing a high qual-
ity safety culture.
TVO and its personnel have committed them-
selves to a high level of safety culture. Each matter 
is given the treatment and attention its importance 
deserves. Each matter is considered on the basis of 
its safety impact and safety is always given prior-
ity when decisions are made. If there is a conﬂict 
between safety and economic considerations, TVO 
always gives priority to safety.
TVO has conducted several measures to main-
tain and develop its safety culture. Related to this, 
the safety culture was self-assessed by the company 
management in 1992. Review was based on the 
principles and questions presented in the INSAG 
4 Report. Review concluded that TVO’s measures 
are well in-line with the measures and character-
istic features, deﬁned in the INSAG 4 Report, of a 
company that has a high level safety culture. TVO 
also assessed the results of the two comprehensive 
Swedish safety culture reviews in 1995 from the 
standpoint of its own actions. Several ﬁndings 
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requiring development actions were made on the 
basis of the reviews, but no new signiﬁcant issues 
surfaced.
TVO conducted an internal review of its actions 
during the year 1996 and the beginning of the 
year 1997 by using the objectives and criteria pre-
sented by the WANO (World Association of Nuclear 
Operators). In connection with the review, several 
issues requiring improvements were found. WANO 
conducted a Peer Review In Olkiluoto in the 1999 
and a Follow-up in the 2001. 
Currently, in order to maintain a high safety cul-
ture and good operational results, TVO has decided 
to make a self-assessment of the safety culture to 
start up a programme for enhancing safety culture 
and safety management. The self-assessment and 
the enhance programme will be conducted with the 
help of IAEA. Training for the self-assessment was 
carried out in June 2004.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 10.
2.7 Article 11. Financial 
and human resources
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that adequate 
ﬁnancial resources are available to 
support the safety of each nuclear 
installation throughout its life.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take 
the appropriate steps to ensure that 
sufﬁcient numbers of qualiﬁed staff with 
appropriate education, training and 
retraining are available for all safety-
related activities in or for each nuclear 
installation, throughout its life.
2.7.1 Financial resources
Nuclear Energy Act deﬁnes as a condition for 
granting a Construction or Operating Licence that 
the applicant has sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources, 
necessary expertise and, in particular, that the 
operating organisation and the competence of the 
operating staff are appropriate. Decision 395/1991 
requires initial, complementary and refresher train-
ing programmes for the personnel. STUK controls 
the necessary qualiﬁcations on the persons engaged 
in activities important to safety. STUK has issued 
requirements on staff qualiﬁcation and described 
the respective regulatory control procedures in the 
Guides YVL 1.1, YVL 1.6 and YVL 1.7.
For example according to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the licensee shall have adequate ﬁnancial 
resources to enhance the safety of the facility 
based on operating experience and the results of 
safety research as well as on the advancement of 
science and technology. Nuclear Energy Act provides 
detailed regulations for the ﬁnancial arrangements 
for taking care of nuclear waste management. The 
Act on Third Party Liability provides regulations 
on ﬁnancial arrangements for nuclear accidents, 
taking into account that Finland is a party to the 
Paris and Brussels conventions.
The annual reports of Fortum Corporation and 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy for 2003 are attached to 
this document, References 5 and 6. They provide 
ﬁnancial information on the utilities. Both utilities 
have annually invested typically about 10–20 M€ 
for maintaining and improving safety. Figures 5 
and 6 provide information on plant annual rate 
of investments. The costs of large modernisation 
programmes at both nuclear power plants during 
1996–2003 can be seen in these ﬁgures.
Figure 5. The annual rate of investments at Olkiluoto.
Figure 6. The annual rate of investments at Loviisa.
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2.7.2 Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for ensur-
ing that his employees are qualiﬁed and authorised 
to their jobs. Both Finnish power companies have 
training organizations and training facilities at 
NPP sites with the training staff round ten persons 
and full-scope plant-speciﬁc training simulators. 
Training programmes, including simulator training, 
are further discussed in this report.
Both utilities have a systematic approach to 
training. However, changes in energy markets and 
the fast development of technology will bring new 
challenges to the knowledge, and this requires spe-
cial emphasis of all parties. During 2003–2005 two 
ﬁve–six weeks training courses on nuclear safety 
technology are provided to train newcomers in the 
nuclear ﬁeld as a speciﬁc co-operation of all nuclear 
related organizations. About 90 young experts and 
new comers are trained during the courses. The 
intention is to continue with the training course on 
annual basis as long as there are enough partici-
pants who need the training. Training materials are 
developed that can be used by the organizations in 
their internal training programmes as appropriate 
and for self-study via distance learning including 
text book, overhead materials, exercises and video 
lectures.
Certain persons, such as the responsible director 
and his deputies, shift supervisors and control room 
operators of the plant, persons taking care of physi-
cal protection, emergency preparedness and nuclear 
material control need an authorization from STUK 
for their tasks. The authorization of plant operators 
is valid for three years at a time. The renewal of the 
authorization requires e.g. that the person in ques-
tion has worked continuously in the control room, 
has taken part in the refresher-training program 
and in demonstration of shift work skill as well as 
an oral examination.
STUK also approves the persons, who control 
the operation of the plant pressure vessels. Only 
companies approved by STUK and persons working 
for them may conduct repairs of pressure bearing 
structures and inspections of mechanical compo-
nents and structures.
In spring 2000, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry set up a working group to analyse the 
contents and scope of the know-how required to 
continue the safe operation of nuclear power plants. 
The task of the group was to identify the measures 
needed to compensate the retirement of many 
experts and train new experts. The age distribution 
of personnel working in organisations in the nu-
clear energy sector indicates that the need for new 
experts will increase two- or even three-fold round 
2010 due to retirement. The current training capac-
ity of universities is adequate to meet this need.
In addition to nuclear power plants, it is im-
portant to take care of the ﬁnancial and human 
resources of technical support organizations such 
as research institutions and universities. In this 
respect, the new funding arrangement for nuclear 
research (see section 2.3.2) is an important prereq-
uisite and this item needs further attention also in 
the future.
Loviisa NPP personnel training
The principles and organisation of the training 
activities of the Loviisa plant as well as detailed 
training instructions have been presented in the 
Training Manual. It has been established to en-
sure the systematic implementation of training 
activities. The training and simulator groups take 
care of training activities at the plant. The total 
manpower is 11 persons. For assisting the training 
group, organisation unit-speciﬁc contact persons 
have been appointed. They ensure that unit- and 
individual-speciﬁc needs are taken into account and 
that information is transferred to both directions. 
The competence requirements of the personnel are 
presented in the Training Manual. The competence 
requirements are based on the duties of each 
vacancy, on responsibility areas and on regulatory 
requirements related to the duties in question. The 
competence requirements deﬁne the basic education 
of a person and the initial and refresher training to 
be given at the Loviisa plant.
A full-scope training simulator identical with 
the plant is available for the training of the plant 
operators. Simulator training is given to new 
operator candidates during about 50 days as a part 
of the initial training. In addition to the simulator 
training, the initial training programme of the op-
erators includes course-oriented classroom lectures 
and practical training at the plant and in the main 
control room. The initial training takes about two 
and a half years. Thereafter an operator can be 
licensed to work as a turbine or reactor operator. 
At the end of the training period a written and 
oral examinations as well as the demonstration of 
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professional skills at the simulator are arranged for 
the operators. These are preconditions for the work 
as an operator or a shift supervisor in the main 
control room of the plant.
For the operators of the plant a refresher training 
programme has been established. It is implemented 
in the periods of three years. The programme 
includes those subjects which shall be annually 
gone through. In addition, the refresher training of 
the operators includes annually simulator training 
during two weeks, covering normal operational 
situations (e.g. start-up and shutdown situations) 
and plenty of training for disturbance situations. 
Refresher training is arranged for the plant opera-
tors during three weeks a year on average.
To ensure that all the expertise available within 
Fortum Group is utilised in dealing with extensive 
and/or many-sided principled safety issues the 
Loviisa plant and Fortum Nuclear Services have 
signed a co-operation agreement. In the agreement 
those expertise areas are identiﬁed within which 
it is the responsibility of Fortum Nuclear Services 
inside Fortum Group to educate and maintain 
sufﬁcient number of experts to support the Loviisa 
plant operation.
Olkiluoto NPP personnel training
The principles and organisation of TVO’s training 
activities as well as detailed training procedures 
are presented in the training manual, by the means 
of which a systematic implementation of the train-
ing is ensured. The training in the company has 
been organised so, that in addition to the existing 
seventeen persons in the training centre there are 
training contact persons at both units in operation 
and also in the project organization of the third unit 
in Olkiluoto. In addition to this, there are several 
committees that survey and handle the training 
needs of e.g. operation and maintenance as well as 
of the entire company and monitor training results. 
External or internal experts give major part of 
the general training and the training centre staffs 
gives only minor part. The training centre staffs, in-
stead, gives all simulator training. An organisation 
model like this makes it possible to take unit and 
individual related training needs into account in 
an efﬁcient manner. The training manual presents 
vacancy related competence requirements that have 
been deﬁned for the personnel. The competence 
requirements are based on the tasks, areas of 
responsibility relating to the vacancies in question, 
and the related regulations of the regulatory au-
thority. Person’s basic education and the basic and 
refresher training given by the TVO are deﬁned in 
the qualiﬁcation requirements.
A training simulator, is available for the training 
of plant operators of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 at power 
plant site. The number of operating training days to 
new operator candidates is approximately 50 days 
as a part of the basic education. In addition to the 
simulator training, the basic training program of 
operators includes classroom and on-the-job train-
ing at the plant and in the main control room. The 
basic training takes approximately 18 months, after 
which the operator is allowed to work as a turbine 
operator. After working as a turbine operator and 
gaining more experience, the turbine operator is 
given more individual training by e.g. the simulator 
for the duties of a reactor operator. In the end of the 
training period, a written and oral examinations as 
well as a demonstration of operating skills at the 
training simulator are required before a person is 
allowed to start working as an operator or as a shift 
supervisor in the main control room of the nuclear 
power plant.
A refresher-training program, which is con-
ducted in a three-year period, is available for the 
plant operators. The program includes the subjects 
that shall be repeated annually. Furthermore, the 
refresher training of operators includes annually 
two weeks of operating training at the simulator 
containing a considerable amount of transient situ-
ation training in addition to the training of normal 
operating conditions (e.g. start-ups and shutdowns). 
The plant operators receive approximately three 
weeks of refresher training annually.
Initial training of personnel of the new NPP 
unit Olkiluoto 3, which will be given during the 
construction and commissioning phases, will cover 
all staff members who are directly involved in plant 
operation, plant and systems maintenance, tech-
nical support and in power plant management. 
The training courses are comprised of theoretical 
courses such as fundamental plant technology, 
survey and plant courses. The training will also in-
clude practical training such as on-the-job training 
in factories and operating power plants as well as 
active hands-on training during the commissioning 
phase of the power plant. Olkiluoto 3 will also be 
equipped with a plant speciﬁc training simulator. 
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Shift supervisors and control room operators will 
have a training period at the simulator, starting 
one year before the ﬁrst fuel loading and ending 
with the licensing examination just before the fuel 
loading, which has been planned to take place in 
August 2008. The length of the simulator training 
course is 10 weeks. During the operational period 
of Olkiluoto 3, the training and the refresher train-
ing of the personnel will be incorporated into the 
existing complementary and refresher training 
programmes of TVO.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 11.
2.8 Article 12. Human factors
Each Contracting party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that the capabilities and 
limitations of human performance are taken 
into account throughout the life of a nuclear 
installation.
2.8.1 Regulatory approach to human factors
Decision 395/1991 requires that a nuclear power 
plant’s control rooms shall contain equipment which 
provide information about the plant’s operational 
state and any deviations from normal operation 
as well as systems which monitor the state of the 
plant’s safety systems during operation and their 
functioning during operational transients and 
accidents. A nuclear power plant shall contain 
automatic systems that maintain the plant in a safe 
state during transients and accidents long enough 
to provide the operators a sufﬁcient time to consider 
and implement the correct actions. There shall be 
an emergency control post at a nuclear power plant 
which is independent of the control room and the 
necessary local control systems by the means of 
which the nuclear reactor can be shut down and 
cooled and residual heat from the nuclear reactor 
and spent fuel stored at the plant can be removed.
Decision 395/1991 requires that special attention 
shall be paid to the avoidance, detection and repair 
of human errors. The possibility of human errors 
shall be taken into account both in the design of 
the nuclear power plant and in the planning of its 
operation so that the plant withstands well errors 
and deviations from planned operational actions. 
Human factors have also to be taken into account 
in the failure analyses of plant safety systems and 
in probabilistic safety analyses. Such analyses 
have been completed for all Finnish nuclear power 
plants.
As regards the operation of the facility, the inﬂu-
ence of human factors and the respective need for 
corrective measures are assessed by the licensees 
and STUK, when evaluating abnormal events and 
their lessons learnt. Each operating organisation 
has established a systematic procedure for making 
event evaluations. Figures 7 and 8 show the share 
of technical and human related causes for the lat-
est incidents at the Finnish nuclear power plants. 
During 2003, Loviisa NPP reported 6 events from 
which 3 contained human root causes and Olkiluoto 
NPP reported 17 events from which 8 contained 
Figure 7. Number of technical and / or human root causes identiﬁed in the event analyses at the Loviisa NPP.
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human root causes. In two events in Olkiluoto NPP 
there were both technical and human root causes. 
(See Chapter 2.15.6)
Human resources and quality assurance are 
discussed under Articles 11 and 13, respectively.
2.8.2 Monitoring and control of 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant
The Loviisa 1 and 2 units have their own independ-
ent main control rooms. There are available the 
needed process information and all the needed 
control actions can be performed there. Alarm 
signals from the spent fuel storages are also avail-
able in the Loviisa 2 main control room. As regards 
their implementation, the main control rooms are 
of proven control room technology.
Process information is presented in the main 
control room with indicating meters, indicator lights 
and recorders as well as with the monitors of the 
process computer system. There are two redundant 
alarm systems in the main control room. These 
systems have been realised by using two different 
techniques, conventional and computer-based tech-
niques. Indicator light ﬁelds are in the operator’s 
consoles, and two monitors have been reserved for 
computer alarms. In addition, data on events and 
conditions as well as the exceeding of warning and 
alarm limits are recorded by the alarm printers. The 
process computer gives process information in an 
illustrative format for the use of the operators.
In addition to the main control room, the 
shutdown of the reactor as well as the control and 
monitoring actions necessary for safety can be per-
formed by means of a so-called emergency control 
room table, located in the main control room of the 
other unit.
In addition to the main control room, the ad-
ditional control rooms are located in the both 
auxiliary buildings for controlling the functioning of 
important auxiliary processes. Furthermore, there 
are the unit-speciﬁc ventilation control rooms and 
the diesel-speciﬁc local control posts at the plant. 
The alarm signals from all auxiliary control rooms 
are available in a combined format in the main 
control rooms.
The Loviisa 1 and 2 protection systems have 
been designed so that quick operator actions are not 
required for the start-up of the safety systems dur-
ing transient or accident situations. Possibilities of 
human errors are effectively reduced by a sufﬁcient 
consideration time available to the operators before 
control or other actions, by appropriate instructions 
for transient and emergency situations as well as 
by operator training. The process computer has 
been equipped with a so-called critical safety func-
tions control system (SPDS), by means of which 
an operator can follow the performance of all the 
safety functions in a combined and clear format. An 
identiﬁcation system for transient situations is also 
related to the control of the critical safety functions. 
An operator may use it as a support when a situa-
tion is being identiﬁed.
The renewal of plant automation is in prepara-
tory stage and will be discussed under Article 18.
Figure 8. Number of technical and / or human root causes identiﬁed in the event analysis at the Olkiluoto NPP.
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Human factors
Human errors can not be entirely avoided. However, 
the possibility of errors can be made smaller with 
proper instructions, procedures, and training and 
efﬁcient quality assurance. For identifying hu-
man error possibilities and for clarifying their 
consequences Fortum has prepared an extensive 
evaluation concerning these issues. This evaluation 
is a part of the probabilistic safety analysis. For 
analysing hidden defects inﬂuencing the course of 
a possible transient or accident, Fortum has evalu-
ated regularly performed duties of different types at 
the plant. In the analysis concerning human errors 
such operational and maintenance mistakes have 
been evaluated which may act as an initiating event 
of a transient or an accident. Different plant states 
and duties related to them have been evaluated in 
detail.
Control actions needed during an accident have 
been divided in the evaluation into two parts: a 
diagnosis and actions taken to prevent the ac-
cident. Possibilities for mistakes have been studied 
with the help of a simulator. Plant procedures for 
emergency situations have been developed and will 
be further developed, taking also into account the 
results of PSA. The progress is shortly referred in 
Article 19.
For preventing human errors it is important, that 
the operating events are carefully evaluated and, if 
necessary, procedures or the plant is developed to 
prevent similar mistakes. Fortum has developed the 
utilisation of operating experiences and does the 
root cause analyses out of every signiﬁcant event.
When starting up the plant from an outage, a 
dedicated quality procedure is followed in order to 
check all required provisions for continued power 
operation.
The protection systems of the plant initiate the 
safety systems automatically when needed so that 
the operators will have enough time to consider 
actions according to operating instructions. Due to 
the inherent characteristics of the Loviisa plant, 
the operators will have usually more time for 
consideration in a transient situation than at other 
types of nuclear power plants. The Loviisa plant is 
well equipped concerning the needed training for 
preventing human errors. A simulator is at hand. It 
is used for training the operators to come through 
accident situations.
Studies on human errors until now and the 
development of improvement measures are also 
internationally focused on the activities of the plant 
operators and of the lowest levels of the operating 
organisation. In the future, also the functions of an 
organisation more extensively and the preventing of 
human errors in design activities may be signiﬁcant 
targets for development.
2.8.3 Monitoring and control of 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 have their own independent con-
trol rooms, where the necessary process information 
is available, and from where all necessary control 
measures can be conducted. The alarms covering 
also the spent fuel storage (KPA storage) are output 
to the control room of the Olkiluoto 1. The technical 
solutions of the main control rooms are based on the 
proven control room technology.
Process information is presented by the indicat-
ing measuring equipment installed in the steering 
desks and panels. Conventional and computer aided 
alarm systems are used to facilitate the manage-
ment of main processes and other sub and auxiliary 
processes.
The alarms are indicated primarily by the alarm 
lamp panels. The parallel alarms received through 
the computer are seen on the monitors. In addition, 
the event and state data as well as deviations from 
warning/alarm limits are printed on the alarm 
printers.
A safety parameter display system (SPDS), 
which improves the performance capability of the 
operating personnel in controlling transient and 
accident situations, has been taken into use at the 
Olkiluoto plant units.
A so-called 30-minute rule has been the design 
basis for the protection system at Olkiluoto 1 
and 2. Important protection measures and safety 
systems start up automatically so, that no actions 
of operating personnel are needed during the ﬁrst 
thirty minutes after the beginning of the opera-
tional transient or postulated accident. Operators 
have time for consideration before entering into the 
control and other measures. Proper emergency and 
transient situation procedures as well as training 
of those situations reduce the possibility of human 
errors further.
Both Olkiluoto plant units have an emergency 
control post, from where the reactor can be tripped 
and where the main parameters of the reactor such 
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as neutron ﬂux, pressure, temperature and water 
level can be monitored. Cooling the reactor down to 
a cold state and removal of decay heat can be car-
ried out after the shutdown by using local control 
rooms. The interim spent fuel storage has its own 
local control room for the monitoring of decay heat 
removal.
The requirement of another, independent emer-
gency control post emerged after the TVO plants 
were designed. The units have been designed so 
that they can be shutdown in an ordinary way only 
from the control room or from the emergency control 
post.
TVO has studied the independence of the control 
room and the emergency control post in connection 
with different accident scenarios such as ﬁres and 
in different initiating events of common cause fail-
ures such as earthquakes, high temperature of air 
and sea water, a magnetic ﬁeld caused by a mobile 
phone and losses of electrical power. The risk of a 
simultaneous loss of the control room and the relay 
room, which functions as an emergency control post, 
can be considered small.
In a long-term accident situation the main 
process parameters as well as crucial radiation 
measurements and weather information can be 
monitored from the space preserved for the emer-
gency preparedness supporting group. The indicat-
ing instrumentation equipment, which is one of the 
severe accident management systems (SAM system) 
and monitors the state of the containment in case 
of a severe accident has been placed in an easily 
accessible room.
The modernization of systems, conducted in 
connection with the power uprating, facilitated the 
monitoring and operation of the plant. During the 
projects, functions that were earlier manual have 
been automated and displays of the control rooms as 
well as other means for collecting information have 
been improved. The modernisation of the neutron 
ﬂux measuring system and reactor pressure control 
can be mentioned as examples from these modiﬁca-
tions. TVO plans to continue the modernization of 
systems during the forthcoming operating period.
A new programmable technology was also taken 
into use, in connection with the conducted mod-
ernisation, in the aforementioned neutron ﬂux 
measuring system and in controlling the reactor 
pressure and feed water ﬂow. The introduction of 
new technology sets new challenges not only for 
the modiﬁcation design of the systems but also for 
personnel training and for the procedures applied at 
the plant during the operation. The aforementioned 
matters can be considered as improvements for the 
forthcoming operating period.
Human factors
TVO has conducted a probabilistic safety analysis 
(PSA) where the consequences of human errors 
have been studied. Latent maintenance and testing 
errors have been studied in connection with the sys-
tem analyses related to the PSA. In addition to the 
human factor experts, experienced staff members 
from the operating and maintenance personnel have 
participated in assessing the possibility of errors. 
The identiﬁed error possibilities have been classi-
ﬁed into groups according to their importance and 
the most important ones have been modelled in the 
PSA study to clarify the risks related to errors. 
The reliability of operator actions conducted 
during accident conditions was assessed as a part 
of the PSA analysis. The diagnostic errors that may 
be made in connection with accidents have also 
been assessed. Based on the results of the analyses 
concerning the human errors, a few additions and 
modiﬁcations have been made on the emergency 
and operating procedures of the plant.
All the main control room related modiﬁcations 
are tested at the training simulator and operators 
are trained for managing the modiﬁed systems 
prior to the modiﬁcations are installed. In the 
development of human aspects in the operating 
procedures TVO has utilized operating experience 
and results of root causes analyses. Errors related to 
the maintenance actions have also been examined 
and measures have been developed to avoid cor-
responding errors.
When needed TVO has used the services of 
nationally well-known experts on the area of hu-
man behaviour. TVO has also participated in the 
research of matters related to the human behaviour 
and organizational culture both on national and in-
ternational level. In order to enhance its knowledge 
further, TVO has recruited a specialist of human 
factors.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 12.
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2.9 Article 13. Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that quality assurance 
programmes are established and implemented 
with a view to providing conﬁdence that speci-
ﬁed requirements for all activities important 
to nuclear safety are satisﬁed throughout the 
life of a nuclear installation.
2.9.1 Regulatory approach 
to quality assurance
Nuclear Energy Decree requires that a quality 
management system for design and construction as 
well as for operation are required to be submitted 
to STUK when applying for the construction and 
operating licence of a nuclear facility, respectively. 
The general quality management system require-
ments apply to the whole life of a nuclear facility. 
Decision 395/1991 requires that advanced quality 
management system shall be employed in all ac-
tivities which affect safety and relate to the design, 
construction and operation of a nuclear power plan. 
The quality management system requirements are 
provided in the Guides YVL 1.4 and YVL 1.9. The 
detailed quality management requirements for de-
sign of a nuclear facility are presented in the Guide 
YVL 2.0 and for the fuel are presented in the Guide 
YVL 6.7. The quality management requirements 
related to speciﬁc technical areas are presented in 
the corresponding technical guides.
Quality management systems of the licensees/
applicants and of the main suppliers are subject to 
approval by STUK. Furthermore, quality manage-
ment systems have to be established by all other 
organisations participating in activities important 
to safety of the use of nuclear energy. The imple-
mentation of these quality management systems is 
veriﬁed by STUK through inspections.
At the moment, STUK’s YVL Guides that set the 
general requirements for quality management sys-
tem are being updated. The new guides will reﬂect 
the ongoing updating of the IAEA guidelines and 
the recent development in the quality management 
in industry. In addition, both licensees have recently 
implemented new quality management systems. 
The assessment of the quality management system 
for the design and construction of the new unit is 
underway.
STUK’s Quality Manual has been prepared and 
implemented since the First Review Meeting. It 
includes STUK’s quality policy, description of the 
quality system, organisation and management, 
main and supporting working processes and person-
nel policy. The results of systematic internal audits, 
self-assessments and international evaluations 
are used as inputs for the enhancement projects 
of the Quality Management System at STUK. 
In addition to STUK’s Quality Manual, all main 
functions of STUK have their own more detailed 
Quality Manuals. During 2003 STUK has updated 
its strategy and its quality policy. The quality man-
agement system is under revision to implement the 
process oriented approach through out the whole or-
ganization before the end of year 2004. The Quality 
Manual prepared for the regulatory control of the 
use of nuclear energy has been benchmarked with 
other regulators under the auspices of OECD/NEA 
working groups and bilateral agreements.
2.9.2 Development of the quality 
system in the Loviisa NPP
After Fortum Corporation was formed a need for 
an updated quality policy was obvious. In 1999 a 
quality statement “Fortum’s Policy Commitment 
to Quality in the Nuclear Power Operations” was 
issued by the president of Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy. The statement has been conﬁrmed in 2001 also 
by the new management of Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy.
The recent development of the plant quality 
management system is based on the principle of 
continuous improvement in accordance with the ob-
servations and remarks made in quality audits and 
quality assessments. Loviisa Power Plant adopted 
in 2001 a newly formulated management procedure 
which deﬁnes an annual planning process from 
strategic planning to annual reports. A ﬁrst 10-year 
strategic plan for the power plant was developed 
in 2000. A second important and new procedure 
describes those review processes (e.g. management 
reviews, self assessments), which are needed in an 
effective quality management system.
In the internal quality audits, new efforts are di-
rected to the evaluation of the recurrence of events. 
These have considerably increased the necessary 
background work both in the preparation and in the 
reporting phase of an internal audit. An evaluation 
of the plant quality management system against the 
ISO/DIS 9001, 9004:2000 standards were made in 
2000 by Fortum Engineering. The work continued 
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in 2001 - 2002 and a similar comparison with IAEA 
Safety Series No. 50-C/SG-Q was carried out.
The environmental management system of the 
plant was certiﬁed in 2002 according to the ISO 
14001:1996 standard. During the preparation phase 
an environmental policy and a new chapter on en-
vironmental system were introduced in the Quality 
Manual. Numerous quality procedures were also 
updated. A novel environmental aspect shall be 
considered in internal audits and new part-time 
auditors have been trained for environmental 
evaluations.
A new tracking system for quality and safety 
decisions, obligations and actions has been taken 
into use in 2002.
2.9.3 Development of the quality 
system in the Olkiluoto NPP
TVO’s new quality management system, Activity 
Based Management System, is described in the 
quality management manual. It takes into account 
the requirements from the documents YVL 1.4 
(1991), YVL 1.9 (1991), IAEA Safety Series No. 
50-C/SG-Q, and ISO 9001:2000. Activity Based 
Management System guides all TVO’s operations 
and provides each staff member with procedures for 
the safe, economical, high-quality and environmen-
tally friendly generation of electricity. The system 
comprises a general section and a functions section. 
The general section presents TVO’s vision, business 
concept and values, company-level policies, organi-
zation and areas of responsibility, general principles 
governing the operations, the principles guiding 
quality assurance in operational processes, and a 
general description of the processes, their resources 
and the ways in which they are run. The functions 
section describes the operation as process models, 
and it also contains more detailed handbooks and 
instructions covering the functions.
TVO reviewed its company-level policies during 
the year 2003. They were grouped under four head-
ings and approved in February 2004. TVO bases its 
company-level policies on its values and business 
concept.
TVO has approved the following as its company-
level policies: nuclear safety and quality policy, 
social responsibility policy, production policy and 
corporate security policy. Also the process for plant 
modiﬁcation has been updated during the year 
2003.
The functions and responsibilities of TVO’s or-
ganizations and personnel are described in detail in 
the TVO Administrative Rules, in the Organisational 
Manual and in the manuals and instructions of 
individual organizations. The Administrative Rules 
have been approved by STUK as a part of the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
The documentation and instructions are con-
trolled by a software based system as well as the 
management of deviations and corrective actions.
For the new reactor, one of the licensing docu-
ments submitted to STUK for approval is QA for 
construction, “The Quality Manual for Olkiluoto 3 
Project”. Review of the document as well as review 
of the QM systems of plant vendor and major sup-
pliers is carried out by STUK. STUK has also asked 
external QM experts opinions on the QM systems.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 13.
2.10 Article 14. Assessment 
and veriﬁcation of safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. comprehensive and systematic safety 
assessments are carried out before the 
construction and commissioning of a 
nuclear installation and throughout 
its life. Such assessments shall be well 
documented, subsequently updated in 
the light of operating experience and 
signiﬁcant new safety information, and 
reviewed under the authority of the 
regulatory body;
ii. veriﬁcation by analysis, surveillance, 
testing and inspection is carried out 
to ensure that the physical state and 
the operation of a nuclear installation 
continue to be in accordance with its 
design, applicable national safety 
requirements, and operational limits and 
conditions.
2.10.1 Regulatory approach 
to safety assessment
The license applications for a new licence or for the 
renewal of license include the documents required 
by the Nuclear Energy Decree: Preliminary or 
Final Safety Analysis Reports; Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis Reports, including Level 1 and 2 PSA anal-
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yses; Quality Assurance Programmes for Operation; 
Safety Classiﬁcation Document, Operational Limits 
and Conditions Document (Technical Speciﬁcations); 
Programmes for Periodic Inspections; Plans for 
Physical Security and Emergency Preparedness; 
Manuals for Accounting and Control of Nuclear 
Materials; Administrative Rules for the Facilities; 
Programmes for Radiation Monitoring in the 
Environment of the Facilities.
The design of the facility is described in the 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and 
in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The 
reports are submitted, respectively, to STUK for 
approval in connection with the applications for 
Construction and Operating Licences. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Decree, FSAR has to be 
continuously updated.
Decision 395/1991 requires that nuclear power 
plant safety and the design of its safety systems 
shall be substantiated by accident analyses and 
probabilistic safety analyses. Analyses shall be 
maintained and revised if necessary, taking into 
account operating experience, the results of experi-
mental research and the advancement of calculat-
ing methods. The calculating methods employed for 
demonstrating the meeting of the safety regulations 
shall be reliable and well qualiﬁed for dealing with 
the events in question. They shall be applied so 
that the calculated results are, with a good conﬁ-
dence, less favourable than the results which are 
considered best estimates. Furthermore, analyses 
which simulate the likely course of transients and 
accidents shall be conducted for the purpose of 
probabilistic safety analyses and for the develop-
ment of emergency operating procedures. Detailed 
requirements concerning transient and accident 
analyses, including sensitivity analyses, are pre-
sented in Guide YVL 2.2, “Transient and Accident 
Analyses for Justiﬁcation of Technical Solutions at 
Nuclear Power Plants” and requirements concern-
ing reliability and risk analyses in Guide YVL 2.8. 
Additional criteria are presented in the Guides 
YVL 6.2 and YVL 7.1 concerning fuel and releases 
from the nuclear power plant.
Special attention has been paid to plant modiﬁ-
cation processes and documentation. Requirements 
concerning modiﬁcations designed by the utility and 
their independent assessment have been reassessed 
and included into appropriate YVL Guides. The 
new requirements mean in practice that all safety 
signiﬁcant plant modiﬁcations have to be assessed 
by a unit which is independent of the design and im-
plementation of the modiﬁcation. Detailed require-
ments for the system modiﬁcations are presented 
in the Guide YVL 2.0. STUK has also established 
its own plant modiﬁcation database, including the 
whole operating history of the Finnish plants. Based 
on this database, STUK produces reports on ongo-
ing plant modiﬁcations biannually. These reports 
include all safety signiﬁcant plant modiﬁcations 
and other important modiﬁcations.
Comprehensive and systematic safety assess-
ment is an essential part of the licensing process 
and license renewal. As a condition for a license, 
both deterministic and probabilistic safety assess-
ments (PSA) need to be carried out and submitted 
to STUK for approval. Both assessments are kept 
up to date throughout the operation of the nuclear 
facility, reﬂecting the advancement of science and 
technology. Any changes to these documents are 
submitted to STUK for approval. The review of 
these safety assessments by STUK includes inde-
pendent safety analyses.
The latest comprehensive safety assessments 
of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants 
were carried out in connection with the license 
renewal and power uprate of the plants in 1996-97. 
The license applications included the documents 
required by the Nuclear Energy Decree (see above). 
E.g. Final Safety Analysis Reports were updated. 
The update of the accident analyses and PSAs 
including Level 1 and 2 PSA analyses, was made 
in this connection. It involved calculations of most 
transients and accidents with advanced computer 
codes. The results of the analyses are discussed in 
detail below. Licensee also provided assessments 
how the regulations have been complied with, 
including the fulﬁlment of YVL Guides. Licensee 
also explained how an adequate safety level has 
been maintained. Plans for Radioactive Waste 
Management were presented.
Recently, the PSAs have been updated, and their 
scope has been extended at both nuclear power 
plants. Plant-speciﬁc living PSAs, including internal 
initiators, ﬁres, ﬂooding, severe weather conditions, 
seismic events for operation mode, and internal 
events, ﬂoods, and severe weather conditions for 
normal annual refuelling outage, have been com-
pleted for the plants. These PSA studies are used 
in support of decision making by the regulatory 
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body and of safety management at the utilities. 
Special attention has been paid to seismic events 
in Finland, although Finland is not in a seismi-
cally active area. According to the PSA results, 
seismic events do not cause major risks in Finland. 
However, some modiﬁcations have been made at 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, where for example 
the support structures of batteries and switchgear 
cubicles have been improved. There has been no 
need to implement any speciﬁc measures regarding 
seismic events at Loviisa nuclear power plant.
Safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3
The design and licensing process of Olkiluoto 
3 project will be done according to the detailed 
Finnish YVL guides and their main references. The 
safety approach includes a strong deterministic 
basis complemented by probabilistic analyses in 
order to improve the prevention of accidents, as well 
as their mitigation.
A twofold strategy is pursued for the EPR safety 
requirements:
• To improve the preventive measures against 
accidents.
• To mitigate Severe Accidents consequences, even 
if their probability has been further reduced. 
This is achieved by implementing features, which 
ensure containment integrity. Thus, it can be 
demonstrated that the need of stringent counter-
measures are restricted to the immediate vicinity 
of the plant. The most important special safety 
features of Olkiluoto 3 design are as follows:
• severe accident management (SAM) has been 
taken into account already in the beginning 
of the design process
• plant structures are designed against a pos-
sible airplane crash so that the event does 
not lead to release of signiﬁcant amount of 
radioactive substances to the environment 
or threaten the safety functions required to 
achieve safe shutdown state. The military and 
the large commercial aircraft are considered 
in the design.
The compliance of the EPR with the Decision 395/91 
of the Council of State and with all YVL guides 
are assessed by the plant designer. The review of 
this assessment is going on by TVO and STUK, 
independently.
The deterministic as well as probabilistic safety 
assessment will be done by plant designer and 
reviewed by TVO. The deterministic approach is 
founded on the international defence in depth 
concept. The comprehensive review of STUK dur-
ing the design, construction and operating phases 
of Olkiluoto 3 is an on-going process divided into 
several stage-by-stage approvals.
In addition to the review of the reports provided 
by TVO, STUK has asked VTT and foreign institutes 
to perform independent transient and accident 
analysis for the most limiting scenarios. VTT has 
developed own model and codes for the analysis. 
Results of these analyses will be compared to ones 
provided by TVO.
2.10.2 Deterministic safety assessment
Transient and accident analyses 
of the Loviisa NPP
By means of analyses it is aimed to demonstrate the 
capability of the plant to cope with various transient 
and accident situations safely enough. According to 
Guide YVL 2.2, the analyses shall be focused to 
events, which by nature and severity cover different 
kind of transient and accident situations.
Fortum has revised in connection with the mod-
ernising of the Loviisa 1 and 2 units the transient 
and accident analyses included the Final Safety 
Analysis Report, taking into account the reactor 
power increase. For the assessment of normal 
operating conditions, transients and postulated 
accidents Fortum has used primarily calculation 
methods which have been developed in Finland. 
The main tool in the analysis work was APROS code 
that is developed in co-operation between Fortum 
Nuclear Services and the Technical Research Centre 
of Finland (VTT) since 1986. In this connection a 
new model and input data ﬁle of the plant were 
developed from scratch. The plant model is very 
detailed modelling all six loops and the whole 
secondary circuit, too. So-called topical reports have 
also been presented on used methods. Their aim 
is to demonstrate the reliability and usability of 
the methods. Methods have been validated to the 
extent, which is consistent with the level recognised 
internationally as good, mainly by making reference 
calculations with various methods and by using 
measurement results at experimental equipment 
as a reference. Due to uncertainties related to the 
accuracy of the calculation methods it is essential 
that adequate safety margins are applied when 
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evaluating the fulﬁlment of the acceptance criteria 
of analyses.
Input data and assumptions inﬂuencing on the 
results of the analyses as well as made sensitivity 
calculations have also been presented and justiﬁed 
in the analyses described in the Safety Analysis 
Report and in related topical reports.
The analyses presented in the Safety Analysis 
Report cover anticipated operational transients, 
postulated accidents used as a design basis of safety 
systems and so called severe reactor accidents. 
Analyses related to severe reactor accidents, mainly 
radioactive release analyses, are still partly being 
done. Different transient and accident types have 
been classiﬁed. Each category contains several dif-
ferent accident sequences. Speciﬁc analyses have 
been presented on each accident sequence. Each 
analysis essential to safety includes sensitivity cal-
culations which are often considerably extensive.
The anticipated operational transients are 
events which can be expected to occur at least once 
during the lifetime of a plant. The following events 
have been considered as anticipated operational 
transients: stopping of reactor coolant pumps; un-
controllable withdrawal of control rods; stopping 
of a main feedwater pump; closure of isolation 
valves of steam generators, and loss of off-site 
power supply. Based on the results of the analyses 
concerning operational transients it can be noted 
that the power increase does not essentially make 
the transient behaviour of the plant worse.
As postulated accidents all such situations have 
been re-evaluated which according to Guide YVL 2.2 
are postulated accidents and which begin at full 
reactor power. These kind of accidents are: loss 
of coolant accidents; breaks of a steam line; leaks 
from the primary to secondary circuit; ejection of a 
control rod; anticipated transients without scram 
(ATWS); and a large spectrum of disturbances in 
reactivity control, including false dilution of boron 
concentration in the primary circuit (boron is used 
in reactivity control).
As regards transients beginning at low or zero-
power, the power increase can only be seen as small 
changes in the process quantities of the initial 
state, when compared with the earlier ﬁgures. 
Furthermore, transients and accident situations be-
ginning in outage situations have been analysed. 
The inﬂuence of the 9% power increase on the 
results of accident analyses is mainly quite small. 
The inﬂuence can be seen more clearly in connection 
with a so-called major loss of coolant accident. Due 
to the power increase, the maximum cladding tem-
perature of the fuel rods exceeds during this kind 
of postulated accident the maximum temperature 
calculated using comparable assumptions and the 
earlier nominal power 1375MW. The mentioned ex-
ceeding is, however, only a small part of the present 
safety margin to the approval criterion of the maxi-
mum fuel rod cladding temperature. On the other 
hand, because the power increase is implemented by 
balancing the power distribution without changing 
the load of the most loaded fuel rods, the number of 
the most loaded fuel rods slightly increases.
In connection with the updating of the safety 
analyses it was noted that the original dimension-
ing of the intermediate cooling circuit for decay heat 
removal from the containment has been done on 
faulty basis. In accident conditions, the intermediate 
cooling system has two essential duties: to remove 
decay heat into the ﬁnal heat sink, and to cool a 
large number of equipment and systems for various 
safety functions and their room spaces. Accordingly, 
the reliable function of the intermediate cooling 
system is an essential safety factor in accident 
situations. Fortum has implemented extensive 
measures for increasing the design temperature of 
the intermediate cooling circuit, in order to ensure 
the adequate reliability of the functions of the in-
termediate circuit on the basis of new information. 
Such measures are i.e. process modiﬁcations for de-
creasing heat load and component modiﬁcations for 
improving heat endurance of motors and cables.
Accident analyses for evaluating functioning 
capabilities of the safety systems are also discussed 
as regards the reactor core and nuclear fuel, and 
as regards radiation safety. Fortum has separately 
made accident analyses for the storages of spent fuel 
and reactor wastes. The descriptions and results of 
the analyses have been presented in the appropriate 
Chapters of the Safety Analysis Report.
Transient and accident analyses and used 
analytical methods have to be maintained and de-
veloped throughout the whole lifetime of a nuclear 
power plant. Based on the results of the analyses 
measures are taken for enhancing safety, when 
necessary. The accident analyses indicate that the 
process parameters of some essential safety systems 
can be deﬁned more appropriately than currently 
done.
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STUK has reviewed the analyses and the meth-
ods applied. In addition, STUK has made independ-
ent reference analyses, or such analyses have been 
done by order of STUK. Sensitivity calculations and 
reference analyses are needed for evaluating and 
reducing uncertainties related normally to calcula-
tion methods and assumptions.
Transient and accident analyses 
of the Olkiluoto NPP
The performed analyses and the methods used in 
them have been described in the Safety Analysis 
Report, related Topical Reports and in the pre-in-
spection documents of the systems.
Transient and accident analyses as well as anal-
ysis methods describing the operation of Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 have been maintained and developed during 
the entire time of plant operation. The analyses 
concerning the operation of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 have 
been completely renewed during the modernisation 
project currently in progress. In addition to the 
uprated power level the analyses have taken into 
account e.g. the changed reactor power/ﬂow rate 
area and the structural modiﬁcations of fuel rods 
and reactor internals. To ensure that the scope of 
analyses is adequate TVO has conducted a failure 
consequence analysis, where consequences of the 
transients caused by system and equipment fail-
ures have been considered from the standpoint of 
plant operation. Based on the review, the available 
transient and accident analyses cover well the 
transients caused by system and equipment failures 
that may surface in plant operation.
In connection with the modernisation project, 
new analysis methods for description of accident 
situations have also been taken into use together 
with the new systems. The analysis of transient 
situations has been improved by the means of a new 
computer code capable of three dimensional model-
ling of the reactor core, due to which e.g. the reactor 
stability and the course of reactivity accidents can 
be observed more accurately than before.
STUK has inspected the essential parts of the 
analyses and applied methods described in the 
Safety Analysis Report. STUK has also conducted 
or purchased comparison analyses, by the means 
of which both the applicability of analysis methods 
to the description of different transients, and the 
sensitivity of analysis results to the parameters 
describing the plant status, course of an accident or 
functioning of the models has been clariﬁed. STUK’s 
review is that the plant behaviour in different 
transient and accident situations has been analysed 
comprehensively and that the methods used in the 
analyses are properly validated to describe the 
operation of the Olkiluoto plant.
Transient and accident analyses 
of the Olkiluoto 3
Safety analysis rules provide a methodology to 
verify that safety systems are suitably designed. 
The degree of conservatism of these rules is suf-
ﬁcient to provide appropriate margins in design of 
the safety relevant systems.
The safety analysis rules are strictly applied 
when calculating the thermal-hydraulic and neu-
tronic transients associated to the DBC incidents 
and accidents. They cover the initiating events of 
DBC 2 to 4. The “DBC accident analysis rules” are 
part of the conservative methodology, which sup-
ports the deterministic safety assessment of the 
Nuclear Power Plant.
Events are grouped according to their potential 
risk with regard to the main safety functions:
• reactivity and power control,
• heat removal from the fuel assemblies,
• conﬁnement of radioactivity.
The events with potential risk are classiﬁed in 
Design Basis Conditions and in Design Extension 
Conditions. The classiﬁcation of Design Basis 
Conditions is based upon their rough expected 
frequency of occurrence:
• DBC 1 events: Normal operation,
• DBC 2 events: Incident Conditions,
• DBC 3 events: Accident Conditions, Category 1 
and
• DBC 4 events: Accident Conditions, Category 2.
The Design Basis Conditions contain events caused 
by the failure of one component or the failure of one 
I&C function or one operator error (e.g. spurious 
starting of RCP) or loss of offsite power.
The deterministic design of the safety systems 
is supported by the safety analysis of the Design 
Basis Conditions. Beyond this analysis, the design 
basis is extended to provide a frame for the design 
of additional equipment needed to meet the proba-
bilistic objectives for core melt and large releases, 
and to limit radiological releases to an acceptable 
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level in case of a postulated low pres-sure core 
melt. In this design extension, a limited number 
of representative events are analyzed in order to 
justify the design of this additional equipment. The 
representative events are considered as Design 
Extension Conditions.
The preliminary analyses of Olkiluoto 3 are 
presented in PSAR and the Topical Reports joined 
to PSAR. The validation process of the used calcula-
tion methods and codes is based on the operational 
data and experiences of the reference plants as well 
as model comparisons by test facilities. The valida-
tion process of codes used for design and licensing 
calculations is going on. 
STUK is reviewing the analyses provided by 
plant designer and verifying the most important 
results by the analyses performed by technical 
support organisations and STUK itself.
2.10.3 Probabilistic safety 
analysis in the Loviisa NPP
STUK required in 1984 that Fortum makes an 
extensive probabilistic safety analysis concerning 
the Loviisa units. It was required that the objec-
tive of the study is to determine the plant-speciﬁc 
risk topographies of the most essential accident 
sequences. Another important objective was to train 
the plant personnel to understand more deeply than 
before the plant and its behaviour as a whole in 
different situations.
Fortum provided STUK with level 1 PSA in sum-
mer 1989. Since 1990 Fortum has extended PSA by 
analysing risks related to ﬁres, ﬂoods, earthquakes, 
severe weather conditions and outages, as well as 
by making level 2 PSA (integrity of the containment 
and releases). Since 1991 many modiﬁcations of the 
Loviisa units have been implemented. By means of 
these modiﬁcations risks have been decreased and 
the risk topography of the plant has been balanced. 
A part of the modiﬁcations was implemented in 
connection with the modernisation of the plant. 
Technical solutions of the modiﬁcations have also 
been often justiﬁed with PSA. Examples of the most 
essential plant modiﬁcations have been presented 
in the following. They are classiﬁed according to 
initiating events.
Level 1 PSA – Internal initiating events
The 1989 analysis contained an evaluation of the 
risks caused by various plant transients, ruptures of 
the cooling pipes and disturbances in the electrical 
network (internal initiating events). The result of 
the analysis concerning the probability of reactor 
core damage was about 2 × 10–3 a year. Reasons for 
that high estimate were simpliﬁed assumptions 
related to event sequences which are difﬁcult to 
model: some events, such as e.g. exceeding the 
design temperature in the rooms of electrical 
systems were assumed to result in a reactor core 
damage. For decreasing the importance of these 
event sequences new redundant air cooling system 
for instrumentation rooms were implemented, 
after which their probability became so small that 
they had no signiﬁcant effect on the total risk. In 
the same connection other improvements such as 
primary coolant pumps improved antireverse con-
trol system and new stopping signal based on the 
low seal coolant ﬂow were implemented to prevent 
seal LOCA. After the improvements of the plant in 
1990 the probability of reactor core damage was 
estimated to be about 1.4 × 10–4 a year.
In addition, since 1991 several modiﬁcations of 
the plant have been made, reducing essentially the 
risk:
• The reliability of reducing the pressure of the 
primary circuit was improved by making pos-
sible the emergency spray of the pressurizer by 
means of the pumps of the high-pressure safety 
injection system. The modiﬁcation makes more 
effective the reducing of the primary circuit 
pressure to the level of the secondary circuit 
e.g. in connection with a leak from the primary 
to secondary circuit (PRISE). In this way the 
primary-secondary leak in a steam generator 
can be stopped.
• A new safety injection water tank was installed 
in order to cool the reactor and extend the time 
available to operators when coolant is lost from 
the primary circuit due to the primary-secondary 
leak through an open-stuck relief valve of the 
steam generator.
• Radiation monitoring equipment was installed in 
the secondary circuit for making a more effective 
detection of leaks from the primary circuit to the 
secondary circuit in a steam generator.
• A new protection signal was installed for isolat-
ing the feedwater line and the steam line and for 
stopping the reactor coolant pump in the case of 
a high water level in a steam generator.
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• The reliability of the emergency core cooling 
was improved. The old minimum circulation 
lines leading to the emergency injection water 
tank have been replaced with the new minimum 
circulation lines which lead directly from the 
delivery side of the safety injection pumps to the 
suction side of the pumps. They have also been 
equipped with a separate cooling system. After 
the modiﬁcation the possibility has been elimi-
nated for the alternate turnover of the suction 
source of the pumps between the tank and the 
containment emergency sumps. In connection of 
a turnover a valve failure might occur resulting 
in loss of emergency cooling.
Level 1 PSA – Fires
Plant ﬁre risks were evaluated in the analysis 
completed in 1992. The probability of reactor core 
damage caused by ﬁres was estimated to be 1 × 10–3 
a year. This ﬁgure was conservative, because simpli-
ﬁed pessimistic assumptions had to be done in the 
modelling of ﬁre progress and consequences due to 
a lack of well established methods. For reducing 
ﬁre risks several modiﬁcations of the plant were 
made:
• installation of sprinkler system for the main 
transformer area
• removal of standby transformer from the main 
transformer area
• permanent closing of some ﬁre doors
• additional emergency feedwater system to back 
up the auxiliary feedwater system in case of 
turbine hall ﬁre
• additional ﬁre pump station
• isolation/rerouting of the most critical cables
• additional sprinklers for protection of cables 
important to safety
• ﬁre protection of control and power supply cables 
was improved
• ﬁre protection of important pressurised air pip-
ing was improved
• structural protection of the hydraulic oil stations 
of the turbine bypass valves as well as sprinkler 
protection of the stations was improved for 
preventing high pressure oil sprays.
• ﬁre alarm system renewed.
Level 1 PSA – Floods
The probability of reactor core damage caused by 
ﬂoods was estimated to be about 1 × 10–5 a year 
in the analysis completed in 1994. The analysis 
resulted in many modiﬁcations of the plant for 
reducing the risks related to internal ﬂoods:
• A wall against ﬂoods was constructed for pre-
venting the spreading of a ﬂood from the turbine 
hall to the lower rooms of the reactor building 
through cable spaces. In the lower rooms a ﬂood 
could cause failures in the cooling system of the 
reactor coolant pumps and in the emergency core 
cooling system.
• Drainage of the cable spaces in the control room 
building was improved so that the ﬂooding water 
accumulating on the ﬂoor would not cause the 
exceeding of the design load of the ﬂoor.
• For reducing the ﬂood risks of the control room 
building the cooling water pipes related to the 
standard ventilation units were removed from 
the cable spaces below the control room to more 
secure routes.
• Drainage on the level of the feedwater tanks was 
improved so that the ﬂooding water accumulat-
ing on the ﬂoor would not cause the exceeding of 
the design load of the ﬂoor.
• To protect the ﬂoor of the feedwater tanks 
against possible high pressure jet forces, jet 
shelters were installed on the welded joints 
of the feedwater piping to control the reaction 
forces in leak situations. Furthermore, the pipes 
crossing the feedwater tank level were replaced 
by pipes made out of better material.
Level 1 PSA – Weather
In the analysis concerning weather risks, completed 
in 1994, seawater phenomena, a bad snow storm 
and algae were evaluated as signiﬁcant risks. The 
probability of reactor core damage was estimated to 
be about 5 × 10–4 a year. The following modiﬁcations 
of the plant were implemented to reduce the risks:
• To reduce the breaking risk of the travelling 
basket screen in the sea water intake channel, 
a system was installed which stops sea water 
pumps one by one based on the increase of the 
pressure difference in the screen. As a result of 
this change the access of the algae into the sea 
water cooling piping and heat exchangers is 
prevented.
• To protect the intake air channels of the diesel 
generators against clogging caused by a snow 
storm, the type of the intake air ﬁlters has been 
changed. In addition, the intake air of the diesel 
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generators can now be taken from the interiors 
through the automatically opening air inlet 
dampers, if the intake air channel clogged.
• To protect frazil ice of causing blockage of service 
water system a new procedure to utilize service 
water and condenser water in warming up water 
intake at low intake water temperatures.
• To protect sea vegetation and frazil ice causing 
blockage of service water system a new proce-
dure was developed to utilize siphon through 
the main condensers after the circulating water 
pumps have stopped.
After the improvements of the plant, the biggest 
part of the weather risk is caused by algae (sea 
vegetation) and frazil ice. In this case the sea water 
intake channel may be clogged by ice crystallising 
out of subcooled water.
Level 1 PSA – Outages
The probability of reactor core damage caused by 
internal initiating events during refuelling outages 
was estimated to be about 2,8 × 10–5 a year in the 
analysis completed in 1997. Heavy hoisting in con-
tainment building was to be a very important risk 
factor. By means of the outage risk analysis Fortum 
has justiﬁed following improvements:
• Changes were made in the operating and testing 
instructions based on the observations done in 
PSA.
• To reduce the risk related to the hoisting of 
heavy loads procedures were changed.
• To ensure the cooling of the instrument spaces 
important to safety, a modiﬁcation was made in 
the change-over automation of the ventilation 
units. This will ensure the proper functioning 
also in the case of a fuse failure.
All the improvements of the plant mentioned above 
have been taken into account in the updated risk 
analyses related to the internal ﬂoods, ﬁres, severe 
weather conditions and internal initiating events 
(level 1). Fortum provided STUK with these analy-
ses in 1994–2003.
At the end of 2003 the results of the risk analy-
ses were the following:
• internal initiating events, 1.9 × 10–5 a year
• ﬁres, 3.4 × 10–5 a year
• ﬂoods, 0.6 × 10–5 a year
• severe weather conditions, 0.5 × 10–5 a year
• earthquakes, 3.6 × 10–6 a year
• outages, 9.7 × 10–5 a year, internal initiating 
events, ﬂoods and severe weather conditions.
The calculated estimate for the total probability of 
reactor core damage is about 1.7 × 10–4 a year. This 
estimate takes into account all the factors presented 
above.
Fortum has also provided STUK with the level 
2 PSA in which the integrity of the containment 
and the release of radioactive materials from the 
plant to the environment are evaluated. It was 
estimated that the probability of a large release to 
the environment is about 5 × 10–6 a year, caused by 
the internal initiating events at power. The biggest 
part of the calculated risk (about 70%) is caused by 
leaks between the primary and secondary circuit as 
well as by other bypasses of the containment. The 
rest of the risk is caused by high-energy phenomena 
resulting in the damage of the containment, such 
as a steam explosion in the reactor vessel, the dis-
charge of the melted core out of the pressure vessel 
to the reactor cavity, or a hydrogen explosion in the 
containment.
The calculated risk estimate mentioned above 
took already into account the modiﬁcations of the 
Loviisa plant designed for severe accidents. These 
are: the external cooling of the reactor pressure 
vessel, the measures aimed for preventing such 
loading situations which break the reactor cav-
ity, the improved control of hydrogen and the new 
procedures for severe accident management. These 
modiﬁcations have been implemented by 2003.
For evaluating the current situation STUK has 
made a rough risk assessment related to the Loviisa 
plant as it was at the end of 1997. This upper 
limit estimate for the probability of a large release 
was about 9 × 10–6 a year, caused by the internal 
initiating events. Until now, the risk estimate of 
the level 2 PSA does not include the risk caused by 
the external initiating events (ﬁres, ﬂoods, severe 
weather conditions). 
STUK has reviewed the analyses provided by 
Fortum. In the reviews a PSA computer program 
developed by STUK has been used. The results 
of the review show that Fortum has applied in its 
analyses commonly accepted methods in modelling 
transient and accident situations of the plant and 
in collecting and handling reliability data
STUK-B -YTO 234
43
2.10.3 Probabilistic safety analysis 
in the Olkiluoto NPP
By the means of probabilistic safety analyses (PSA) 
the effects of different initiating events – plant 
transients, ﬁres, internal ﬂoods, natural external 
events including harsh weather conditions and 
earth-quakes – to the plant safety are assessed.
PSA describes the course of the accident from 
the initiating event to the reactor core damage and 
assesses the probability of failure to manage the 
transient caused by the initiating event and the ini-
tiating event itself. The objective is to model plant 
systems and their operation so accurately that the 
effect of accident and transient situations, equip-
ment failures as well as operation and maintenance 
errors to the plant operation can be clariﬁed.
A so-called accident sequence is determined 
by the accident’s initiating event and failures in 
the safety systems as well as failures in operator 
actions. The frequencies of initiating events that 
initiate an accident are assessed on the basis of both 
plant-speciﬁc and world-wide operating experience. 
The functions of the safety systems and the actions 
of the plant personnel to prevent the damage of 
the reactor core are analysed by the means of e.g. 
thermo-hydraulic analyses, system analyses as well 
as operation and emergency procedures. The failure 
probability of these actions is assessed by the means 
of gathered operating experience. A special atten-
tion in the analyses is paid to the dependences, 
which can simultaneously cause the inoperability of 
several safety systems, and common cause failures 
of identical components. When the core damage 
frequencies of different accident sequences are 
connected, the result is the core damage frequency 
for the entire plant, which is one of the measures 
describing the plant’s safety level.
In 1984 STUK required that TVO shall conduct 
a comprehensive probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) 
referring to Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2, with the 
objective to clarify plant related “risk topographies” 
and to train the personnel to understand more 
profoundly the plant and its behaviour as a whole 
in different accident situations. In the ﬁrst part of 
the PSA, TVO was to analyse the frequencies of ac-
cident sequences leading to a reactor core damage 
(level 1). In the second part of the PSA, TVO was to 
observe the damage mechanisms of the reactor core 
and the course of an accident as well as to group the 
accident sequences to release categories according 
to the amount of radioactive substances released 
to the environment, release mode and timing of 
release, and to assess the occurrence probabilities 
of these release categories (level 2).
At the beginning of 2004 the overall core damage 
frequency of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is according to the 
living PSA approximately 1.7 × 10–5 per reactor 
year, when all analyses described below are taken 
into account. The core damage risk is distributed 
according to following frequencies:
• internal initiating events, power operation, 
1 × 10–5 a year
• internal initiating events, refuelling outage, 
4 × 10–7 a year
• internal hazards, ﬁres, power operation,  
5 × 10–7 a year
• internal hazards, ﬁres, refuelling outage,  
3 × 10–8 a year
• internal hazards, ﬂoods, power operation,   
2 × 10–7 a year
• external hazards, natural, earthquakes, power 
operation 5 × 10–6 a year
• external hazards, natural, other, power opera-
tion, 9 × 10–7 a year.
Level 1 PSA – Internal initiating events
TVO delivered the level 1 PSA, for the part of 
analysis of internal initiating events, to STUK in 
the summer of 1989. The analysis contained an 
analysis of core damage risk caused by different 
plant transients, ruptures of cooling water piping 
and disturbances of external grid. After the analy-
sis, improvements were made e.g. on emergency and 
operation procedures, which endeavour to ensure 
the supply of excess water to the tanks of the 
auxiliary feed water system and to the condenser, 
electrical supplies from the diesel generators of the 
neighbouring unit as well as the manual depres-
surisation of the reactor conducted from the relay 
room. Furthermore, modiﬁcations that affect the 
core damage frequency were conducted in connec-
tion with the modernisation, for example
• two valves that apply to both the steam and 
water blow-ups were added to the reactor over 
pressure protection system
• turbine control and protection system was mod-
ernised
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• plant's grid connections were improved by 
installing on each unit a parallel start-up trans-
former supplied by an independent transmission 
line from the external grid.
TVO has continuously kept the PSA model up-to-
date with regard to the plant modiﬁcations and op-
erating experience. The core damage frequency due 
to internal initiating events was in 1989 4 × 10–5 per 
reactor year. During the recent years it has been 
around 1 × 10–5 per reactor year.
Outage risks were assessed in an analysis 
completed in 1992. The core damage frequency 
during an outage was assessed to be approximately 
3.6 × 10–6 per refuelling outage. The most signiﬁcant 
outage risk proved clearly to be the bottom leakage 
of the reactor vessel caused by a maintenance error 
of main circulation pumps. To reduce the risk the 
instructions of maintenance work were improved 
and the Technical Speciﬁcations were modiﬁed in 
such a way that the lower personnel hatch is kept 
closed during the maintenance of main circulation 
pumps.
The modiﬁcations of procedures have reduced 
the core damage frequency during an outage sig-
niﬁcantly, an it has been from the year 1997 to 2004 
around 4 × 10–7 per refuelling outage.
Level 1 PSA – Internal hazards
Fire risks at the plant were assessed in an analysis 
completed in 1991. According to the analysis the core 
damage frequency due to ﬁres was approximately 
1 × 10–5 p.a. To reduce the ﬁre risks improvements 
were made e.g. in ﬁre extinguishing systems and in 
the separation of cables important to safety. TVO 
has updated the ﬁre risk analysis for power opera-
tion in 1994 and 1997. In the year 1998 the ﬁre risk 
analysis was extended to the refuelling outage.
According to the living PSA results in the 
year 2004 the core damage frequency due to ﬁres 
– including power operation and outage – at the 
Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2 is 5 × 10–7 per reactor 
year. The contribution of the ﬁres during the refuel-
ling outage is small, 3 × 10–8 per reactor year.
As a part of the PSA, TVO analysed also the risks 
caused by internal ﬂoods. According to a study con-
ducted in 1994 the core damage frequency caused 
by ﬂoods is approximately 1.4 × 10–6 p.a. TVO has 
updated the analysis of internal ﬂood in 1997.
Recently conducted plant modiﬁcations haven’t 
signiﬁcantly affected this value. However, reduction 
of conservatism in the assumptions has in the year 
2003 decreased the core damage frequency due to 
ﬂoods one order of magnitude to 2 × 10–7 per reactor 
year.
Level 1 PSA – External hazards
A limited external hazards was conducted to as-
sess the risks caused by the most important harsh 
weather conditions, the severe blizzard and the 
frazil ice experienced in the beginning of 1995. 
Severe blizzard and frazil ice were found to be very 
signiﬁcant risks. The probability of reactor core 
damage caused by them was at that time assessed 
at approximately 2 × 10–5 p.a. Following plant modi-
ﬁcations were made to reduce the risks:
• To improve the reliability of emergency electrical 
supply, automatically opening dampers based on 
the pressure difference operation, were installed 
in the diesel generator system during the 1996 
annual maintenance outage, so that the combus-
tion air can be taken directly from the rooms.
• A system that supplies warm water, when neces-
sary, to plant units' sea water inlet was built 
for the plant to reduce the risk caused by frazil 
ice. The system secures the supply of condenser 
water to the plant by preventing the blockage of 
the sea water canal caused by icing.
A comprehensive screening analysis of external 
hazards was conducted to assess the risks caused 
by the natural phenomena (threats from the sea, 
earth and air) in 1997. Detailed analyses were 
done for the single phenomena and combinations 
of phenomena that exceeded the screening limit of 
the core damage frequency: White frost; Frazil Ice; 
Storm – Blizzard; Lightning; Algae and mussels in 
the seawater tunnels. The analysis was extended 
at the end of 1998 with the detailed analyses of the 
high and low seawater level and the high tempera-
ture of the seawater and the air. A new extension of 
the analysis is going on during 2004.
By the means of modiﬁcations the core damage 
frequency due to external hazards has been reduced, 
and it is in 2004 9 × 10–7 per reactor year.
The risk analysis of earthquakes, was completed 
in 1996. Especially direct-current systems and 
accumulators were found to be sensitive to minor 
earthquakes. To reduce the risks, modiﬁcations 
have been made to support the accumulators in 
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the direct-current systems that are important to 
safety and to anchor rectiﬁer/inverter cabinets to 
the load bearing structures. After the modiﬁcations 
the core damage frequency due to earthquake is 
approximately 5 × 10–6 p.a.
Level 2 PSA
In the year 1996 TVO also delivered to STUK the 
level 2 PSA, in which the durability of the contain-
ment and the releases of radioactive materials to 
the plant vicinity are assessed. The analysis has 
been updated during 1997 and 2003. The level 2 
PSA has caused or contributed following modiﬁca-
tions:
• The isolation valves of the ﬁltered venting line 
are left open after a LOCA in order to provide 
ﬁltered overpressure protection of the contain-
ment.
• The primary route for containment venting is 
from the upper drywell through the automatic 
rupture disk line, because the venting from 
wetwell does not signiﬁcantly decrease the 
release of radio nuclides.
• The lower drywell access locks of Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 were modiﬁed in 2001 and in 2002, respectively, 
so that they will sustain a steam explosion.
• The basket bolts of the four containment spray 
system pipes penetrating the pedestal wall were 
changed in the 2001 refuelling outages to weaker 
ones to prevent the deformation of the pipes in 
case of ex-vessel steam explosion.
• The operator training was extended in the initia-
tion of the lower drywell ﬂooding, because the 
time available is rather short.
According to the living PSA model in 2004 the fre-
quency of the large early release to the environment 
(>100 TBq Cs or undelayed release of noble gas) is 
6 × 10–6 per reactor year, which is approximately 
one third of the core damage frequency. Several 
modiﬁcations in the plant systems and in the pro-
cedures as well as training of the control room staff 
have signiﬁcantly decreased the size of the release, 
but the frequency of the release exceeding the limit 
has decreased only slightly. The frequency of the 
unﬁltered release has been reduced from 8 × 10–6 to 
3 × 10–6 per reactor year, while the total large early 
release frequency has been decreased from 8 × 10–6 
to 6 × 10–6 per reactor year. The risk of release is 
greatest during the operation at power. The biggest 
threats to the integrity of the containment are 
caused by the
• inadvertent opening of the ﬁltered venting line 
of the containment leading to undelayed release 
of noble gas
• early containment failure due to hydrogen 
detonation in shutting down the reactor for refu-
elling, or start up of the reactor after refuelling, 
when the containment is not inert.
STUK has inspected the analyses that TVO supplied 
by the means of a PSA-program it has developed. 
The inspection showed that, in its analyses, TVO 
applied generally approved methods in modelling 
the transient and accident situations of the plant as 
well as in obtaining and handling of the reliability 
data. In the level 2 PSA, the speciﬁcation of results 
requires further development of the models describ-
ing the course of an accident.
Probabilistic safety analyses of Olkiluoto 3
The supplier of the nuclear island of Olkiluoto 3 
has conducted a design phase PSA. The design 
phase PSA has been delivered to STUK as required 
by Nuclear Energy Decree 35 §. The design phase 
PSA includes analysis of internal initiating events, 
internal hazard and external hazards for power 
operation and refuelling outage. The document is 
under review of STUK in 2004.
2.10.5 Veriﬁcation
Decision 395/1991 includes several requirements 
which concern the veriﬁcation of the physical 
state of a nuclear power plant. For instance, In 
all activities affecting the operation of a nuclear 
power plant and the availability of components, a 
systematic approach shall be applied for ensuring 
plant operators’ continuous awareness of the state 
of the plant and its components. The reliable opera-
tion of systems and components shall be ensured 
by adequate maintenance as well as by regular 
in-service inspections and periodic tests. General 
requirements on veriﬁcation programmes and 
procedures are provided in YVL Guides (e.g. Guide 
YVL 1.8, YVL 1.9, YVL 3.0, YVL 3.8).
Main programmes used for veriﬁcation of the 
state of a nuclear power plant are
• periodical testing according to the Technical 
Speciﬁcations
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• preventive and predictive maintenance pro-
gramme
• in-service inspection programme
• periodical inspections of pressure equipment and 
piping
• surveillance programme of reactor pressure ves-
sel material
• programmes for evaluating the ageing of compo-
nents and materials.
Activities for verifying the physical state of a power 
plant are carried out in connection with normal 
daily routines and with scheduled inspections, 
testing, preventive maintenance etc. Activities are 
performed by the licensee personnel, and in the 
case of certain inspections by contractors approved 
separately. Detailed programmes and procedures 
are established and approved by the licensee, and 
reviewed and, to some extent, approved by STUK. 
The results of tests and inspections are documented 
in a systematic way and used through a feedback 
process to further develop the programmes. The 
Operational Limits and Conditions are approved by 
STUK. In general, the role of STUK is to verify that 
the licensees follow the obligations imposed on them 
and carry out all activities scheduled in veriﬁcation 
programmes.
Comprehensive evaluations related to the state 
and operation of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants 
were carried out by Fortum and Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy in 1996–1998. These evaluations also covered 
the trial tests of the plants at the increased power 
levels. These activities were controlled by STUK.
According to international experience and Guide 
YVL 3.8 STUK has recognised the qualiﬁcation of 
non-destructive testing systems and procedures as 
an issue of high importance. This issue requires 
high priority at both nuclear power plants. The 
implementation of qualiﬁed NDT systems has been 
started in 1990's in Finland. STUK has decided in 
those days that the consensus document “Common 
position of European Regulators on qualiﬁcation 
of NDT-systems for pre- and in-service inspection 
of light water reactor components, EUR 16802 
EN” is to be followed in Finland. ENIQ documents 
(European Network for Inspection Qualiﬁcation) 
can also be followed. The application of the docu-
ments has been described now by Guide YVL 3.8. A 
draft national strategy document for NDT qualiﬁca-
tion has been written. The most important issue is 
that the qualiﬁcation body shall be competent and 
independent. Ad hoc type qualiﬁcation bodies have 
been established by the Steering Committee of 
NDT Qualiﬁcations. However, this has not been an 
easy task due to the shortage of independent and 
competent personnel in Finland. A draft national 
strategy document for NDT qualiﬁcation has been 
written by the Finnish utilities.
General requirements on inspection qualiﬁca-
tion are provided in Guide YVL 3.8. The document 
European methodology for qualiﬁcation drawn up by 
the European Network for Inspection Qualiﬁcation, 
shall be used as the minimum requirement level 
for qualiﬁcation of inspection systems to be used 
in-service inspection, and it shall be complemented 
by recommended practices. The report stating the 
common position of European regulators on the 
qualiﬁcation of NDT systems relates the qualiﬁca-
tion of inspection methods applied in the in-service 
inspection of nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment to nuclear safety.
Inspection qualiﬁcation means the systematic 
assessment, by all those methods that are needed 
to provide reliable conﬁrmation, of an inspection 
system to ensure it is capable of achieving the 
required performance under real inspection condi-
tions. Each inspection system shall be qualiﬁed for 
in-service inspections such that it reliably detects, 
characterises and/or sizes defects endangering 
structural integrity and nuclear safety.
The licensee is responsible for organising qualiﬁ-
cation and using in its implementation the services 
of a testing body and a qualiﬁcation body. On the 
basis of sections 19 and 20 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act (990/1987), the licensee shall have available the 
necessary expertise and economic resources.
The licensee shall have a qualiﬁcation body for 
qualiﬁcation management, implementation, control 
and assessment as well as the issuing of qualiﬁca-
tion certiﬁcates. The qualiﬁcation body shall be 
competent and independent of the construction 
and operation of nuclear power plants as well as 
ﬁnancial factors that could affect its work and 
decisions.
The personnel of the qualiﬁcation body shall 
have diverse expertise and experience in the 
technical ﬁelds required to assess the capability of 
inspection systems to reliably detect, characterise 
and size ﬂaws. At least one member of the personnel 
monitoring and assessing qualiﬁcations from the 
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inspection technical point of view shall have Level 
3 basic qualiﬁcation for the inspection method in 
question according to a qualiﬁcation system that 
complies with Standard SFS-EN 473 or a corre-
sponding system; in addition, extensive practical 
experience is required on factors that could affect 
inspection reliability in the in-service inspection 
of nuclear power plant components and structures.
A qualiﬁcation body may also be qualiﬁcation-
speciﬁc. The licensee is responsible for assuring the 
continuity of qualiﬁcation by setting up a qualiﬁca-
tion steering committee and assigning to it mem-
bers who have sufﬁcient expertise in the ﬁeld. Ad 
hoc type qualiﬁcation bodies have been established 
by the Steering Committee of NDT Qualiﬁcations. 
However, this has not been an easy task due to the 
shortage of independent and competent personnel 
in Finland. Lack of plans and administration of 
qualiﬁcation process, insufﬁcient written plans, 
procedures and other qualiﬁcation documents have 
made inspection qualiﬁcation difﬁcult. No totally 
qualiﬁed inspection systems have been approved 
by STUK until now.
In-service inspections in the Loviisa NPP
The condition of the pressure-retaining components 
of Loviisa 1 and 2 is ensured with regular in-service 
inspections. The components of the primary circuit 
are inspected by means of non-destructive examina-
tion methods. These regularly repeated examina-
tions are carried out during outages according to 
Guide YVL 3.8. The results of the in-service inspec-
tions are compared with the results of the previous 
inspections and of the preservice inspections which 
have been carried out before the commissioning.
The in-service inspection programmes are sub-
mitted to STUK for approval before each inspec-
tion series. Programmes and related inspection 
procedures are changed when necessary, taking 
into account the development of requirements and 
standards in the ﬁeld, the advancement of examina-
tion techniques and inspection experiences as well 
as operating experiences in Finland and abroad.
Those areas have been tried to select as inspec-
tion objects where defects arise most probably. 
These kind of areas are e.g. objects susceptible to 
fatigue due to temperature variations. The selec-
tion of inspection objects is subject to a continuous 
development.
The length of the inspection period of the regular 
inspections (e.g. ASME Code, Section XI) is normally 
ten years. Inspection programmes have been com-
plemented with additional inspections as regards 
the reactor pressure vessel and the primary circuit 
piping, and the length of the inspection period of 
the reactor pressure vessel has been reduced to 
eight years. The length of the inspection period of 
the objects susceptible to thermal fatigue is often 
3 years.
Guide YVL 3.8 and the latest revisions of the 
regulations ASME Code, Section XI are applied 
as approval bases for the in-service inspection 
programmes and procedures.
The reliability of the non-destructive examina-
tion methods for the primary circuit piping and 
components has been essentially improved after 
the commissioning of the plant. Guide YVL 3.8 
calls for the qualiﬁcation of the entire NDT-system; 
equipment, software, procedures and personnel. 
Improvements of the qualiﬁcation are at an early 
stage and the plans concerning it are general in 
nature. STUK follows the development and imple-
mentation of the plans closely. The implementation 
of the qualiﬁcation system will be a signiﬁcant 
improvement issue in the future.
In addition to the inspections mentioned above, 
physical inspections concerning the condition and 
reliability of pressure equipment are carried out as 
regular pressure equipment inspections according 
to the Finnish pressure equipment legislation. Such 
inspections are a full inspection, an internal inspec-
tion and an operational inspection. These inspec-
tions include non-destructive examinations as well 
as pressure and tightness tests. The inspections 
of piping have been deﬁned in the system-speciﬁc 
monitoring programmes. These periodic inspections 
are dealt with in Guides YVL 3.0, YVL 3.3, YVL 5.3, 
YVL 5.4, YVL 5.7. The periodic inspection pro-
grammes fulﬁl the requirements of YVL Guides, as 
regards the number and techniques of inspections.
The reliability of the non-destructive examina-
tion methods for the primary circuit piping and 
components has been essentially improved after the 
commissioning of the plant. The implementation of 
the qualiﬁcation system of in-service inspections is 
an essential subject for development of activities.
Plant life management
Ageing of the systems, components and structures 
at Loviisa 1 and 2 is followed based on operation 
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and maintenance experiences. A systematic plant 
life management, utilising reports and data systems 
related to inspection, testing, maintenance and 
repair activities, was established in 1995. Tasks 
were reorganized from the beginning of 2002 when 
plant life management was interpreted as one the 
key processes of the new Technology unit.
The present life time management process is 
based on full time system engineers with expert en-
gineering support and system classiﬁcation accord-
ing to life management needs. The process includes 
continuous maintaining the database and updating 
the long term investment plan as well as semi-an-
nual expert meetings and an annual review.
Ageing of the Loviisa 1 and 2 electric and auto-
mation equipment and systems as well as cables is 
systematically followed. The ageing of the plant pro-
tection automation was evaluated in a study carried 
out by the Technical Research Centre of Finland 
(VTT). According to the study there is no immedi-
ate technical need to replace the system. Ageing 
components have been systematically replaced at 
the both units with new devices and components 
fulﬁlling the current requirements. Cables have also 
been extensively replaced.
The renewal of plant automation is in prepara-
tory stage and will be discussed under Article 18.
In-service inspections in the Olkiluoto NPP
The condition of pressure retaining components 
of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is assured through regular 
in-service inspections. Periodically repeated in-
spections are performed during the outages to the 
safety-signiﬁcant components by non-destructive 
testing methods according to the Guide YVL 3.8. 
Results of in-service inspections are compared 
with the results of earlier inspections and with the 
results of pre-service inspections conducted before 
the commissioning.
In-service inspection programs are supplied 
to STUK for approval before each inspection. The 
programs and related inspection procedures are 
changed when necessary, taking into account the 
development of requirements and standards in 
the area, the development of inspection techniques 
as well as inspection experience and operational 
experience from nuclear power plants in Finland 
and elsewhere.
The objective has been to choose areas where 
initiation of defects is most likely as inspection 
items. Such ones are the items that are susceptible 
to thermal fatigue and stress corrosion.
The length of an inspection period is usually ten 
years. The inspection periods for items susceptible 
to stress corrosion are ﬁve or three years and for 
items susceptible to thermal fatigue, respectively, 
three years.
Guide YVL 3.8 and the latest editions of the 
standard ASME Code, Section XI are used as the ac-
ceptance criteria of in-service inspection programs, 
procedures and results.
Guide YVL 3.8 calls for the qualiﬁcation of the 
entire NDT-system; equipment, software, procedures 
and personnel. Improvements of the qualiﬁcation 
are at an early stage and the plans concerning it 
are general in nature. STUK follows the develop-
ment and implementation of the plans closely. The 
implementation of the qualiﬁcation system will be a 
signiﬁcant improvement issue in the future.
In addition to the aforementioned inspections, 
physical inspections that concern the condition 
and reliability of pressure vessels are performed at 
regular intervals according to the Finnish Pressure 
Vessel Legislation. These inspections are the full 
inspection, internal inspection and operational 
inspection and they include non-destructive testing 
as well as pressure and tightness tests. Inspections 
concerning pipelines have been deﬁned in the 
system related condition monitoring programmes. 
These in-service inspections are handled in the 
Guides YVL 3.0, YVL 3.3, YVL 5.3, YVL 5.4 and 
YVL 5.7.
Life-time management of the plant units
The management of ageing at the Olkiluoto plant 
is based on predictions made by an expert group 
composed of experts from the areas of mechanical, 
electrical, instrumentation, civil, maintenance and 
safety engineering. By utilising the operational 
and maintenance experience and research results 
related to the ageing phenomena, the objective is to 
identify in an early stage those areas of the plant, 
that limit the operating life and require signiﬁcant 
modiﬁcation, repair and inspection work or special 
condition monitoring.
The predictions for necessary measures are 
drawn up from the estimates supplied by the 
experts responsible for systems, techniques and 
components as well as by other expert groups, and 
these predictions are updated annually. The unit 
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responsible for operation takes the predictions into 
account when it designs the annual maintenance 
and assesses the comprehensiveness of preventive 
maintenance programs.
The updating of predictions, conducted in con-
nection with the power uprating, was directed to 
e.g. components of the reactor pressure vessel and 
its internals susceptible to stress corrosion, valves 
and pipelines of the reactor plant, sea water canals 
as well as the containment and its cables.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 14.
2.11 Article 15. Radiation protection
Each contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that in all operational 
states the radiation exposure to the workers 
and the public caused by a nuclear installa-
tion shall be kept as low as reasonably achiev-
able and that no individual shall be exposed 
to radiation doses which exceed prescribed 
national dose limits.
Radiation Act includes the ALARA requirement 
for radiation protection. Occupational dose limits 
and dose limits for the general public are set 
forth in the Radiation Decree. These limits are in 
conformity with the ICRP 60 Recommendation 
(1990). Council of State decision 395/1991 includes 
regulations for limiting the radiation exposure of 
the general public and the releases of radioactive 
materials into the environment, arising from the 
operation of a nuclear power plant. These sections 
also cover design limits for releases in anticipated 
operational occurrences and accidents. There are 
several YVL Guides which deal with radiation 
protection as regards the design and operation of 
nuclear power plants, e.g. YVL 1.0, YVL 7.1, YVL 
7.9 (revised in 2002), YVL 7.10 (revised in 2002) 
and YVL 7.18 (revised in 2004). The changes in 
the revised Guides YVL 7.9 and 7.10 concerned the 
requirements for ALARA programmes, the categori-
sation of radiation workers, change of work speciﬁc 
criteria for a detailed radiation protection plan and 
registration thresholds of radiation doses. Also the 
international development in the dosimetry QA was 
included. The major changes of the Guide YVL 7.18 
imply more in depth requirements e.g. for radiation 
safety conditions within the plant during severe 
accident scenarios.
STUK carries out regulatory control for ensuring 
that the radiation protection requirements are com-
plied with during the operation of nuclear facilities. 
Experience gained from operation of Finnish nu-
clear facilities shows that the ALARA principle has 
been followed and that the dose limits have not been 
exceeded. The results of environmental surveillance 
programmes show that the amount of radioactive 
materials originating from Finnish nuclear facilities 
has been very low in their environment. Radiation 
safety is discussed in more detail below.
2.11.1 Topical issues on the 
radiation safety of workers
The radiation safety of workers depends on the 
structure and maintenance of a plant as well as on 
radiation protection measures in connection with 
works. The factors affecting safety at the plant are 
partly same as for the safety of the surroundings 
population (integrity of nuclear fuel, materials/wa-
ter chemistry, functioning of puriﬁcation systems). 
In addition, e.g. the realisation of the work planning 
and permits of radiation protection as well as radia-
tion measurements contribute to radiation safety.
Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants have 
implemented plant-speciﬁc ALARA programmes. 
Key issues in this ALARA implementation are e.g. 
proper maintenance work and outage planning, real-
time dosimetry, training and contamination control. 
The plant operators have also paid special attention 
to water chemistry conditions and the proper selec-
tion of materials, when changing primary circuit 
equipment and components. The activity levels in 
the primary circuit water have been reasonably low. 
STUK has followed the work and made also its own 
judgement on the results.
Loviisa nuclear power plant has carried out a 
project for the renewal of the installed radiation 
monitoring systems (area monitors, air monitors, 
process monitors and efﬂuent monitors) at the plant 
during 2001-2003.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant has contracted 
an outside company to operate the TL dosimetry 
service as a whole. This change in the procedures 
was approved by STUK in 2002. Practical transi-
tion into the contracted (outsourced) service was 
successful.
The Finnish nuclear plants and utilities run a 
joint annual training of contractor’s key radiation 
protection experts as well as basic radiation protec-
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tion training for all workers accessing the nuclear 
power plant.
Monitoring of occupational radiation doses and 
the reporting of measurement data in the central 
dose register of STUK are based to YVL Guide 7.10. 
The Finnish and Swedish competent authorities 
for radiation safety agreed already in 1983 on the 
practice that the radiation doses of the nuclear 
power plant workers received in other country are 
reported in the central register of the home country 
of the workers. The radiation doses received in other 
countries than Finland and Sweden are reported to 
STUK with a speciﬁc dose record, the use of which 
is also imposed by the regulations of European 
Union. 
2.11.2 Radiation exposure of 
workers at the Loviisa NPP
According to Guide YVL 7.9 the objective for the 
limitation of the collective radiation exposure of 
nuclear power plant workers is 2.5 manSv per 1 
GW of net electric power, calculated for one reactor 
unit and averaged over two successive years. At 
the preset power level of the Loviisa plant, this 
corresponded with the average of 1,22 manSv a 
year for one reactor unit. If this value is exceeded 
as a result of the operation for two successive years, 
radiation protection shall be improved at the unit 
in question. Exceeding of the set goal occurred at 
Loviisa 1 in 2001, this was because of the inﬂuence 
of the previous year, when collective dose was 1,7 
manSv. The utility has clariﬁed the situation and 
no further actions are needed. The collective dose 
depends on the extent and nature of works in an-
nual outages. The radiation exposure of the workers 
has not essentially increased during the operation 
at the Loviisa NPP.
The dose limit for the exposure of a worker is 
50 mSv a year. In addition it is provided, that the 
radiation exposure of a person engaged in radiation 
work is limited so that the added dose does not ex-
ceed 100 mSv for the period of 5 years. The personal 
radiation doses at the Loviisa NPP have remained 
under the set dose limits. The largest dose of a 
Finnish worker during a 5 years period 1999–2003 
was received during working at Loviisa nuclear 
power plant, and it was 71,6 mSv.
The radiation dose statistics are presented in 
Table I and Figure 9.
Table I. Radiation doses at Loviisa NPP in 2001–2003.
Year
Collective dose
[manSv]
Maximum personal dose
[mSv]
Average dose*)
[mSv]
2001 1.13 12.4 1.8
2002 2.61 19.5 3.1
2003 0.94 11.6 1.6
*) calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are >= 0.1 mSv/month
Figure 9. Collective occupational doses and distribution of individual annual worker doses at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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average of 1,22 manSv a year for one reactor unit. If this value is exceeded as a result of the operation for 
two successive years, radiation protection shall be improved at the unit in question. Exceeding of the set 
goal occurred at Loviisa 1 in 2001, this was because of the influence of the previous year, when collective 
dose was 1,7 manSv. The utility has clarified the situation and no further actions are needed. The collective 
dose depends on the extent and nature of works in annual outages. The radiation exp sure of the workers 
has not essentially increased during the operation at the Loviisa NPP. 
The dose limit for the exposure of a worker is 50 mSv a year. In addition it is provided, that the radiation 
exposure of a person engaged in radiation work is limited so that the added dose does not exceed 100 
mSv for the period of 5 years. The personal radiation doses at the Loviisa NPP have remained under the 
set dose limits. T  larg st dose of  Fi nish work r during a 5 years p riod 1999–2003 was received dur-
ing working at Loviisa nuclear power plant, and it was 71,6 mSv.  
The radiation dose statistics are presented in Table I and Figure 9.
STUK's review finding is that the limitation of personnel's radiation exposure has been arranged appropri-
ately at the Loviisa plant. Measures for limiting radiation exposure shall be continued according to the 
ALARA principle.  
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Figure 9. Colle tive occupatio al doses and distribution of individual annual worker doses at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant. 
2.11.3 Radiation exposure of workers at the Olkiluoto NPP 
The occupational collective and personal radiation doses at the Olkiluoto NPP have clearly remained under 
the set dose limits. The radiation dose statistics are presented in Table 2 and Figure 10. 
At the present power level of the Olkiluoto plant, the YVL 7.9 limit 2.5 manSv per 1 GW of net electric 
power correspond to 2,10 manSv a year for one reactor unit. The collective dose of the Olkiluoto plant is 
also clearly smaller compared to the average values gained from the boiling water reactor plants of the 
same vintage. 
STUK's review finding is that the limitation of personnel's radiation exposure has been arranged appropri-
ately at the Olkiluoto plant. Measures for limiting radiation exposure shall be continued according to the 
ALARA principle.  
Table 2. Radiation doses at Olkiluoto NPP in 2001–2003. 
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STUK’s review ﬁnding is that the limitation of 
personnel’s radiation exposure has been arranged 
appropriately at the Loviisa plant. Measures for 
limiting radiation exposure shall be continued ac-
cording to the ALARA principle.
2.11.3 Radiation exposure of 
workers at the Olkiluoto NPP
The occupational collective and personal radiation 
doses at the Olkiluoto NPP have clearly remained 
under the set dose limits. The radiation dose statis-
tics are presented in Table II and Figure 10.
At the present power level of the Olkiluoto 
plant, the YVL 7.9 limit 2.5 manSv per 1 GW of net 
electric power correspond to 2,10 manSv a year for 
one reactor unit. The collective dose of the Olkiluoto 
plant is also clearly smaller compared to the aver-
age values gained from the boiling water reactor 
plants of the same vintage.
STUK’s review ﬁnding is that the limitation of 
personnel’s radiation exposure has been arranged 
appropriately at the Olkiluoto plant. Measures for 
limiting radiation exposure shall be continued ac-
cording to the ALARA principle.
2.11.4 Radioactive efﬂuents
In the operation of a nuclear power plant radioac-
tive materials are produced and mainly remain 
within the nuclear fuel. Radioactive materials are 
produced also in the reactor coolant circuit, and 
are further transferred in water, gas and waste 
treatment systems. A very small part of radioactive 
materials is released in the air and water of the 
surroundings.
Fuel rods at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear 
power plants have had low failure rates. There has 
been 0–1 observed leakages during one annual 
operational period of the Olkiluoto reactors during 
the period 2001–2003. There were no observed leak-
ages at Loviisa NPP during 2001–2003. Puriﬁcation 
and waste systems of the both plants have been 
operating properly.
Both nuclear power plants have efﬁciently im-
plemented measures to reduce the releases of radio-
active substances into the environment. Radioactive 
releases into the environment from the Finnish 
nuclear power plants have been well below author-
ised limits (for important nuclides and pathways, 
of the order of 0.01% to 0.1% of set values based 
Table II. Radiation doses at Olkiluoto NPP in 2001–2003.
Year
Collective dose
[manSv]
Maximum personal dose
[mSv]
Average dose*)
[mSv]
2001 1.18 12.7 1.2
2002 1.12 10.4 1.1
2003 1.03 7.9 1.0
*) calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are >= 0.1 mSv/month
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Figure 10. Collective occupational doses and distribution of individual annual worker doses at Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant. 
2.11.4 Radioactive effluents 
In the operation of a nuclear power plant radioactive materials are produced and mainly remain within the 
nuclear fuel. Radioactive materials are produced also in the reactor coolant circuit, and are further trans-
ferred in water, gas and waste treatment systems. A very small part of radioactive materials is released in 
the air and water of the surroundings.  
Fuel rods at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants have had low failure rates. There has been 0–1 
observed leakages during one annual operational period of the Olkiluoto reactors during the period 2001 - 
2003. There were no observed leakages at Loviisa NPP during 2001–2003. Purification and waste systems 
of the both plants have been operating properly. 
Both nuclear power plants have efficiently implemented measures to reduce the releases of radioactive 
substances into the environment. Radioactive releases into the environment from the Finnish nuclear 
power plants have been well below authorised limits (for important nuclides and pathways, of the order of 
0.01 % to 0,1 % of set values based on the requirements of Guides YVL 7.1, YVL 7.2, YVL 7.3 and 
YVL 7.6). The radioactive effluents in 2001–2003 are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3. Radioactive effluents from the Loviisa NPP. Between brackets is presented the %-proportion of 
the release limit.  
Year Airborne effluents Liquid effluents 
 Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. 
[Bq] 
Iodine I-131 ekv. 
[Bq] 
Aerosols 
[Bq] 
excluding tritium 
[Bq] 
2001 4,93E+12 (0,02 %) under MDA 4,10E+07 1,28E+09 (0,1 %) 
2002 4,98E+12 (0,02 %) 9,85E+05 (0,0004%) 6,69E+07 8,46E+07 (0,01 %) 
2003 6,49E+12 (0,03 %) 3,53E+06 (0,002 %) 7,95E+07 3,08E+08 (0,03 %) 
Table 4. Radioactive effluents from Olkiluoto NPP. Between brackets is presented the %-proportion of the 
release limit. 
Year Airborne effluents Liquid effluents 
 Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. Iodine I-131 ekv. Aerosols excluding tritium 
Figure 10. Collective occupational doses and distribution of individual annual worker doses 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
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on the requirements of Guides YVL 7.1, YVL 7.2, 
YVL 7.3 and YVL 7.6). The radioactive efﬂuents in 
2001–2003 are shown in Tables III and IV.
The limit for the dose commitment of an indi-
vidual of the population, arising from the normal 
operation of a nuclear power plant in any period of 
one year, is 0.1 mSv (395/1991). Calculated radiation 
exposures to the person of the critical group living 
in the environment of the nuclear power plants 
are shown in Figure 11. Doses have been clearly 
under the limit. A new set of calculation codes of the 
Loviisa NPP TUULETV2004 and MERI2003 have 
been approved by STUK in 2004.
2.11.5 Environmental radiation monitoring
Environmental radiation monitoring in the vicinity 
of nuclear power plants has been comprehensive 
and implemented according to the requirements 
of Guide YVL 7.7. The experience from the surveil-
lance was taken into account when the nuclear 
power utilities proposed a new monitoring pro-
gramme for approval to be implemented 2004-2008. 
These programs were approved by STUK. Changes 
were minor; a trial of carbon-14 measurements from 
indicator samples in the vicinity of the sites will be 
done during this 5-years period.
An outside contracted laboratory collects and 
analyzes about 400 samples (air, fallout, sediment, 
indicator organisms, milk etc) per year from the 
environment of each NPP. Very small quantities of 
radioactive substances of local origin were detected 
in 2001–2003 on some samples (20–40 per year) col-
lected from the environment of each nuclear power 
plant. Cobalt-60 is the most common NPP-origin 
nuclide detected. Also, silver-110m and manganese-
54 were detected. Concentrations of the radioactive 
substances were very low, and health effects for the 
public are insigniﬁcant.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 15.
Figure 11. Calculated annual radiation exposures to the members of critical groups in the environment of the 
Finnish nuclear power plants. Doses have been clearly under the limit 100 microSv.
Table III. Radioactive efﬂuents from the Loviisa NPP. Between brackets is presented the %-proportion of the 
release limit. 
Airborne efﬂuents Liquid efﬂuents
Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]
Iodine I-131 ekv.
[Bq]
Aerosols
[Bq]
excluding tritium
[Bq]
2001 4.93E+12 (0.02 %) under MDA 4.10E+07 1.28E+09 (0.1%)
2002 4.98E+12 (0.02 %) 9.85E+05 (0.0004%) 6.69E+07 8.46E+07 (0.01%)
2003 6.49E+12 (0.03 %) 3.53E+06 (0.002 %) 7.95E+07 3.08E+08 (0.03%)
Table IV. Radioactive efﬂuents from Olkiluoto NPP. Between brackets is presented the %-proportion of the release 
limit.
Airborne efﬂuents Liquid efﬂuents
excluding tritium
[Bq]Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]
Iodine I-131 ekv.
[Bq]
Aerosols
[Bq]
2001 5.67E+10 (0.0003%) under MDA 3.26E+07 8.64E+08 (0.3%)
2002 2.80E+10 (0.0002%) 9.81E+06 (0.009%) 3.03E+07 7.50E+08 (0.3%)
2003 1.35E+11 (0.0008%) 1.74E+07 (0.02%) 3.25E+07 5.88E+08 (0.2%)
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Figure 10. Collective occupational doses and distribution of individual annual worker doses at Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant. 
2.11.4 Radioactive effluents 
In the operation of a nuclear power plant radioactive materials are produced and mainly remain within the 
nuclear fuel. Radioactive materials ar  pr duced also in the react r cool nt circuit, and are furth r trans-
ferred in wat r, gas nd waste treatment systems. A very sm ll part of radioactive materials is relea ed in 
the air and water of the surroundings.  
Fuel rods at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants have had low failure rates. There has been 0–1 
observed leakages duri g one annual operational period of the Olkiluoto reactors during the period 2001 - 
2003. There were o bserved leakages at Loviisa NPP during 2001–2003. Purification and waste systems 
of the both plants have been operating properly. 
Both nuclear power plants have efficiently implemented measures to reduce the releases of radioactive 
substances into the environment. Radioactive releases i to the environment from the Finnish nuclear 
power plants have been well below authorised limits (for important nuclides and pathways, of the order f 
0.01 % to 0,1 % of set values based on the requirements of Guides YVL 7.1, YVL 7.2, YVL 7.3 and 
YVL 7.6). The radioactive effluents in 2001–2003 are shown in Tables III and IV.
The limit for the dose c m itment of a  individual of the population, arising from the n rmal op ration of a 
nuclear power plant in any period of one year, is 0.1 mSv (395/1991). Calculated r diation exposure  t  
the person of the critical group living in the environment of the nuclear power plants are shown in Figure 9.  
Doses have been clearly under the limit. A new set of calculation codes of the Loviisa NPP TUULETV2004 
and MERI2003 have been approved by STUK in 2004.  
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2.12 Article 16. Emergency preparedness
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that there 
are on-site and off-site emergency plans 
that are routinely tested for nuclear 
installations and cover the activities to be 
carried out in the event of an emergency. 
For any new nuclear installation, such 
plans shall be prepared and tested before 
it commences operation above a low power 
level agreed by the regulatory body.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take 
the appropriate steps to ensure that, 
insofar as they are likely to be affected 
by a radiological emergency, its own 
population and the competent authorities 
of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear 
installation are provided with appropriate 
information for emergency planning and 
response.
3. Contracting Parties which do not have 
a nuclear installation on their territory, 
insofar as they are likely to be affected 
in the event of a radiological emergency 
at a nuclear installation in the vicinity, 
shall take the appropriate steps for the 
preparation and testing of emergency 
plans for their territory that cover the 
activities to be carried out in the event of 
such an emergency.
The basic regulations for on-site emergency plan-
ning are given in the Nuclear Energy Act and in 
Decision of the Council of State (397/1991). STUK 
YVL Guide 7.4 has been revised in 2002 mainly be-
cause of the changes in national rescue legislation.
The licensee is responsible for the on-site 
emergency response arrangements. Emergency 
response arrangements shall also be consistent 
with the rescue service and emergency plans made 
by the authorities in provision against nuclear 
power plant accidents. Appropriate training and 
exercises shall be arranged to maintain operational 
preparedness.
Since the Second Review Meeting emergency re-
sponse procedures at Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear 
power plants have been further developed based on 
the requirements of Guide YVL 7.4 and the experi-
ences in training and exercises. These procedures 
have been regularly tested in annual exercises that 
are part of the plants’ emergency preparedness 
training. STUK has approved major changes to the 
emergency plans of nuclear power plants, and car-
ries out annual inspections to assess the emergency 
preparedness regime, including emergency training 
and exercises. Among other things, the maintenance 
and adequacy of emergency rooms and equipment, 
communication and alarm systems, computerised 
support systems as well as personnel training and 
qualiﬁcations are inspected. Main observations 
in the inspections concerned new equipment and 
computer programmes and their testing, instruc-
tions for emergency situation, annual training and 
exercises. In 2003 STUK organised a joint seminar 
about on-site emergency preparedness at Finnish 
nuclear power plants to share experiences and to 
develop further e.g. training, exercises and co-op-
eration between the nuclear power plants and the 
authorities.
Annual on-site emergency exercises are con-
ducted so that at least the licensee personnel, local 
off-site emergency management group and STUK 
participate in them. There are observers from 
STUK and several other organisations assessing 
the performance of exercising teams. In the 2002 
exercise of Loviisa the exact exercise time was not 
announced in advance for STUK participants. In 
2003 the Olkiluoto exercise was a table-top exercise 
focusing on the regional changes in rescue legisla-
tion and arrangements in Finland.
In addition to the on-site emergency plans es-
tablished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans 
required by the Rescue legislation (468/2003) are 
prepared by local authorities. At the moment, the 
requirements for off-site plans and activities in a 
radiation emergency are provided in the Decree of 
the Ministry of Interior (774/2001) and the guide 
VAL 1.1 (2001) ‘Protective Actions in Nuclear or 
Radiological Emergency’. In the case of an accident 
the local authorities are alerted by the operating or-
ganisation of the plant. The regulations and guides 
are tested in off-site emergency exercises conducted 
every third year. Full scale off-site emergency and 
rescue exercise was carried out in Finland in 2002 
based on the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant accident 
scenario. In 2003 the national exercise concerned 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
The on-site and off-site plans include provisions 
to inform the population in the case of an accident. 
In addition, written instructions on radiation 
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emergencies, emergency planning and response 
arrangements have been provided to the population 
living within the 20 km Emergency Planning Zone. 
Basic information on radiological emergencies and 
response is given in the telephone directories of 
Finland. The published regional directories (about 
the EPZ area) contain similar but more detailed 
instructions.
STUK has an Emergency Preparedness Manual 
for its own activities in the case of a nuclear acci-
dent or radiological emergency. STUK has an expert 
on duty for 24 hours a day, in order to be able to 
immediately give advice to local and governmental 
authorities on needed emergency response actions. 
These actions can include, i.e., warning the popula-
tion with a message which can be heard through 
all radio channels. The message on an exceptional 
event (alarm) can be received from the operating 
organisations of the facilities, or automatically from 
the radiation monitoring network that is dense in 
the whole country (300 measuring stations), or from 
foreign authorities (Figure 12).
Finland is a party to the Convention on 
Early Notiﬁcation of a Nuclear Accident and 
the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a 
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, done 
in Vienna in 1986. Being a member of the European 
Union the Council Decision (87/600/EURATOM) on 
Community arrangements for the early exchange of 
information in the event of a radiological emergency 
applies in Finland, too. In addition, Finland has 
respective bilateral agreements with Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. 
Accordingly, arrangements have been agreed to 
directly inform the competent authorities of these 
countries in the case of an accident.
A new development at STUK is www-FINRI, 
a protected web emergency information site for 
Finnish and foreign counterparts. The Nordic radia-
tion and nuclear safety authorities’ expert on duty 
services have already earlier developed and use 
routinely a dedicated urgent mail - message system 
when exchanging information during nuclear or 
radiological emergencies.
In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency 
exercises held annually on each nuclear power 
plant site, STUK has taken part in international 
emergency exercises. STUK has also participated 
as a co-player in emergency exercises arranged by 
the Swedish nuclear power plants and authorities. 
Neighbouring countries have been actively invited 
to take part in the Finnish exercises. In 2003, all 
Nordic countries participated in the Loviisa ex-
ercise. A lot of efforts have been put to organise 
exercises focusing recovery phase of an emergency. 
Such exercises have been carried out e.g. with gov-
ernmental organisations and with three provinces.
For the new NPP unit at Olkiluoto site the utility 
has already provided STUK e.g. with a preliminary 
emergency plan. This contains the description of 
the basic emergency arrangements including the 
principles for the site emergency rooms and data 
transfer from the main control room to the emer-
gency centres of the nuclear power plant and STUK. 
In 2004 STUK also veriﬁes in the inspection the 
emergency arrangement for the whole site, training 
for construction workers and co-operation arrange-
ments with local rescue authorities.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 16.
Figure 12. The automatic radiation monitoring stations 
of Finland.
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2.13 Article 17. Siting
Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that appropriate 
procedures are established and implemented:
i. for evaluating all relevant site-related 
factors likely to affect the safety of a 
nuclear installation for its projected 
lifetime;
ii. for evaluating the likely safety impact 
of a proposed nuclear installation on 
individuals, society and the environment;
iii. for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant 
factors referred to in sub-paragraphs 
(i) and (ii) so as to ensure the continued 
safety acceptability of the nuclear 
installation; for consulting Contracting 
Parties in the vicinity of a proposed 
nuclear installation, insofar as they are 
likely to be affected by that installation 
and, upon request providing the necessary 
information to such Contracting Parties, 
in order to enable them to evaluate and 
make their own assessment of the likely 
safety impact on their own territory of the 
nuclear installation.
2.13.1 Regulatory approach to siting
Requirements for the siting of a nuclear power plant 
and for an environmental impact assessment are 
provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. According to 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, the application for a 
Decision-in-principle has to include e.g.:
• an outline of the ownership and occupation of the 
site,
• a description of settlement and other activities 
and town planning arrangements at the site and 
its vicinity,
• an evaluation of the suitability of the site and 
the restrictions caused by the nuclear facility on 
the use of surrounding areas,
• an assessment report in accordance with the 
Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (468/1994) as well as a description 
on the design criteria the applicant will observe 
in order to avoid environmental damage and to 
restrict the burden to the environment.
More detailed requirements on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment are provided in the Decree 
(792/1994). The procedures have been applied in 
practice e.g. when modernising and increasing the 
power levels of Finnish nuclear power plants. The 
site selection has to be conﬁrmed in the application 
for a Construction Licence. This application includes 
also up-to-date descriptions similar to the above.
In the design of a nuclear plant, site-related 
external events have to be taken into account. 
Regulation 395/1991 provides as follows: The most 
important nuclear power plant safety functions shall 
remain operable in spite of any natural phenomena 
estimated possible on site or other events external 
to the plant. In addition, the combined effects of 
accident conditions induced by internal causes and 
simultaneous natural phenomena shall be taken 
into account to the extent estimated possible. STUK 
issued a Guide YVL 1.10, “Safety criteria for siting 
a nuclear power plant”, that describes generally all 
requirements concerning the site and surroundings 
of a nuclear power plant, gives requirements on 
safety factors affecting site selection as well as cov-
ers regulatory control. Speciﬁc provisions against 
earthquakes are provided in Guide YVL 2.6.
Structures, systems and components important 
to safety shall be designed and located, as well as 
protected by means of structural ﬁre barriers and 
adequate ﬁre ﬁghting systems so that the likelihood 
of ﬁres and explosions is small and their effect on 
plant safety insigniﬁcant. Detailed requirements 
are presented in Guides YVL 1.0, YVL 2.6, YVL 4.1, 
YVL 4.2 and YVL 4.3.
The probabilistic safety analysis required as part 
of the safety review for Construction and Operating 
Licences provides information on risks caused by 
external events. As an input to PSA, deterministic 
analyses are made to assess the impact of various 
natural phenomena and other external events.
In connection with the construction of the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto plants, safety requirements were de-
ﬁned for the siting of nuclear power plants and for 
the population density and human activities in the 
surrounding area. Currently, these requirements in-
clude also administrative restrictions for industrial 
facilities and air trafﬁc. In a sparsely populated 
country like Finland the safety requirements were 
quite easily and practically achievable.
The operating licences for nuclear facilities are 
granted for a limited period of time. For the license 
renewal, a comprehensive re-assessment of safety, 
including the environmental safety of the nuclear 
facility and the effects of external events on the 
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safety of the facility, has to be done. STUK reviews 
the licence application, including all site-speciﬁc 
safety reports. These reports deal e.g. with mete-
orology, hydrology, population and use of land and 
sea area as well as other items mentioned above. 
During the operation of the nuclear facility, FSAR, 
including the descriptions of its site-speciﬁc parts, 
has to be periodically reviewed and updated as 
needed.
Finland is a party to the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, done in Espoo in 1991. The Finnish policy 
is (Act 468/1994), to provide full participation to all 
neighbouring countries, which can be affected by 
the nuclear facilities in question. In 1976, an agree-
ment was done between Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden as regards nuclear power plants to 
be constructed near the borders. This agreement 
includes provisions for exchanging information on 
such plants. The bilateral agreements mentioned 
under Article 16 include provisions to exchange 
information on the design and operation of nuclear 
facilities.
In Teollisuuden Voima Oy, the preparation of the 
environmental management system based on the 
ISO 14001 standard was started in 1998 and accom-
plished at the end of 1999 when TVO was granted 
an international certiﬁcate based on this environ-
mental management system. TVO’s environmental 
management system is EMAS registered under the 
identiﬁer FIN-000039. The environmental manage-
ment system of Loviisa plant is also based on ISO 
14001:1996 standard and was certiﬁed in 2002.
In 1998, Teollisuuden Voima Oy and Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy launched the Environmental 
Impact Assessment procedure (EIA) of the new 
nuclear power plant. The EIA reports were ﬁnalised 
in 1999. In 1999, STUK issued to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry statements on the EIA reports 
from the radiation and nuclear safety point of view. 
The following issues, among others, were assessed: 
how the applicants fulﬁl current radiation safety 
requirements and releases of radioactive matters 
during normal operation and during a severe ac-
cident situation. STUK also assessed the estimated 
environmental impacts of fuel procurement and nu-
clear waste management. In the STUK statements, 
no factors emerged concerning environmental radia-
tion safety that would prevent the construction of a 
new reactor on the existing sites of nuclear power 
plants: The sites are remote to population and there 
are no large industrial facilities or transport routes 
near the sites; The most signiﬁcant environmental 
impacts of a possible new reactor would arise 
from cooling water discharges increasing the tem-
perature of sea water in the vicinity of the nuclear 
power plant. Based on the Espoo-treaty, Finland 
also received statements on the EIA from the 
neighbouring countries. The co-ordination authority, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, gave its statement 
on the completeness of EIA Report in 2000.
In November 2000, TVO submitted to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry an application 
for a Decision-in-principle for the new nuclear 
reactor unit to be constructed in the existing sites 
either in Olkiluoto or in Loviisa. The application 
was reviewed by all stakeholders. STUK made a 
safety assessment in early 2001 of the siting of 
new reactor unit: Both sites were considered to be 
appropriate for the new reactor of the proposed size 
of 1000–1600 MW electric power. After September 
11, 2001, STUK updated the deﬁnitions for external 
threats to better reﬂect to change in international 
experience base. This update was formulated as an 
Addendum to the safety assessment of the new unit, 
and speciﬁes as aircraft crash design requirement 
both a military craft and a large passenger craft. 
Certain other identiﬁed malevolent external actions 
were also explicitly included in the design require-
ments. The addendum was provided to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry in January 2002.
The statements in favour of the new nuclear 
power plant unit were given by the candidate site 
municipalities. In addition, based on the Espoo-
Treaty between the Nordic Countries, also Sweden 
gave its favourable statement on the application 
for a Decision-in-principle. The statements were 
submitted to the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
that prepared the issue for the decision of Council 
of State. The Council of State decided in favour of 
the Decision-in-principle in February 2002, and this 
decision was conﬁrmed by a vote of 107 to 92 by the 
Finnish Parliament in May 2002.
2.13.2 Protection against external 
events and ﬁres in the Loviisa NPP
The structures of the Loviisa plant have been 
designed taking into account the loads caused by 
natural phenomena applied in Finland. The risks 
caused by natural phenomena have been later on re-
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viewed in connection with the weather risk analysis, 
prepared by Fortum. The analysis has identiﬁed a 
few needs for improvement. External missiles, like 
aircraft crashes or other effects of events caused 
by human actions, have been taken into account in 
the plant design to a smaller extent than required 
for new nuclear power plants. The combinations of 
internal and external effects, evaluated to be possi-
ble, have not been taken into account in the Loviisa 
plant design as required by Guide YVL 1.0. These 
events are evaluated in connection with PSA.
The effects of an earthquake were evaluated to 
be small at the time when the Loviisa plant was 
designed. They were not separately taken into 
account in the design, but it was considered that 
safety factors related to structures and components 
are adequate for taking into account earthquakes. 
The fulﬁlment of the earthquake requirements has 
been assessed in the probabilistic safety analysis 
made by Fortum. According to its results, the risks 
arising from earthquakes are small as compared 
with other risks.
Loss of off-site electric power supply has been 
taken into account in the plant design. The plant 
is currently also equipped with a net connection to 
the Ahvenkoski hydro power station to ensure the 
power supply. The main transformers have been 
protected with a sprinkler system which essentially 
reduces the risk that a ﬁre would spread into the 
surrounding buildings, especially into the turbine 
hall.
The possibility of ﬁres and nuclear accident 
risks caused by them were not adequately taken 
into account initially in the functional design and 
the lay-out design of the Loviisa plant. Therefore, 
ﬁre compartments were not implemented in many 
parts so that the plant safety functions could be 
maintained during all ﬁre situations considered 
possible. For this reason the signiﬁcance of an active 
ﬁre ﬁghting (ﬁre alarm and extinguishing systems 
as well as operative ﬁre ﬁghting) is important along 
with structural ﬁre protection arrangements.
Fire safety has been improved with several 
measures at the Loviisa plant after its commis-
sioning. These measures have been implemented 
in various ﬁelds of ﬁre protection. As a result, the 
plant safety against the effects of ﬁres has been 
essentially improved.
For a provision against oil ﬁres in the turbine 
hall several measures have been taken. Fire insu-
lators of the load-bearing steel structures of the 
turbine building have been installed. The turbine 
hall has been equipped with an automatic sprinkler 
system and the signiﬁcant parts of the turbines 
have been protected. Later on, the ﬁre wall of the 
turbine hall has been built up to protect compo-
nents important to reactor decay heat removal. 
Furthermore, the additional emergency feedwater 
system has been built for the case that all feedwater 
and emergency feedwater systems would be lost in 
a turbine hall ﬁre.
The risk to lose the AC-power during transformer 
ﬁres has been reduced by protecting the diesel gen-
erators against ﬁres. The 110 kV net connection has 
been physically separated from the 400 kV connec-
tion so that the loss of both connections as a result 
of a transformer ﬁre is improbable. Several improve-
ments against ﬁres have been done in off-site power 
supply arrangements and in diesel generators. The 
original ﬁre water pumps are supplied only from the 
off-site electrical network. Therefore, an additional 
ﬁre water pump station has been constructed at the 
plant. It has been equipped with diesel-driven ﬁre 
water pumps and with a separate ﬁre water tank. 
Fire water piping and ﬁre extinguishing systems 
as well as their coverage have been improved. A 
new addressed ﬁre alarm system was completed in 
1999 at Loviisa 1 and in 2001 at Loviisa 2. Several 
structural improvements for ﬁre safety have been 
done, or are under design.
The level of the operative ﬁre protection has 
been improved by establishing a plant ﬁre- ﬁght-
ing crew which is permanent, constantly ready to 
depart and has the proper equipment. As regards 
ﬁre protection and ﬁre risks also plant instructions 
have been complemented.
In the cable spaces, underneath the control room 
level of the control room building, a halon system 
was earlier used as a primary ﬁre protection. Halon 
extinguishing systems were replaced with water 
extinguishing systems by the year 2000.
2.13.3 Protection against external events 
and ﬁres in the Olkiluoto NPP
Usual loadings such as snow and wind loads and 
temperature changes that are applied in Finland 
and caused by natural phenomena were taken 
into account, when the structures of the existing 
Olkiluoto plant were designed. Unusual natural 
phenomena, from the standpoint of plant cooling 
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systems and the cooling of other important spaces 
as well as the functioning of systems, were not 
studied especially when the plant was designed.
Risks that arise from natural phenomena such 
as storms, algae, ﬂuctuation of the sea water level, 
warm air, warm sea water, formation of frazil ice 
and drifting of snow arising from snow storms 
have been examined later in connection with the 
probabilistic weather risk analysis conducted by the 
TVO. Risks have been reduced by improving e.g. the 
suction air system of the diesel generators and sea 
water cooling of the plant against severe weather 
conditions. During recent years maximum sea water 
temperatures have been higher than earlier. As a 
preparative measure for still higher temperatures, 
modiﬁcation work is going on to increase the capac-
ity of the shut-down service water systems.
External missiles such as large air plane crashes 
or other external events caused by man were not 
taken into account in the original plant design. 
Furthermore, the combined effects of external and 
internal events have not been taken into account 
in the design of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 in the manner 
required by the Guide YVL 1.0. These events have 
been examined later in connection with the proba-
bilistic safety analysis. Air craft crash sensitivity 
was re-evaluated after September 2001. Immediate 
catastrophic consequences were found unlikely. All 
site buildings were included in the assessment. 
The assessment criteria were risk of core damage 
and risk of large radioactivity release. Structural 
response evaluations were performed for three 
aircraft types:
• business jet
• large passenger aircraft
• large wide-body passenger aircraft.
It was concluded that the plant design provides 
relatively good protection from aircraft impacts 
based on
• multitude of the systems that can be used to 
achieve the required safety functions
• the presence of four spatially separated safety 
trains.
The containment and the fuel pools are not breached. 
A key aspect of reducing the risk in the event of an 
aircraft strike is the location of equipment of each 
of the four safety trains in distinct quadrants of the 
buildings. Even if safety equipment is lost in some 
of the quadrants, but equipment of one or more of 
the trains survive, safe shutdown capacity is likely 
maintained.
The effects of earthquakes were assessed as 
insigniﬁcant, when the existing Olkiluoto plant was 
designed. The effects were not taken particularly 
into account during the design, but it was consid-
ered, that the safety coefﬁcients included in the 
design of structures and devices were adequate for 
taking earthquakes into account. The risks arising 
from earthquakes have been examined later in 
connection with the probabilistic safety analysis 
conducted by the TVO. The analysis identiﬁed 
certain improvement needs such as the anchoring 
of direct current accumulator batteries and recti-
ﬁer cabinets. After this the rectiﬁer cabinets, some 
of the electronic cabinets and the cabinets next to 
them and the accumulator batteries of two paral-
lel subsystems have been anchored on both plant 
units to prevent them from moving. The control 
room ceilings including lighting ﬁxtures have been 
rebuilt. These improvements reduce considerably 
the risks arising from earthquakes. The anchoring 
of accumulator batteries will be continued during 
the next years.
Preparedness for ﬁres and ﬁre protection
The possibility of ﬁres and the risks of nuclear 
power plant accidents arising from ﬁres have 
been taken into account in the functional and 
layout design of the existing Olkiluoto plant. The 
nuclear power plant does not, however, fulﬁl the 
requirements set forth in the Guide YVL 4.3. Fire 
safety has been improved in different areas of 
the ﬁre protection at the existing Olkiluoto plant 
after commissioning. Although the loss of external 
electrical supply has been taken into account in the 
plant design, the plants were provided with e.g. a 
new start-up transformer, based on the experience 
gained from the ﬁre of the electric supply unit 
in 1991, to improve the independency of plant’s 
external grid connections. Furthermore, the main 
transformers, in-house transformers and start-up 
transformers are protected with a sprinkler extin-
guishing system, which reduces essentially the risks 
arising from transformer ﬁres.
The use of halon is forbidden in Finland after the 
year 1999 with the exception of some special items. 
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Due to this the halon extinguishing systems at the 
existing Olkiluoto plant were replaced with other 
extinguishing systems by the year 2000.
Fire risks have been assessed in a probabilistic 
safety analysis that concentrates on ﬁre issues. 
Based on this the ﬁre protection of cables, that are 
crucial to safety, have been improved at the entire 
plant. On the basis of the probabilistic safety analy-
sis these improvements reduce the risks arising 
from ﬁres considerably.
Olkiluoto 3
Protection against external events and ﬁres in 
Olkiluoto 3 are presented and analysed in Olkiluoto 
3 PSAR and PSA documents . Documents are under 
STUK’s review. STUK is also performing additional 
analyses with respect to aircraft protection by tech-
nical support organisations.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 17.
2.14 Article 18. Design and construction
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
i. the design and construction of a 
nuclear installation provides for several 
reliable levels and methods of protection 
(defence in depth) against the release 
of radioactive materials, with a view to 
preventing the occurrence of accidents 
and to mitigating their radiological 
consequences should they occur;
ii. the technologies incorporated in the 
design and construction of a nuclear 
installation are proven by experience or 
qualiﬁed by testing or analysis;
iii. the design of a nuclear installation allows 
for reliable, stable and easily manageable 
operation, with speciﬁc consideration 
of human factors and the man-machine 
interface.
2.14.1 Defence in depth
According to the Decision 395/1991, several levels of 
protection have to be provided in the design of a nu-
clear power plant. The design of the nuclear facility 
and the technology used is assessed by STUK when 
reviewing the application for a Decision-in-princi-
ple, Construction License and Operating License. 
Design is reassessed against the advancement of 
science and technology, when the Operating License 
is renewed.
In the design, construction and operation, proven 
or otherwise carefully examined high quality tech-
nology shall be employed to prevent operational 
transients and accidents. A nuclear power plant 
shall encompass systems by means of which opera-
tional transients and accidents can be quickly and 
reliably detected and the aggravation of any event 
prevented. Effective technical and administrative 
measures shall be taken for the mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident. The design of a nuclear 
power plant shall be such that accidents leading 
to extensive releases of radioactive materials are 
highly unlikely.
Decision 395/1991 requires that dispersion of 
radioactive materials from the fuel of the nuclear 
reactor to the environment shall be prevented by 
means of successive barriers which are the fuel 
and its cladding, the cooling circuit of the nuclear 
reactor and the containment building. Provisions for 
ensuring the integrity of the fuel, primary circuit 
and containment are included.
Decision 395/1991 requires that in ensuring 
safety functions, inherent safety features attainable 
by design shall be made use of in the ﬁrst place. 
If inherent safety features cannot be made use of, 
priority shall be given to systems and components 
which do not require an external power supply or 
which, in consequence of a loss of power supply, will 
settle in a state preferable from the safety point 
of view (passive and fail-safe functions). Systems 
which perform the most important safety functions 
shall be able to carry out their functions even though 
an individual component in any system would fail 
to operate and additionally any component affect-
ing the safety function would be simultaneously 
out of operation due to repairs or maintenance. 
In ensuring the most important safety functions, 
systems based on diverse operation principles shall 
be used to the extent possible. Furthermore, a nu-
clear power plant shall have sufﬁcient on-site and 
off-site electrical power supply systems. Detailed 
requirements are given in Guides YVL 1.0, YVL 2.0, 
YVL 2.4, YVL 2.7, YVL 3.0, YVL 4.3, YVL 5.2, YVL 
5.5, YVL 6.2.
An assessment of the design of the facility and 
related technologies is made by STUK for the 
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ﬁrst time when assessing the application for a 
Decision-in-principle. Later on, the evaluation is 
continued when the Construction Licence applica-
tion is reviewed. Finally, the detailed evaluation of 
systems and equipment is carried out through their 
design approval process. The design of Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants was reassessed by 
STUK in 1997-1998. The results of this review are 
discussed in Annex 2.
Severe accidents were not taken into account 
in the original design of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants. However, since their commissioning, many 
improvements have been implemented in the plant 
structures and systems, as well as procedures to 
enhance safety and to mitigate the consequences of 
severe accidents. Improvements have been imple-
mented to enhance the safety of the plants and to 
mitigate the consequences of severe accidents. Plant 
improvements are discussed in Annex 2.
Olkiluoto 3
Possibilities to mitigate the consequences of the 
severe accidents are taken into account in the early 
design phase of Olkiluoto 3. This is achieved by 
implementing features to ensure containment in-
tegrity. Thus, it can be demonstrated that the need 
of stringent countermeasures during the severe 
accident are restricted to the immediate vicinity 
of the plant. In line with the deterministic design 
targets, two categories of events for risk reduction 
were introduced:
• Prevention of core melt
• Prevention of large releases.
Design provisions for the reduction of the residual 
risk are:
• Primary system discharge into the containment 
in case of total loss of secondary side cooling
• Features for corium spreading and cooling, for 
hydrogen recombination, and for containment 
heat removal in case of severe accidents.
Application of the Defence in Depth principle in 
the design of the new reactor is presented in the 
PSAR. in addition to PSAR, TVO has performed a 
self assessment on the fulﬁlment of Council of State 
Decision 395/1991 requirements. The application of 
Defence in Depth principle of the new reactor seems 
to follow the principles laid down in the design 
of existing reactors. Technical principal solutions 
presented in the design seem to follow the design of 
the reference reactors. However, a detailed review 
is underway.
2.14.2 Proven technology
The requirement to use proven or otherwise quali-
ﬁed technology is stated in the Decision 395/1991 
as follows: In design, construction and operation 
proven or otherwise carefully examined high quality 
technology shall be employed to prevent operational 
transients and accidents (preventive measures). The 
respective detailed requirements are provided in 
many YVL Guides.
2.14.3 Reliable, stable and easily 
manageable operation
Decision 395/1991 requires that a nuclear power 
plant’s control room shall contain equipment which 
provide information about the plant’s operational 
state and any deviations from normal operation 
as well as systems which monitor the state of the 
plant’s safety systems during operation and their 
functioning during operational transients and 
accidents. Furthermore, it requires that a nuclear 
power plant shall contain automatic systems that 
maintain the plant in a safe state during transients 
and accidents long enough to provide the operators 
a sufﬁcient time to consider and implement the 
correct actions. Special attention shall be paid to 
the avoidance, detection and repair of human errors. 
The possibility of human errors shall be taken into 
account both in the design of the nuclear power 
plant and in the planning of its operation so that 
the plant withstands well errors and deviations 
from planned operational actions.
Plant systems reliability and human factors are 
systematically considered in the probabilistic safety 
analyses. The analyses support the efforts to elimi-
nate accidents or to mitigate their consequences. 
The probabilistic safety analyses are subject to the 
approval of STUK. Human factors in relation to the 
monitoring and control of Finnish nuclear power 
plants are described in 2.8.2 and 2.8.3.
Both plants are planning to modernise their 
control rooms. At the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
this is included into a large automation modernisa-
tion project. At the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
changes in the control room are made gradually. 
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Digital instrumentation and control technology 
has already been implemented in some modern-
ised systems. The development of detailed safety 
requirements and procedures to ensure adequate 
reliability of such systems is still underway.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 18.
2.15 Article 19. Operation
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the initial authorization to operate 
a nuclear installation is based upon 
an appropriate safety analysis and a 
commissioning programme demonstrating 
that the installation, as constructed, 
is consistent with design and safety 
requirements;
ii. operational limits and conditions derived 
from the safety analysis, tests and 
operational experience are deﬁned and 
revised as necessary for identifying safe 
boundaries for operation;
iii. operation, maintenance, inspection and 
testing of a nuclear installation are 
conducted in accordance with approved 
procedures;
iv. procedures are established for responding 
to anticipated operational occurrences 
and to accidents;
v. necessary engineering and technical 
support in all safety-related ﬁelds is 
available throughout the lifetime of a 
nuclear installation;
vi. incidents signiﬁcant to safety are reported 
in a timely manner by the holder of the 
relevant licence to the regulatory body;
vii. programmes to collect and analyse 
operating experience are established, 
the results obtained and the conclusions 
drawn are acted upon and that existing 
mechanisms are used to share important 
experience with international bodies and 
with other operating organizations and 
regulatory bodies;
viii. the generation of radioactive waste 
resulting from the operation of a nuclear 
installation is kept to the minimum 
practicable for the process concerned, 
both in activity and in volume, and any 
necessary treatment and storage of spent 
fuel and waste directly related to the 
operation and on the same site as that 
of the nuclear installation take into 
consideration conditioning and disposal.
2.15.1 Initial authorisation based on safety 
analysis and a commissioning programme
The Operating Licence is needed before fuel loading 
into the reactor. Initial authorization for fuel load-
ing is given by STUK after its speciﬁc inspection 
where readiness of the power plant and operating 
organization is checked. Furthermore, according to 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, the various steps of the 
commissioning, i.e. criticality, low power operation 
and power ascension, are subject to the approval of 
STUK.
Requirements for the commissioning programme 
are set forth in Guide YVL 2.5. According to 
Guide YVL 2.5, the purpose of the commissioning 
programme is to give evidence that the plant has 
been constructed and will function according to 
the design requirements. Through the programme 
possible deﬁciencies in design and construction can 
also be observed.
The commissioning programme is described in 
the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports. 
The participation of the operating staff in the com-
missioning programme is a requirement of Guide 
YVL 1.6. The commissioning programme is to be 
submitted to STUK for approval. The detailed com-
missioning test programmes for systems in safety 
classes 1, 2 and 3 are submitted separately to STUK 
for approval. STUK witnesses commissioning tests 
and assesses the test results before giving stepwise 
permits to proceed in the commissioning.
Trial tests in the Loviisa 
NPP for power uprate
Fortum planned and carried out a trial test pro-
gramme, by which it has been made sure of the 
effects of the nominal power increase on the 
functioning of the systems and components of the 
plant. Normal operation and in a limited way also 
transient behaviour of the plant were studied in 
the trial tests. Studies made by means of the plant 
simulator and the results of transient analyses were 
used in the planning of the trial test programme. 
62
STUK- B-YTO 234
Due to the small number of plant modiﬁcations 
required for the power increase of the Loviisa plant, 
a simple trial test programme supported by the 
simulator studies was considered as appropriate 
and acceptable. Trial tests and disturbance tests 
can not be considered only as type tests, but their 
purpose was to make sure of the appropriate func-
tioning of the components of both units.
The trial operation of both units was carried out 
at the various reactor powers, increasing stepwise 
the current power level (103%, 105%, 107% and 
109%). The trial operation at the power levels 103–
107% continued at both units for several months. 
At the ﬁnal target power level 109% the operation 
of the Loviisa 1 continued for fourteen days and 
the operation of the Loviisa 2 eight days. According 
to the trial test programme, transient tests and 
extensive measurements concerning the state of the 
plant were carried out at various power levels.
Transient tests were carried out at the power 
levels 105% and 109% at both units. They were 
selected so that by means of tests the acceptability 
of the functioning of the most important process 
and control systems of the primary and secondary 
circuit could be veriﬁed, the number of the tests 
being as small as possible. Stopping of a reactor 
coolant pump and stopping of a main feedwater 
pump (without starting up an emergency pump as 
well as a turbine load trip (only at the Loviisa 1) 
were carried out as transient tests.
Based on the trial tests it was considered that 
the units operate as planned also at the increased 
power level. However, e.g. following observations 
were made during the trial tests:
• in the determination of the reactor heat power a 
fault was noticed at the Loviisa 1 unit
• steam ﬂow rate has from time to time exceeded 
the original target value 40 m/s of the steam 
piping at both units
• a hidden fault was detected in the protection 
system limiting reactor power at the Loviisa 1 
unit; the system was unnecessarily launched due 
to the fault.
As a result of the observations mentioned the 
necessary corrective measures were planned and 
implemented.
In conclusion it was noted that the trial tests of 
the Loviisa plant, performed in connection with the 
modernisation, were carried out with acceptable 
results and to the extent necessary for the planned 
power increase.
Trial tests in the Olkiluoto 
NPP for power uprate
An essential part of the modernisation and power 
uprating projects at the Olkiluoto plant units has 
been the test operation. The objective of the test 
operation is to demonstrate planned and safe opera-
tion of modiﬁed systems and the plant integration 
made up of these systems in normal operating 
conditions and in certain probable transient condi-
tions. Test operation has also been used as a part 
of design, when such modiﬁcations have been made 
to the systems of the plant units and set limits of 
the control systems that enabled the operation of 
the units at the uprated power level and improved 
their transient behaviour and mitigated sensitivity 
for the transients.
Test operation included system related tests, 
plant unit related transient tests and so-called 
long-term test operations, during which the reac-
tor was operated at an uprated constant power 
for a longer period of time. Test operations were 
conducted in stages at different power levels under 
STUK’s supervision and within the frames permit-
ted by STUK. Before uprating the reactor power to a 
higher power level STUK conducted a safety review 
concerning the test operation for the power level in 
question and asked the Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Committee for a statement concerning the review 
before granting the test operating license.
Test operation programs that included the entire 
plant units and were drawn up by TVO, were based 
on the original commissioning programs that were 
run through during the start-up phase and that 
were modiﬁed taking into account the test require-
ments caused by the modernised systems. One prin-
ciple was also to minimise the loads to structures 
and equipment caused by the test operation, due 
to which the different transient tests concerning 
the behaviour of the entire plant units were evenly 
distributed, when possible, to both plant units.
For the long-term test operation of the plant 
units the reactor powers were uprated step by step 
from the nominal power of 2160 MW to 2500 MW. 
The test operation begun at Olkiluoto 1 after the 
1996 refuelling outage, when the reactor power was 
uprated to a 105% level from the nominal power of 
2160 MW. In 1997 the test operation was continued 
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at Olkiluoto 1 unit and was begun at Olkiluoto 2 
unit at a 109% level on both units. The reactor pow-
ers were uprated to the ﬁnal level of 115.7% (2500 
MW), designed in the modernisation, after the 1998 
annual maintenance outage.
The most signiﬁcant plant transient tests of the 
test operation were the load rejection test, turbine 
trip test and the by-pass test of the high-pressure 
preheaters. Furthermore, tripping tests of con-
densate and feed water pumps were conducted. In 
addition to the plant transient tests the functioning 
of the most important control systems was tested in 
separate pressure, power and feed water transient 
tests. During the long-term tests the following 
matters, for example, have been monitored: the 
behaviour of the reactor core, the functioning of 
condensate and reactor water clean-up systems, 
erosion and corrosion effects, vibration levels of 
pipelines and turbine generator, temperatures of 
rooms and electric appliances, radiation levels in 
systems and rooms of the reactor plant.
No such matters emerged in the test operation 
that could have formed an obstacle to a continuous 
and safe operation of the plant units at the 2500 
MW reactor power level. Based on the observations 
made during the test operation, several modiﬁca-
tions were made to the plant systems to comple-
ment the plant and the system design that were 
conducted in connection with the modernisation or 
to repair deﬁciencies. Some of the observations were 
made only after a longer period of lower power level 
test operation. STUK considered it necessary to con-
tinue the test operation at the 2500 MW power level 
for about two months before issuing a statement in 
favour of continuing the operation of the plant units 
at the 2500 MW power level.
2.15.2 Operational Limits and Conditions
Nuclear Energy Decree requires that the applicant 
for an Operating License must provide STUK with 
the Technical Speciﬁcations (Operational Limits 
and Conditions). The Technical Speciﬁcations shall 
at least deﬁne limits for the process quantities that 
affect the safety of the facility in various operating 
states, provide regulations on operating restric-
tions that result from component failures, and set 
forth requirements for the testing of components 
important to safety. Technical and administrative 
requirements and restrictions for ensuring the 
safe operation of a nuclear power plant shall be set 
forth in the plant’s Technical Speciﬁcations. Guide 
YVL 1.1 requires that the minimum staff avail-
ability in all operational states and the limits for 
the releases of radioactive substances have also to 
be deﬁned in the document.
The Technical Speciﬁcations have been es-
tablished for each nuclear power plant unit. The 
Technical Speciﬁcations are updated based on 
operational experiences, tests, analyses and plant 
modiﬁcations. The Technical Speciﬁcations are 
subject to the approval of STUK prior to the 
commissioning of a facility. Strict observance of 
the Technical Speciﬁcations is veriﬁed by STUK 
through a regular inspection programme. Technical 
Speciﬁcations, operating procedures and other 
plant documentation need to be updated after plant 
modiﬁcations.
Loviisa NPP
Fortum has established the Technical Speciﬁcations 
for the Loviisa 1 and 2, and STUK has reviewed 
and accepted them. The Technical Speciﬁcations 
are continuously updated, and all the changes 
need to be approved by STUK. The limitations and 
conditions of the reactor and plant operation, the 
requirements for periodic tests and the essential 
administrative instructions are presented in the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
The operating procedures of the Loviisa plant 
are a part of the quality assurance programme. The 
most important instruction types are:
• administrative instructions of which the 
Organisational Manual and especially the 
Administrative Rules included in the Manual 
are essential
• instructions for emergency and transient situa-
tions
• fuel handling instructions and instructions for 
radiation protection
• operating instructions and testing instructions
• maintenance instructions.
The updating and coverage of the procedures are 
subjects to inspection in the STUK's inspection 
programme for the operation of the Loviisa plant. 
In addition, during all inspections of the programme 
individual instructions are evaluated.
An advanced and updated system of procedures 
exists at the Loviisa plant. It includes about 2300 
separate instructions. The instructions cover well 
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work processes and functions important to safety 
and availability.
The system of procedures is a part of the quality 
system of the plant. Strict requirements have been 
set in the Quality Assurance Manual for the cover-
age, responsibilities, updating and observance of the 
procedures. According to the Manual the evaluation 
of the system of procedures is included in the an-
nual review of the coverage and effectiveness of the 
quality assurance programme. Among other things 
the requirements, adequacy and need for updating 
of the instructions and the fulﬁlment of the set 
requirements are considered in this review.
The state of the plant procedures is good at 
the Loviisa plant. Procedures are maintained, 
evaluated and developed systematically and in a 
controlled way.
Olkiluoto NPP
The Technical Speciﬁcations determine the limits 
of process parameters, that affect the plant safety, 
for different operating modes, set the provisions for 
operating limits caused by component inoperability 
and set forth the requirements for the tests that 
are conducted regularly for components important 
to safety. Furthermore, the Technical Speciﬁcations 
include the bases for the set provisions.
The Technical Speciﬁcations have to be supplied 
to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK), when the operating licence is applied, and 
the Technical Speciﬁcations have to be kept updated 
during the entire time of plant operation. STUK’s 
approval has to be applied, if any modiﬁcations are 
to be made to the Speciﬁcations.
The administrative and technical procedures 
needed in operation of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 have 
been gathered into the Operating Manual. The 
Procedures have been inspected by STUK. The 
checking/updating of the procedures is a continuous 
task.
The Operating Manual contains necessary 
transient and emergency procedures for unusual 
conditions.
The Maintenance Manual includes the ad-
ministrative and technical procedures needed in 
maintenance. The most important procedures have 
been inspected by STUK. The power company 
checks the procedures periodically, approximately 
in four-year-intervals.
Updating and comprehensiveness of the pro-
cedures are among the inspection issues included 
in the STUK’s Periodical Inspection Program. 
Furthermore, other procedures that relate to the 
topic of inspection are reviewed in all inspections 
of the STUK’s program.
2.15.3 Operation and maintenance in 
accordance with approved procedures
Requirements related to the procedure approvals 
are provided in the Decision 395/1991: Appropriate 
procedures shall exist for the operation, mainte-
nance, in-service inspections and periodic tests 
as well as transient and accident conditions of a 
nuclear power plant. Detailed guidance is given in 
the guides YVL 1.1, YVL 1.8 and YVL 1.9. YVL 1.9 
requires that documents and operating procedures 
needed by the control room operators have to be 
deﬁned, and that these documents and procedures 
shall be continuously updated. The responsibilities 
and administrative procedures indicating how 
to take care of these actions are described in the 
Quality Assurance Programme.
The procedures for operation, maintenance, 
inspection and testing have been established at 
both Finnish nuclear power plants. The procedures 
shall be approved by the licensee itself, and most 
of them are required to be submitted to STUK for 
information. Detailed requirements are presented 
in appropriate YVL Guides. STUK veriﬁes by means 
of inspections and audits that approved procedures 
are followed in the operation of the facility.
Figures 13 and 14 present the number of exemp-
tions and deviations from the Operational Limits 
and Conditions. Since 1994–1995 the number 
of exemptions from the Operational Limits and 
Conditions has been decreasing but during the last 
years the trend has changed to increasing from 
21 in 2002 to 25 in 2003. The main reason for the 
large number of exemptions at the Loviisa NPP 
was the project to renew the radiation monitors 
that required exemptions in all operational states 
in 2002–2003. The peak in 1994–1995 relates to the 
modiﬁcation of ventilation systems that needed sev-
eral exemptions. In the case of Olkiluoto NPP the 
main reason for the exemptions was the conduct of 
maintenance and repair works. During 2003, there 
was one deviation from the Operational Limits and 
Conditions at the Loviisa NPP and 8 deviations at 
the Olkiluoto NPP; In the case of Loviisa NPP trend 
is decreasing and in the case of Olkiluoto NPP trend 
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is increasing. Human errors are the main cause for 
deviations.
Loviisa NPP
The procedures followed in the operating activities 
of Loviisa 1 and 2 are based on written instructions 
and on operating orders prepared when needed. An 
operating order is prepared e.g. when the operating 
state or power of the unit is changed, or for meas-
ures related to the reactor or nuclear fuel.
By means of a work order system it is ensured 
i.e. that the plant operators are aware of the state 
of the unit. Fortum has developed, and develops 
further, its work order system based on accumu-
lated operating experiences. In addition to the work 
order system the operators in the main control room 
of the units follow failures, repairs and preventive 
maintenance of the components referred to in the 
Technical Speciﬁcations. A shift supervisor gives a 
permit to start a speciﬁc work when he has evalu-
ated the work plans speciﬁed in the work order 
system, taking into account the operability require-
ments of the systems and components set in the 
Technical Speciﬁcations. The main control room is 
provided with information on the operating states of 
the systems and components and on the conditions 
of room spaces as well as on possible deviations 
existing. The deviations are responded according to 
the procedures for operation and transients.
Maintenance
Requirements for maintenance are given in Guide 
YVL 1.8.
In addition to preventive, predictive and repair-
ing maintenance, the maintenance activities of 
Loviisa 1 and 2 cover implementation of modiﬁca-
tion works, spare part maintenance and activities 
during outages.
Figure 13. Number of exemptions from the Operational Limits and Conditions at Finnish NPPs.
Figure 14. Number of plant events in non-compliance with the Operational Limits and Conditions at 
Finnish NPPs.
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The maintenance organisation of the plant takes 
part into the annual maintenance outages planning 
together with the Technology and Operation Units. 
and prepares annual maintenance outages together 
with the operating organisation. Special attention 
has been paid to the reliable activities of subcon-
tractors as well as to the technical competence of ex-
ternal human resources. Both the utility and STUK 
control companies performing inspection activities 
and the technical competence of organisations car-
rying out various duties. In addition to the normal 
monitoring activities, the preventive and predictive 
maintenance programme includes also continuously 
measuring methods, such as the vibration measure-
ments of the control rod drive units, reactor coolant 
pumps and turbogenerators, the monitoring of the 
primary circuit loadings as well as the monitoring 
of leakages, water chemistry and lose parts.
The maintenance procedures at the Loviisa 
plant have been programmed in the plant computer 
according to the work order system. Some parts of 
the system are available to STUK for reading.
The functioning of the systems and components 
is ensured with regular tests. The systems and 
components to be tested and the time periods of the 
tests are presented in the Technical Speciﬁcations. 
At least the respective periodic tests are required 
after the modiﬁcation and repairing works and 
maintenance activities requiring dismounting. The 
performance test programme to be carried out after 
an essential modiﬁcation is required to be approved 
by STUK in advance.
In addition, inspections regarding to the func-
tioning and condition of components are carried 
out when necessary based on operating experiences 
from other plants and on the advancement of tech-
nical knowledge. Other operating organisations of 
VVER-type reactors have been essential sources of 
operating experiences in this respect.
STUK controls monitoring and maintenance 
activities as well as repair and modiﬁcation works 
with regular inspections. During inspections it is 
aimed to make sure that the utility has adequate 
resources, such as a competent staff, instructions, 
a spare part and material storage as well as tools 
for the sufﬁciently effective implementation of the 
monitoring and maintenance activities. Special 
subjects are the condition monitoring programmes 
for the carbon steel piping and their results.
Modiﬁcation management development
An analysis of reported events often reveals that 
deﬁciencies of modiﬁcation management have been 
a contributing factor. Such deﬁciencies include late 
planning, lack of co-ordination with other works, 
last moment changes, documentation defects, unﬁn-
ished disassembling works and delayed updating of 
the documentation.
Proper planning and scheduling are the key 
factors in modiﬁcation management. Loviisa Power 
Plant has completed an extensive project training 
course in 2000 for those in the operating organisa-
tion who will be involved in future modiﬁcation 
projects. Successful projects such as the plant 
modernisation and power upgrading have been 
used as good examples. From the beginning of 2002 
modiﬁcation process has been managed by the 
Technology Unit.
The scheduling of the modiﬁcation planning for 
the next outage is ﬁxed in order to get enough time 
for preparations. Minor modiﬁcations are concen-
trated to every second annual maintenance outage 
and major works are carried out every fourth year. 
This is accomplished by starting from a long term 
investment planning which converts into a long 
term modiﬁcation plan.
During the maintenance outage the scheduling 
ofﬁce is now directing their efforts from the earlier 
control of the overall schedule to controlling the 
individual work packages including also the modi-
ﬁcation works. In the main schedule more time is 
allocated to tests related to start-up. New arrange-
ments for handling the work orders in the main 
control room have been introduced The idea are to 
even up the work load in the main control room and 
decrease the disturbance of the operators.
Quality procedures for executing modiﬁcations 
have recently been updated. The authority to make 
decisions on last moment changes in the scope or 
schedule of the modiﬁcation works has been clari-
ﬁed.
Olkiluoto NPP
The measures that are followed in the operation 
and maintenance of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are based on 
written procedures and on Operating Orders and 
Operating Notices that are drawn up if necessary. 
The Operating Order is drawn up e.g. when the 
operating condition or power of the plant is modi-
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ﬁed or when measures are directed to the reactor 
or nuclear fuel. The Operating Notice, on the other 
hand, is drawn up on unusual procedures that will 
not be permanent.
The Work Request System ensures that the 
operators of the plant are aware of the plant unit’s 
state. TVO has developed its Work Request System 
and will continue to do so on the basis of operational 
experience. In the main control room of the plant 
units, the operators follow, in addition to the Work 
Request System, the failures, repairs and preven-
tive maintenance of the components speciﬁed in 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. The Shift Chief grants 
the permission to begin a single work, when he/she 
inspects the work plans that are in accordance with 
the Work Request System, by taking into account 
the operability requirements for the systems and 
components set forth in the Technical Speciﬁcations. 
The control room is informed from the operational 
conditions of systems and components as well as 
from the room conditions and their possible devia-
tions. The proper response to deviations is speciﬁed 
in the operating and transient procedures.
TVO has available a computer-aided preven-
tive maintenance programme, which includes all 
systems and components that are essential for the 
safety and operability. The program includes the 
normal preventive maintenance measures that are 
in accordance with the Work Request System such 
as calibrations of measuring systems, frequency 
measurements of rotating components, checks of oil 
levels, lubrications and greasing. The comprehen-
siveness of the program is assessed on the basis of 
observations made in connection with operational 
experience and preventive maintenance.
Maintenance
The requirements concerning the maintenance are 
clariﬁed in the Guide YVL 1.8.
The maintenance of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 covers, in 
addition to the preventive and corrective mainte-
nance, the design and execution of modiﬁcations, 
spare part service, outage actions and the related 
quality control.
The maintenance organisation plans and builds 
up the annual maintenance outages together with 
the operation organisation and technical support 
organisation. Special attention has been paid to 
the reliable work of the subcontractors and to the 
technical competence of the external work force. 
The technical expertise of testing laboratories and 
contractors is controlled both by the power company 
and STUK.
TVO has available a computer-aided preven-
tive maintenance programme, which includes all 
systems and components that are essential for the 
safety and operability. The program includes the 
normal preventive maintenance measures that are 
in accordance with the Work Request System such 
as calibrations of measuring systems, frequency 
measurements of rotating components, checks of oil 
levels, lubrications and greasing. The comprehen-
siveness of the program is assessed on the basis of 
observations made in connection with operational 
experience and preventive maintenance.
In addition to the measures listed in the preven-
tive maintenance program, systems, components 
and rooms are controlled in connection with the 
normal operation and daily tour routes. Some of 
the most important components such as the main 
circulation pumps and the turbine are provided 
with on-line monitoring equipment.
The operability of systems and components is 
ensured by regularly conducted tests. The systems 
and the components that will be tested as well 
as the test dates are presented in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations. Periodical testing that correspond 
at least to the aforementioned, are required after 
maintenance measures that require modiﬁcations, 
repairing or disassembling. STUK’s approval is 
required in advance for a functional test programme 
that is conducted after a signiﬁcant modiﬁcation.
Inspections that concern the operability and 
condition of components are also conducted, if nec-
essary, on the basis operational experience received 
from elsewhere and development of technical knowl-
edge. The most signiﬁcant sources of experience, in 
this sense, have been the Swedish BWR plants and 
international communication organs.
As far as the spare part service is concerned, 
it has been made sure that completely assembled 
components, that can be easily used to replace the 
failed component, exist for as many safety-signiﬁ-
cant systems as possible.
STUK controls the condition monitoring and 
maintenance as well as the modiﬁcation and repair 
work by regularly repeated inspections. The inspec-
tions endeavour to ensure that the power company 
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has adequate resources such as a competent person-
nel, instructions, a spare part and material storage 
as well as the tools for adequately efﬁcient imple-
mentation of condition monitoring and maintenance 
actions. Special items are the condition monitoring 
programmes of the carbon steel pipelines and their 
results.
Modiﬁcation management development
The modiﬁcation handling procedure in Olkiluoto 
has been under continuous development since the 
early 1980’s. After the modernisation program and 
several reviews of TVO’s working methods, experi-
ences have been collected in a separate development 
project. The project was realised during the years 
1997–1999 and it had participants from operation, 
maintenance, quality assurance, safety, modiﬁcation 
planning and refuelling planning. Special attention 
was placed also on the new modern automation 
and on modiﬁcations during the ﬁeld installation 
phase.
The project started with exploring
1. The working procedure at present state
2. Comments relevant to the modiﬁcation pro-
cedure collected from the internal, external 
and regulatory audit results of TVO’s working 
methods
3. Experiences from the modernisation programme 
of Olkiluoto1 and 2.
On the basis of the results of the above mentioned 
studies and other experiences, about 60 remarks on 
the state of the modiﬁcation process were collected 
to be taken into account in the development work. 
The target state was deﬁned and it was also checked 
that all remarks had been taken into account. In 
addition, many new ideas were found by the project 
group itself.
In the development work, detailed procedures 
were deﬁned making the decision process more 
exact and taking into account the opinions of all 
parties in TVO’s organisation. Some of the most 
signiﬁcant modiﬁcations made included:
• enhanced information ﬂow on modiﬁcations 
within TVO
• procedure for surveys to use the knowledge of 
the whole TVO-organisation and to enable also 
safety organisation to analyse the safety signiﬁ-
cance already in the early stage of the project
• better commitment of personnel responsible for 
the work
• consideration for independent review on modiﬁ-
cations
• establishment of a basic plan for system modiﬁ-
cations and more exact speciﬁcation for system 
level pre inspection material
• enable comments for the modiﬁcation process in 
early stage
• more exact content for the modiﬁcation plan 
pointing out environmental matters, training, 
commissioning, spare parts
• principle of continuous improvement
• better follow up for modiﬁcation process 
progress
• consideration of changes to the plant documenta-
tion in an early stage.
The practice has shown that there is still need for 
continuous improvement to keep the personnel 
motivated and to take into account all aspects to 
guarantee safe and reliable long term operation 
of the power plant. General training, discussion 
and development seminars have been arranged to 
continue the modiﬁcation process development and 
to get the working organisation committed to the 
new procedure.
2.15.4 Procedures for anticipated 
operational occurrences and accidents
Decision 395/1991 deﬁnes the levels of protec-
tion needed for ensuring nuclear safety. Together 
with the requirements to prevent transients and 
accidents by the plant system design, it is stated 
as follows: Effective technical and administrative 
measures shall be taken for the mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident. Counter-measures for 
bringing an accident under control and for prevent-
ing radiation hazards shall be planned in advance. 
Appropriate procedures shall exist for the operation, 
maintenance, in-service inspections and periodic 
tests as well as transient and accident conditions 
of a nuclear power plant.
At both Finnish nuclear power plants, proce-
dures for anticipated operational occurrences and 
accidents are in use. To the extent found necessary, 
the procedures have been veriﬁed during operator 
training at the plant simulators. At both nuclear 
power plants there are also advanced safety panels 
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for monitoring critical safety functions. STUK has 
independently evaluated the appropriateness and 
comprehensiveness of the procedures for anticipated 
operational occurrences and accidents.
The Loviisa speciﬁc EOP-project (Emergency 
Operating Procedures) was launched by Fortum in 
summer 2000. The initial aim of the project was to 
develop full set of accident and transient procedures 
for initial conditions starting at full power. Before 
the project, an extensive feasibility study of dif-
ferent approaches was carried out. The project is 
based on French approach of combined event and 
symptom based procedures. The development is 
carried out together with EdF, Framatome ANP 
and Fortum Nuclear Services. French consortium 
is mainly responsible for creating strategies for the 
set of procedures as well as transferring knowledge 
of the training and EOP layout. Fortum Nuclear 
Services together with Loviisa NPP ﬁnalizes the 
procedures as well as carries out the validation and 
veriﬁcation routines. The phase 1 will be ﬁnalized 
at the end of 2004.
Plant speciﬁc symptom based EOPs have been 
available at the Olkiluoto units since late 80’s.
2.15.5 Availability of engineering 
and technical support
The requirements in Guide YVL 1.7 also cover tech-
nical support. Competence of the engineering and 
technical support is supervised by the licensee. In 
addition, STUK carries out inspections and audits 
by which also the competence of the support staff is 
evaluated. According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, 
only organisations and their employees approved 
by STUK are allowed to carry out non-destructive 
testing of a nuclear power plant’s structures and 
components. The approval procedures are described 
in Guide YVL 1.3.
Some concern was related to the adequacy of 
engineering and technical support available to 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy when its Operating License 
was renewed in 1998. This was due to the fact that, 
recently, Teollisuuden Voima Oy has quite inde-
pendently designed and implemented some safety 
modiﬁcations at the plant, and the tendency is 
expected to continue. This issue was raised again in 
a preliminary safety assessment by STUK related 
to the Decision-in-principle for the ﬁfth reactor in 
Finland. It was stated that if the Decision-in-prin-
ciple is approved by the Parliament, Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy should in a very early phase start to 
develop its organisation and expertise to ensure the 
safety of the plant in case there is no comprehensive 
design service available in the market.
There has also been some concern about how to 
sustain the expertise of nuclear safety personnel 
in a deregulated environment. This concern has 
especially touched Fortum Engineering that was 
recently exposed to divestment. However, a new 
company, Fortum Nuclear Services Ltd, was founded 
and nuclear safety engineering was transferred to 
this company so that the divestment of Fortum 
Engineering has not reduced the nuclear safety 
expertise of the company.
2.15.6 Reporting of incidents
Guide YVL 1.5 provides in detail the reporting 
requirements on incidents. The Guide provides a 
number of examples of operational disturbances and 
events, which have to be reported to STUK. It also 
deﬁnes requirements for the contents of the reports 
and the administrative procedures for reporting, 
including time limits for submitting of various 
reports. STUK publishes the operational events in 
its quarterly reports on nuclear safety that are also 
available to the general public through internet or 
paper reports in Finnish. STUK Annual Report on 
nuclear safety (see Reference 3) summarizes events 
from the whole year and is available to the general 
public through internet or paper reports both in 
Finnish and in English.
Figures 15 and 16 present the number of events 
at the Finnish nuclear power plants. The total 
number of event reports has varied between 5 and 
25 annually during the last ten year period. At the 
same time frame number of INES classiﬁed events 
(level 1 or above) have been between 0 and 7 annu-
ally. Number of IRS reports produced during the last 
ten year period is 16. During the period 2001-2003 
one IRS report has been produced annually.
INES-classiﬁed events
Loviisa NPP
Twelve events in 2002 and one event in 2003 were 
classiﬁed on the International Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES). In 2002 there was one level 1 event and the 
classiﬁcation of the other events was 0. The level 
1 event was a boron dilution incident at Loviisa 1 
during the annual refuelling outage. When reactor 
70
STUK- B-YTO 234
cavity was cleaned after reloading, more water was 
needed than normally. Boron concentration in the 
primary circuit diluted slightly under the Technical 
Speciﬁcation limits because of inadequate surveil-
lance and poor cleaning instructions. New proce-
dures have been taken into use after the incident.
Olkiluoto NPP
During the year 2002 one event was classiﬁed level 
1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). 
The incident was functional problems with two trig-
gering limits of Start-up and Intermediate Range 
Monitoring (SIRM) system at Olkiluoto 1 and 2. As 
a corrective measure the limits were speciﬁed in a 
proper manner.
During the year 2003, seven events occurred that 
were classiﬁed level 1 on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES). The events were:
• The isolation valve of the main steam line did 
not close at Olkiluoto 1. The procedures for as-
sembling the valve and tightening the shaft seal 
were reviewed.
• Emergency core cooling pumps were disconnect-
ed during the annual outage of Olkiluoto 2. The 
instructions and procedures were reviewed.
• The rate of decrease of the temperature exceeded 
the reactor water temporary change rate deﬁned 
in the Technical Speciﬁcations at Olkiluoto 1. 
Operation instructions were corrected.
• The operating test of the level switches in 
the controlled area ﬂoor drain system in the 
spent fuel storage, speciﬁed in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations, had not been performed on 
four level switches. The respective Technical 
Speciﬁcations were speciﬁed in more detail and 
training on the basics of Technical Speciﬁcations 
was arranged for the personnel.
Figure 15. Number of event reports submitted by Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
Figure 16. Number of events at INES Level 1 and above at the Finnish nuclear power plants.
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• One of the three ﬁre ﬁghting water pumps of 
the plant units was not serviceable as required 
by the Technical Speciﬁcations after the preven-
tive maintenance. The maintenance and sealing 
instructions were updated and training on the 
use of maintenance information systems was 
arranged.
• The ﬁre damper in the stairwell of reactor 
building was inoperable at Olkiluoto 2. The 
instructions that must be speciﬁed using the 
Technical Speciﬁcations were surveyed and all 
tests and inspections speciﬁed in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations were reviewed.
• Vibration measurements revealed that the vibra-
tion levels of three emergency cooling system 
pumps at Olkiluoto 1 were too high. The steel 
plates below the motors were anchored to the 
supporting concrete slab and the empty spaces 
below the steel plates and the grouting were 
injected.
2.15.7 Programmes to collect and 
analyse operating experience
Decision 395/1991 requires the following: Operating 
experience from nuclear power plants as well as 
results of safety research shall be systematically 
followed and assessed. For further safety enhance-
ment, actions shall be taken which can be regarded 
as justiﬁed considering operating experience and 
the results of safety research as well as the advance-
ment of science and technology. Guide YVL 1.11 
provides detailed requirements and administrative 
procedures for the systematic evaluation of operat-
ing experiences, and for the planning and imple-
mentation of corrective actions. Foreign operational 
occurrences have to be assessed as well, from the 
point of view of their safety signiﬁcance.
The licensees have developed the required 
procedures for analysing operating experiences. 
The procedures for root cause analyses are in use. 
Further attention is, however, still needed to avoid 
recurrence of incidents.
STUK veriﬁes by means of inspections and 
audits that the activities of the licensees as regards 
incident evaluation are effective. When necessary, 
a special investigation team is appointed by STUK 
to evaluate a certain incident. The evaluation of 
foreign operational occurrences and incidents is 
based on the reports of the IRS Reporting System 
(IAEA/NEA) and on the reports of other national 
regulatory bodies. IRS-reports are also evaluated 
by the licensees. Reports for the IRS System on 
safety-signiﬁcant occurrences at Finnish nuclear 
power plants are written by STUK.
Special attention was paid to incident evalua-
tion methods and operating experience in Finland 
in 1999. A study was conducted by the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, VTT, to evaluate 
operating experience feedback systems and inci-
dent evaluation methods in the Finnish nuclear 
industry. Several development areas were identiﬁed 
to enhance incident evaluation and to close the op-
erating experience loop in order to avoid recurrence 
of events. Implementation of these measures was 
included to the continuous development of quality 
systems.
Experiences gained from plant operations are 
directly shared with utilities operating similar 
types of plant (same NSSS vendor), and appropriate 
reports are also distributed through WANO. Both 
plants co-operate with WANO and countries hav-
ing similar reactor types. This co-operation is more 
closely described below. STUK has also participated 
in co-operation between international organisations 
such as the IAEA, the OECD/NEA and the EU, who 
exchange information on safety issues and operat-
ing events. Other forums that STUK uses to obtain 
information are WENRA, the VVER Forum and 
the NERS Forum as well as some bilateral agree-
ments. A special exchange of information between 
Gosatomnadzor and STUK on the operation of 
the Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants and 
of Finnish nuclear power plants has taken place 
quarterly.
Exchange of operational experience with 
similar power plants in the Loviisa NPP
VVER reactor operating experience is collected, 
screened and evaluated by a dedicated operating 
experience feedback group composed of engineers 
from the plant operation organisation and from 
Fortum Nuclear Services. The group can give recom-
mendations on further studies and measures to the 
operating organisation. The main information to be 
handled comes from WANO Moscow Centre which 
links all the VVER reactor operators. Additional 
reports are received from the IAEA, OECD/NEA 
and NRC, and naturally the activities of the opera-
tion experience feedback group are not limited only 
to VVER reactors.
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The plant managers of VVER-440 reactors run 
a so-called VVER Club with periodic meetings. The 
plant operation problems, modernisation, back-ﬁt-
ting, plant life management and safety questions 
are handled and experiences are exchanged in these 
meetings and in further individual contacts.
Loviisa Power Plant participates in the WANO 
Peer Review Programme by sending peers to other 
plants including VVER plants. In February–March 
2001 WANO Moscow Centre organised a Peer 
Review at Loviisa Power Plant. Several peers 
including the team leader came from other VVER 
plants. A follow-up review was carried out in March 
2004. This co-operation between plants of the same 
design serves also the exchange of relevant opera-
tion experiences. 
Fortum Nuclear Services has been a partner 
in several international and Finnish safety and 
quality related support programmes. Loviisa Power 
Plant has participated in some of these projects and 
has had a possibility to widen the organisation’s 
experience on current development with other 
VVER operators. The same applies to a couple of 
direct commercial consultation projects which have 
been managed by Loviisa Power Plant.
Exchange of operational experience with 
similar power plants in the Olkiluoto NPP
TVO’s operating experience feedback group consists 
of 7 members and 3 advisors. This onsite group 
gives recommendations to the line organisation that 
makes decisions on eventual corrective actions. The 
industry operating experience from similar reac-
tor types is followed by several means. The main 
sources of information are ERFATOM, KSU, WANO 
and Forsmark. These are explained in more detail 
below. Information is also coming directly from sev-
eral sources (IAEA and OECD/NEA (IRS), Loviisa 
power plant (e.g. operating experience meetings 
and reports), vendors (Westinghouse Atom, Alstom 
Power Sweden AB), component manufacturers, the 
WANO Network, BWROG (BWR Owners Group) 
and BWR Forum (FANP).
ERFATOM was founded by the Swedish utili-
ties and TVO as a consequence of the so called 
Barsebäck incident (July 1992). Activities started 
on January 1st, 1994 in the premises of former ABB 
Atom (Västerås, Sweden). Nowadays ERFATOM is 
part of the NOG (Nordic Owners Group) and issues 
reports every two weeks and topical reports when 
needed. ERFATOM also gives recommendations. 
ERFATOM co-operates very closely with KSU 
(Swedish nuclear training and safety center). KSU 
concentrates on operational safety issues and they 
have the responsibility to screen out external (inter-
national) operating events. ERFATOM screens out 
internal events from Swedish Nuclear Power Plants 
and from Olkiluoto.
TVO is a member of WANO (World Association 
of Nuclear Operators). Although KSU screens out 
important events reported through the WANO 
Network, TVO reviews independently all the SOERs 
(Signiﬁcant Operating Experience Reports) and 
SERs (Signiﬁcant Event Reports) reported by 
WANO. Forsmark units 1 and 2 in Sweden can be 
called as “sister units” of OL1 and OL2. Reports 
from Forsmark 1 and 2 (e.g. licensee event reports) 
and minutes of the meetings of the Forsmark safety 
committee are reviewed regularly.
In addition to the above, TVO participates 
actively in WANO programs and in several interna-
tional technical groups (such as valve group, reactor 
group and turbine group) which have regular meet-
ings about twice a year.
2.15.8 Radioactive waste from the 
operation of a nuclear installation and 
the treatment and storage of spent 
fuel and radioactive waste on site
Management of low and intermediate level waste 
takes place at the NPP sites. At the Olkiluoto site 
the necessary facilities are already in place while 
at the Loviisa site, a solidiﬁcation facility is under 
construction and will be commissioned in 2006. At 
both NPP sites, ﬁnal disposal facilities of rock cav-
ern type are in operation for low and medium level 
radioactive wastes. As these facilities are operated 
by the nuclear power plant utilities, the technical 
feasibility and economic motivation to minimise 
the generation of radioactive waste are evident. The 
average accumulation of low and intermediate level 
waste at Finnish NPPs has been about 75 cubic 
meters per reactor year.
The detailed requirement for radioactive waste 
minimisation is included in Guide YVL 8.3. It calls 
for a limitation of waste volumes in particular from 
repair and maintenance works, and segregation of 
wastes on the basis of activity. Clearance of wastes 
from regulatory control, prescribed in the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and in Guide YVL 8.2, aims at limit-
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ing the volumes of waste to be stored and disposed 
of. Guide YVL 6.2 provides for prevention of fuel 
damages, which also contributes to the limitation of 
activity accumulation in waste from reactor water 
cleanup systems.
Guide YVL 8.3 requires that besides the short-
term radiation protection objectives, also the long-
term properties of waste packages with respect 
to ﬁnal disposal shall be taken into account in 
the conditioning and storage of waste. The Guide 
includes also more speciﬁc requirements for the 
conditioning and interim storage of wastes. Guide 
YVL 8.1 calls for a waste type description, to be ap-
proved by STUK, for each category of reactor waste 
to be disposed of. In the description of waste type, 
the most important characteristics of waste with 
respect to the safety of disposal are deﬁned.
By the end of the year 2003, 7020 cubic meters 
of low and medium level operating waste has accu-
mulated at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs. About 
Figure 17. The volume of low and medium level waste at the Finnish NPPs.
Figure 18. The accumulation of spent nuclear fuel at the Finnish NPPs.
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73% of this waste has been disposed of in the on-site 
repositories.
Guide YVL 1.0 requires that provision for a 
nuclear power plant’s decommissioning shall be 
made already during the plant’s design phase. One 
criterion when deciding the plant’s materials and 
structural solutions shall be that volumes of decom-
missioned waste are to be limited. Guide YVL 7.18 
calls for selection of such construction materials 
that limit the degree of activation and spread 
of contamination and makes decontamination of 
surfaces feasible.
Interim storage facilities for spent fuel are avail-
able at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites. Both are wet-
type storages. At the Loviisa plant, spent fuel was 
earlier transported back to Russia. Amendment of 
the Nuclear Energy Act issued in 1994 requires that 
spent fuel generated in Finland has to be treated, 
stored and disposed of in Finland. Accordingly, spent 
fuel shipments to Russia were terminated at the end 
of 1996, and an extension of the spent fuel storage 
facility was completed in 2000 at the Loviisa site. 
The extension part of the storage was completed in 
2000. At both sites, additional storage capacity still 
needs to be constructed by early 2010’s.
By the end of the year 2003 the spent fuel ac-
cumulation at the Finnish NPPs was about 1350 
tons of uranium.
For taking care of the spent fuel ﬁnal disposal, 
a joint company Posiva Oy has been established by 
Fortum and Teollisuuden Voima Oy. Research, devel-
opment and planning work for spent fuel disposal is 
in progress and the disposal facility is envisaged to 
be operational in about 2020. The repository will be 
constructed in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto NPP site. 
To conﬁrm the suitability of the site, construction 
of an underground rock characterisation facility 
was commenced in mid-2004. Finnish Parliament 
has endorsed a Decision-in-principle made by the 
Government for the implementation of Finnish 
Disposal Facility to the Olkiluoto site.
Safety regulation for spent fuel disposal are 
included in the Government Decision 478/1999 and 
STUK’s Guides YVL 8.4 and YVL 8.5.
To ensure that the ﬁnancial liability for future 
spent fuel and nuclear waste management and de-
commissioning of NPPs is covered, the utilities are 
obliged to set aside the required amount of money 
each year to the State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund. At the end of 2003 the funded money covered 
the whole liability, 1 338 million euros.
A detailed description of spent fuel and radioac-
tive waste management and related regulation is in-
cluded in the Finnish National Report on the Safety 
of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive Waste 
Management (STUK-B-YTO 223, April 2003).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 19.
2.16 Concluding summary on the 
fulﬁlment of the obligations
In the above the implementation of the obligations 
of the Convention, Articles 4 and 6 to 19, is evalu-
ated. Based on the evaluation it can be concluded 
that Finnish regulations and practices continue 
to be in compliance with the obligations of the 
Convention.
Safety improvements have been annually imple-
mented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants since 
their commissioning. There exists no urgent need 
for additional improvements to upgrade the safety 
of these plants in the context of the Convention.
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3.1 Challenges for future work
The Finnish regulatory control system includes both 
periodic safety review and continuous safety review 
processes. Actions for safety enhancement are to be 
taken whenever they can be regarded as justiﬁed, 
considering operating experience, the results of 
safety research and the advancement of science 
and technology. In the following some speciﬁc is-
sues and challenges for future work in Finland are 
presented.
Qualiﬁcation of non-destructive testing
The reliability of NDT systems taking into account 
also the small amount of independent and compe-
tent personnel resources requires special attention 
in Finland. International activities and co-operation 
will be closely followed (see Chapter 2.10.5).
Reliability of digital automation
Practical implementation of the new safety require-
ments and procedures to ensure adequate reliability 
of digital instrumentation and control systems in 
the modernization project of the operating power 
plants and the new nuclear power plant in planning 
can be considered as one of the major challenges 
for the next ten years. This includes also the issues 
related to the digital control rooms.
Provision for plant ageing
Ageing issues in Finnish nuclear power plants have 
already been addressed. However, recent operat-
ing experience has shown that this area requires 
further attention. It is also recognised that ageing 
effects will reveal technical challenges in the future 
for which there need to be expertise available to 
cope with potential problems. The issue of ageing 
has also been included into the national Finnish 
research programme on nuclear power plant safety 
(FINNUS).
Maintaining competence
Based on the evaluation of human resources in 
the nuclear ﬁeld in Finland, further measures are 
needed during the next 5 to 10 years in order to 
avoid loosing competence. Finnish organisations 
have started co-operation to provide professional 
training in nuclear safety. These measures need to 
be enhanced further in the speciﬁc ﬁelds where the 
resource basis is narrow.
3 Planned activities to improve safety
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The Convention on Nuclear Safety is the ﬁrst legally 
binding international instrument for nuclear safety 
in countries that have ratiﬁed it. The content of the 
Convention is consistent and covers well the safety 
concerns connected to the use of nuclear energy. 
The Convention calls for regular reporting on how 
its various articles have been implemented in the 
participating countries and communities.
In Finland the Convention was cordially wel-
comed, and Finland was also among the ﬁrst signa-
tories of it. Based on the experience gained during 
and after the First Review Meeting in 1999, it can 
be said that this international legal instrument can 
be – and it is foreseen to be case also in future – a 
very powerful tool for enhancing the safety of the 
nuclear community.
In Finland the Convention and the review 
mechanism included in it are considered fruitful i.e. 
for the following reasons:
• The preparation of the national reports requires 
a certain amount of self-evaluation. Some short-
ages and development needs of the own regula-
tory framework are ﬁxed and managed before 
reporting the situation to the international 
community.
• The preparation of the review report – if pre-
pared in co-operation with national regulators, 
the nuclear industry and licensees, and the 
technical support organisations – contributes 
to the establishment of a common national un-
derstanding on prioritising the important safety 
issues.
• The reports, as such, form a comprehensive 
database of nuclear programmes not only in the 
own country but also in the sense of providing 
information on other countries’ frameworks 
and programmes. Many Contracting Parties 
have made their reports available through the 
Internet, but also others could be encouraged to 
do the same. In this also the IAEA could provide 
assistance as needed.
4 Conclusions on benefits from 
the first review meetings
• The publication of reports provides for transpar-
ency, which is in today’s world one of the basic 
requirements for gaining general acceptability 
for using nuclear power. Furthermore, the open-
ness in reporting can be considered to be one 
expression of a well-developed safety culture.
• Conﬁdentiality of discussions during the review 
meetings is essential for providing an effective 
and direct atmosphere for the experts to change 
views on the prioritisation of safety issues and 
regulatory policies. Also the way of public report-
ing of the results of review meetings without 
making comparisons between contracting parties 
and without pointing out any countries together 
with some country-speciﬁc needs to enhance the 
safety level of their nuclear facilities is a neces-
sity for an effective review process.
Taking into account the discussions and observa-
tions in the First and Second Review Meeting, the 
following list of items requiring further actions was 
prepared and responded. The list was also published 
on the Internet after the First Review Meeting.
• Reassessment of the requirements for modiﬁca-
tions planned by the power company and their 
independent veriﬁcation (see Article 14).
• Reassessment of the procedures and require-
ments for the submission of documents to 
authorities for approval and information (see 
Article 7).
• Assessment of the degree of detail and control of 
the regulatory guides and other regulations (see 
Article 7).
• Incorporation of safety culture related know-
how into a uniform national programme (see 
Article 10).
• Development of the methods for evaluating the 
appropriateness and functionality of the over-
sight of licensee organisations and strengthen-
ing the control and resources in this sector (see 
Articles 8 and 10).
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• Enhancement of the plant modiﬁcation database 
with adequate technical data (see Article 14).
• Training to increase awareness and considera-
tion of seismic risks at the nuclear facilities and 
updating of the requirements related to the 
control (see Articles 14 and 17).
• Development and maintenance of STUK’s 
Quality System and benchmarking with other 
regulators (see Article 13)
• Evaluation of the independence of the technical 
support to STUK (see Article 8).
These items are also discussed in this report under 
Articles 6–19, as indicated in brackets.
The Second Review Meeting did not rise any spe-
ciﬁc points to be corrected in Finland. The Summary 
Report of Second Review Meeting listed several 
speciﬁc issues that are wished to be addressed in 
the third National Report. These issues have been 
described in the report as follows (number refers to 
the corresponding Article):
• Information on regulatory practices such as ef-
fectiveness of quality management, regulatory 
guidance, adequacy of TSO support, open and 
proactive policy of providing information to the 
public, international co-operation (Art. 7, 8, 13);
• Inspection, monitoring and assessment of the op-
erational safety of nuclear installations through 
the use of performance indicators, analysing 
important events in nuclear installations taking 
into account human performance and organiza-
tional issues; safety management and safety cul-
ture; trends in occupational doses and releases to 
the environment; periodic safety reviews, safety 
of on-site radioactive waste management (Art. 8, 
10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19);
• Information on maintaining competence, simula-
tor training and plant speciﬁc simulators, as 
well as results of national and international 
emergency exercises (Art. 8, 11, 12 16);
• Further and more detailed information on the 
status of safety improvement programmes, back 
ﬁtting of NPPs to meet the current standards, 
information on periodic safety reviews and op-
erating licence renewals, role of advanced safety 
assessment methods such as PSA and updated 
safety analysis reports, measures for severe 
accident management and containment issues, 
operating procedures, including symptom based 
procedures, and guidelines for severe accident 
management (Art. 6, 14, 17, 18, 19);
• Information on provisions in place for ﬁnanc-
ing safety improvement programmes; status of 
decommissioning plans and funds (Art. 11);
• Addressing design principles with respect to new 
reactor concepts (Art.17, 18).
As a conclusion, in Finland the First and Second 
Review Meetings were considered very fruitful and 
it is believed that the Third Review Meeting will 
also follow the same lines.
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Legislation (as of 1.9.2004)
1. Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)
2. Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988)
3. Act on Third Party Liability (484/1972)
4. Decree on Third Party Liability (486/1972)
5. Radiation Act (592/1991)
6. Radiation Decree (1512/1991)
7. Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants (395/1991)
8. Regulations for Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Power Plants (396/1991)
9. Regulations for Emergency Response Arrange-
ments at Nuclear Power Plants (397/1991)
10. Regulations for the Safety of a Disposal Facility 
for Reactor Waste (398/1991)
11. Regulations for Safety of Disposal of the Spent 
Fuel (478/1999)
12. Act and Decree on the Finnish Centre for 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety (1069/1983 and 
1515/1991)
13. Decree on Advisory Committee on Nuclear 
Safety (164/1988)
14. Decree on Advisory Committee on Nuclear 
Energy (163/1988)
ANNEX 1 List of main regulations
YVL Guides (per 1.9.2004)
General guides
YVL 1.0 Safety criteria for design of nuclear power 
plants, 12 Jan. 1996
YVL 1.1 Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety as the regulatory authority for the use of 
nuclear energy, 27 Jan. 1992
YVL 1.2 Documents pertaining to safety control of 
nuclear facilities, 11 Sept. 1995
YVL 1.3 Mechanical components and structures 
of nuclear power facilities. Approval of testing and 
inspection companies, 17 Mar. 2003 (available only 
in Finnish)
YVL 1.4 Quality assurance of nuclear power plants, 
20 Sep. 1991
YVL 1.5 Reporting nuclear facility operation to the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, 8 Sept. 
2003 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 1.6 Nuclear power plant operator licensing, 9 
Oct. 1995
YVL 1.7 Functions important to nuclear power plant 
safety, and training and qualiﬁcation of personnel, 
28 Dec. 1992
YVL 1.8 Repairs, modiﬁcations and preventive 
maintenance at nuclear facilities, 2 Oct. 1986
YVL 1.9 Quality assurance during operation of 
nuclear power plants, 13 Nov. 1991
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YVL 1.10 Requirements for siting a nuclear power 
plant, 11 July 2000
YVL 1.11 Nuclear power plant operating experience 
feedback, 22 Dec. 1994
YVL 1.12 INES classiﬁcation of events at nuclear 
facilities, 16 Jan. 2002 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 1.13 Nuclear power plant outages, 9 Jan. 
1995
YVL 1.14 Mechanical equipment and structures of 
nuclear facilities. Control of manufacturing, 4 Oct. 
1999
YVL 1.15 Mechanical components and structures 
in nuclear installations, Construction inspection, 19 
Dec. 1995 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 1.16 Control of nuclear liability insurance poli-
cies, 22 March 2000 (available only in Finnish)
Systems
YVL 2.0 Systems design for nuclear power plants, 
1 July 2002
YVL 2.1 Nuclear power plant systems, structures 
and components and their safety classiﬁcation, 26 
June 2000
YVL 2.2 Transient and accident analyses for jus-
tiﬁcation of technical solutions at nuclear power 
plants, 26 Aug. 2003 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 2.4 Primary and secondary circuit pressure 
control at a nuclear power plant, 18 Jan. 1996
YVL 2.5 The commissioning of a nuclear power 
plant, 29 Sept. 2003 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 2.6 Seismic events and nuclear power plants, 
19 Dec. 2001
YVL 2.7 Ensuring a nuclear power plant’s safety 
functions in provision for failures, 20 May 1996
YVL 2.8 Probabilistic safety analysis in safety man-
agement of nuclear power plants, 20 May 2003
Pressure equipment
YVL 3.0 Pressure equipment for nuclear facilities, 
9 Apr. 2002 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 3.1 Construction plan for nuclear facility 
pressure vessels, 27 May 1997 (available only in 
Finnish)
YVL 3.3 Nuclear power plant pressure vessels. 
Control of piping, 4 Dec. 1996
YVL 3.4 Nuclear power plant pressure equipment. 
Acceptance of manufacturer, 14 Jan. 2004 (available 
only in Finnish)
YVL 3.5 Ensuring the ﬁrmness of pressure vessels 
of a NPP, 5 April 2002 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 3.7 Pressure vessels of nuclear facilities. 
Commissioning inspection, 12 Dec. 1991
YVL 3.8 Nuclear power plant pressure equipment. 
In-service inspection with non-destructive testing 
methods, 22 Sept. 2003
YVL 3.9 Nuclear power plant pressure vessels. 
Construction and welding ﬁller materials, 6 April 
1995 (available only in Finnish)
Buildings and structures
YVL 4.1 Concrete structures for nuclear facilities, 
22 May 1992
YVL 4.2 Steel structures for nuclear facilities, 19 
Dec. 2001 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 4.3 Fire protection at nuclear facilities, 1 Nov. 
1999
Other structures and components
YVL 5.1 Nuclear power plant diesel generators and 
their auxiliary systems, 23 Jan. 1997 (available only 
in Finnish)
YVL 5.2 Electrical power systems and components 
of nuclear facilities, 24 June 2004 (available only 
in Finnish)
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YVL 5.3 Regulatory control of nuclear facility valves 
and their actuators, 7 Feb. 1991
YVL 5.4 Supervision of safety relief valves in 
nuclear facilities, 6 April 1995 (available only in 
Finnish)
YVL 5.5 Instrumentation systems and components 
at nuclear facilities, 13 Sept. 2002
YVL 5.6 Ventilation systems and components of 
nuclear power plants, 23 Nov. 1993
YVL 5.7 Pumps at nuclear facilities, 23 Nov. 1993
YVL 5.8 Hoisting appliances and fuel handling 
equipment at nuclear facilities, 5 Jan. 1987
Nuclear materials
YVL 6.1 Control of nuclear fuel and other nuclear 
materials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants, 19 June 1991
YVL 6.2 Design bases and general design criteria 
for nuclear fuel, 1 Nov. 1999
YVL 6.3 Regulatory control of nuclear fuel and con-
trol rods, 28 May 2003 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 6.4 Transport packages for nuclear material 
and waste, 9 October 1995
YVL 6.5 Supervision of nuclear fuel transport, 12 
October 1995 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 6.7 Quality management of nuclear fuel, 17 
Mar. 2003 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 6.8 Handling and storage of nuclear fuel, 27 
Oct. 2003 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 6.9 The national system of accounting for and 
control of nuclear material, 23 Sept. 1999 (available 
only in Finnish)
YVL 6.10 Reports to be submitted on nuclear mate-
rials, 23 Sept. 1999 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 6.11 Physical protection of nuclear power 
plants, 13 July 1992 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 6.21 Physical protection of nuclear fuel trans-
ports, 15 Feb. 1988 (available only in Finnish)
Radiation protection
YVL 7.1 Limitation of public exposure in the envi-
ronment of and limitation of radioactive releases 
from nuclear power plants, 14. Dec. 1992
YVL 7.2 Assessment of radiation doses to the popu-
lation in the environment of a nuclear power plant, 
23 Jan. 1997
YVL 7.3 Calculation of the dispersion of radioactive 
releases from a nuclear power plant, 23 Jan. 1997
YVL 7.4 Nuclear power plant emergency prepared-
ness, 9 Jan. 2002 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 7.5 Meteorological measurements of nu-
clear power plants, 28 May 2003 (available only in 
Finnish)
YVL 7.6 Monitoring of discharges of radioactive 
substances from nuclear power plants, 13 July, 
1992
YVL 7.7 Radiation monitoring in the environment 
of nuclear power plants, 11 Dec. 1995
YVL 7.8 Environmental radiation safety reports of 
nuclear power plants, 11 Dec. 1995 (available only 
in Finnish)
YVL 7.9 Radiation protection of nuclear power plant 
workers, 21 Jan. 2002 (available only in Finnish)
YVL 7.10 Monitoring of occupational exposure at 
nuclear power plants, 29 Jan. 2002 (available only 
in Finnish)
YVL 7.11 Radiation monitoring systems and equip-
ment in nuclear power plant, 13.7.2004 (available 
only in Finnish)
YVL 7.18 Radiation protection aspects in the design 
of NPPs, 26 Sept. 2003 (available only in Finnish)
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Radioactive waste management
YVL 8.1 Disposal of low and intermediate level 
waste from the operation of nuclear power plants, 
10 Sept. 2003
YVL 8.2 Premises for removal of regulatory control 
from nuclear waste, 25 March 2002
YVL 8.3 Treatment and storage of radioactive waste 
at a nuclear power plant, 20 Aug. 1996
YVL 8.4 Long term safety of disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel, 23 May 2001
YVL 8.5 Operational safety of a disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel, 23 Dec. 2002
Only the guides without a language marking are available in English. 
The guides are available on the Internet at www.stuk.ﬁ/english.
82
STUK- B-YTO 234
Defence in Depth concept and 
severe accident management 
in the Loviisa NPP
Levels of protection in the Loviisa NPP
Decision 395/1991 requires that in design, construc-
tion and operation proven or otherwise carefully 
examined high quality technology shall be employed 
to prevent operational transients and accidents 
(preventive measures). A nuclear power plant shall 
encompass systems by the means of which opera-
tional transients and accidents can be quickly and 
reliably detected and the aggravation of any event 
can be prevented. Accidents leading to extensive 
releases of radioactive materials shall be highly un-
likely (control of transients and accidents). Effective 
technical and administrative measures shall be 
taken for the mitigation of the consequences of an 
accident. Counter-measures for bringing an ac-
cident under control and for preventing radiation 
hazards shall be planned in advance (mitigation of 
ANNEX 2 Application of Defence 
in Depth Concept in Finnish NPPs
consequences). Detailed requirements are given in 
Guides YVL 1.0 and YVL 1.4.
The Loviisa 1 and 2 units have operated reliably. 
The number of the occurred incidents signiﬁcant 
to safety has remained small. Incidents have been 
dealt with in quarterly reports issued by STUK. 
Important events such as failures of equipment, 
preventive maintenance and deviation from the 
Operational Limits and Conditions cause unavail-
ability of safety important components. Figure 19 
presents the effect of this unavailability to the total 
accident risk. STUK has set a goal value of 5% of 
the total accident risk to the equipment unavail-
ability. The goal value was exceeded during 2003 
because of latent failures of diesel generators and 
preventive maintenance of additional emergency 
feedwater system.
In addition to the structure of the plant, the 
quality of operating activities has also an essen-
tial effect on preventing transient and accidents. 
Quality assurance related to operating instructions, 
Figure 19. Share of the accident risk caused by the unavailability of equipment at the Loviisa NPP.
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa
(percentage of the average annual core damage risk)
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other plant instructions and operating activities has 
been developed by Fortum continuously in recent 
years. In the training of the staff, the importance of 
recognising the instructions and quality assurance 
programme has been emphasised. The inspection 
programme of STUK concerning the operation of 
a nuclear power plant includes several inspections 
which are concentrated on procedures and methods 
followed in operating activities.
Guide YVL 1.0 requires that a nuclear power 
plant is equipped with a protection system. Loviisa 
1 and 2 are provided with the protection systems 
which comprise a reactor protection system and a 
plant protection system. The duty of the protection 
systems is to initiate automatically the needed 
safety functions, if some quantity important to 
safety essentially deviates from its normal value. 
The duty of the reactor protection system is to 
initiate the shutdown of the reactor. The most 
important of the functions initiated by the plant 
protection system are emergency core cooling, decay 
heat removal and containment functions. For these 
functions Loviisa 1 and 2 are equipped with the 
necessary safety systems.
The reactor protection system is realised by 
using relay techniques, and the plant protection 
system by using conventional electronics. The tech-
niques employed are proven, but is already getting 
obsolete. The design and implementation of the re-
actor protection system are based on those solutions 
on which the plant supplier had got experiences 
from earlier constructed VVER-type plants. The 
reliability of the system has been improved based 
on experiences by replacing some components with 
more reliable ones, and by adding new components 
in the system to ensure the function also in the case 
of a common-cause failure of the redundant compo-
nents. The tests and operational experiences of the 
plant protection system show that the solutions 
employed until now have been appropriate.
The renewal of the plant automation is in pre-
paratory stage. The aim of the renewal is to ensure 
that automation systems will not restrict the safe 
and economic operation of the plant to the end 
of planned life time. Maintenance of the current 
automation systems would not be possible still more 
than 20 years. The systems would be over-aged 
and the availability of spare parts would be very 
difﬁcult. The renewal will cover nearly the whole 
automation; including control room, safety automa-
tion, operational automation and training simulator. 
Valve actuators and part of sensors and ﬁeld cabling 
will remain. There will be only minor changes in the 
functions of automation. The new automation will 
be based on digital technology.
The renewal project started in 1999 with stra-
tegic study. The invitation to tender was published 
in December 2002. Two candidates for the supplier 
were selected in June 2003. The supplier of the two 
ﬁrst stages will be selected by the end of 2004. A 
new commercial competition will be arranged for 
stages 3 and 4.
Licensing of the renewal is an essential part 
of the project and it was started at early stage of 
the project by providing information on planned 
schedule and design principles to STUK. In January 
2004 the conceptual design plans of the renewal 
developed together with both candidates were 
delivered to STUK. Preparation of the more detailed 
pre-inspection documents for STUK inspection will 
be started when the supplier has been selected.
The installation of the new automation will be 
realized during the almost normal maintenance 
periods of the units. For this reason there will be 
several stages of the renewal. The installation work 
will start in summer 2006 at unit 1. The renewal 
work at unit 2 will follow 1-2 years later. Stages 1 
and 2 will be completed in summer 2010. Stages 
3 and 4 are planned to be completed in summer 
2014.
The protection systems fulﬁl the fail safe princi-
ple required by Guide YVL 1.0. It means that each 
subsystem settles in a state requiring protection, if 
any of its components fails.
For mitigating the consequences of the postu-
lated accidents taken into account in the design of 
the Loviisa plant, the plant has been equipped with 
the appropriate safety systems. In addition, the 
operators of the plant have available procedures for 
transient and accident situations. These procedures 
have been evaluated by STUK. Emergency Plan 
is a document approved by STUK. It includes i.e. 
the deﬁnitions of duty and responsibility areas for 
accident situations. Regular exercises are carried 
out for testing planned emergency preparedness 
activities.
Major amounts of radioactive materials could 
be releases to the environment mainly in severe 
accidents.
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Technical barriers for preventing 
the dispersion of radioactive 
materials in the Loviisa NPP
Decision 395/1991 requires that dispersion of 
radioactive materials from the fuel of the nuclear 
reactor to the environment shall be prevented by 
means of successive barriers which are the fuel and 
its cladding, the cooling circuit (the primary circuit) 
of the nuclear reactor and the containment building. 
Detailed provisions on the integrity of the technical 
barriers are also given in the Decision 395/1991.
During the operation of a nuclear power plant, 
radioactive materials are mainly produced as the 
result of uranium nuclei ﬁssions in the fuel pellets, 
made from uranium dioxide. The uranium dioxide 
matrix creates as such the ﬁrst barrier for prevent-
ing the dispersion of radioactive materials. During 
normal operational conditions, when the tempera-
ture of uranium dioxide does not rise abnormally 
high, the great majority of ﬁssion products remain 
inside the fuel pellets (in matrix).
As regards the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear fuel, the 
uranium dioxide pellets have been loaded in clad-
ding tubes, the external diameter of which is about 
9 mm. The cladding tubes have been hermetically 
plugged by welding and fabricated as fuel assem-
blies, each comprising of 126 fuel rods. Based on 
its properties the cladding material is well suited 
for the reactor conditions, and it also fulﬁls the 
abnormal durability requirements caused by high 
temperatures.
Next barrier following nuclear fuel (uranium 
dioxide matrix and surrounding hermetic cladding 
tube), for preventing the dispersion of radioactive 
materials, is the pressure-retaining barrier of 
the primary circuit. The main components of the 
primary circuit (the reactor pressure vessel, steam 
generators, pressurizer, piping) have been manufac-
tured from stainless steel, or from carbon steel with 
a stainless steel cladding.
A basis for the primary circuit design was that 
releases to the environment would remain within 
the set limits, although about one percent of the 
fuel rods in the reactor (of about 40 000 fuel rods 
altogether) would lose their cladding integrity 
during normal operational conditions. The water 
treatment system of the primary circuit has been 
equipped with ﬁlter devices by means of which ﬁs-
sion products released in the coolant can be ﬁltered 
and removed. This concerns also corrosion products, 
which have been activated by neutron radiation and 
which are moving in the primary circuit.
Current requirements for the basic dimensioning 
of the primary circuit as well as of the fuel assem-
blies are mainly similar as in the construction stage 
of the plant.
The whole primary circuit is inside the hermetic 
containment, made from steel plates. The steel 
containment is surrounded by a concrete cylindrical 
secondary containment. The secondary contain-
ment has a light roof structure supported by a steel 
frame. A low pressure is held in the space between 
the primary and secondary containment. The space 
has been equipped with a ﬁltered ventilation system 
for reducing possible releases of radioactive materi-
als in accident situations.
The containment was not originally designed 
for severe reactor accidents. Measures to mitigate 
the consequences of severe accidents have been 
implemented later.
Ensuring fuel integrity
Decision 395/1991 requires that the probability of 
signiﬁcant degradation of fuel cooling or of a fuel 
failure due to other reasons shall be low during 
normal operational conditions and anticipated 
operational transients. During postulated accidents, 
the rate of fuel failures shall remain low and fuel 
coolability shall not be endangered. The possibil-
ity of a criticality accident shall be extremely low. 
Detailed requirements are given in Guides YVL 1.0, 
YVL 2.2 and YVL 6.2.
An essential objective of the modernisation of 
Loviisa 1 and 2 was the increase of the reactor 
thermal power by 9 percent units. The increase was 
implemented without changing the current fuel 
thermal margins. This resulted in that the power 
increase had no essential effects on the behaviour 
of the fuel and reactor during normal operational 
conditions, anticipated transient and postulated 
accidents.
Fuel cladding has been fabricated from a zirco-
nium-niobium alloy. The fuel manufacturers have 
a signiﬁcant amount of experiences on its use as a 
fuel rod cladding material. The experiences extend 
to 1960’s. The results of operational experiences and 
hot cell examinations, received from the manufac-
turers, could be conﬁrmed by means of spent fuel 
examinations carried out at the plant. The oxide 
layer on the fuel cladding, caused by corrosion, 
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remains very thin, and the ductility properties of 
the material remain sufﬁcient for the fuel operation 
life.
Measurement results on ﬁssion gas amounts, 
released in fuel rods from fuel pellets, have been 
received from the fuel manufacturer. These results 
have also been assessed with analytical methods. In 
addition, supplementary measurement results have 
been received on fuel assemblies irradiated at the 
Loviisa plant. Based on these results and analyses 
the release rate of ﬁssion gases can be considered to 
be adequately small at the current operation mode 
of the reactor.
The fuel integrity in transient situations related 
to the normal reactor operation is ensured by the 
limitations on power change rates. These limita-
tions are mainly based on studies carried out at re-
search reactors as well as on operating experiences 
received from Russia and other countries.
Based on the current operating experiences of 
the Loviisa plant, the probability of fuel failures can 
be considered to be very small during normal op-
erational conditions (see Figure 20). The structure 
of the fuel assemblies and rods has been developed 
step by step based on accumulated experiences. The 
current upper part design of the fuel assemblies 
takes properly into account the elongation of fuel 
rods during the operation – the elongation is big-
ger than originally considered. The manufacturing 
process of fuel pellets has been changed. The inner 
pressure of fuel rods has been increased. The mate-
rial of fuel assembly spacers is a zirconium based 
alloy. All these changes have had a favourable effect 
on the fuel integrity during normal operational 
conditions, anticipated transients and postulated 
accidents. In Figure 20, the peak value in 1995 was 
caused by the decontamination work carried out for 
the primary circuit.
Several fuel assemblies were clogged at Loviisa 2 
during 1994–1995 after the decontamination of the 
primary circuit. Some of the assemblies were conse-
quently damaged due to fretting failures caused by 
clogging induced vibrations. After this incident the 
fuel failure rate has been almost non-existent.
The probability of a signiﬁcant degradation 
of fuel cooling (heat transfer crisis) is very low 
at Loviisa 1 and 2. This depends mainly on the 
favourable relations between the fuel gross and 
linear power as well as the primary and secondary 
coolant ﬂow rates, coolant amounts and related 
time constants. This is indicated e.g. by a fairly big 
dryout margin during a stationary state.
Based on the reasons mentioned above heat 
transfer crisis is very improbable during anticipated 
transients.
Related to the postulated accidents fuel failures 
would mainly be expected in loss of coolant ac-
cidents, in an accident concerning a control rod 
ejection and in an ATWS-accident. Related to these 
accidents, analyses have shown that the plant com-
plies with the appropriate acceptance criteria.
One basic objective is to prevent transients 
Figure 20. Number of leaking fuel bundles at the Loviisa NPP.
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leading to an unintended criticality of the reactor 
and/or to a reactivity increase. The possibility and 
importance of malfunctions resulting in the dilution 
of the boron solution – boron is used as a reactiv-
ity poison – and of the inner dilution of the boron 
concentration in connection with some accident 
types have been evaluated. Based on calculations, 
signiﬁcant plant modiﬁcations have been done for 
preventing the sudden dilution of the boron content. 
Major modiﬁcations are described later on.
The reliability of the reactor core and contain-
ment emergency cooling systems during an accident 
has been improved by replacing the containment 
emergency sumps of the systems. Heat insulator 
materials, damaged in a loss of coolant accident, 
would have blocked the reactor emergency cooling 
and decay heat removal, if the material had drifted 
to the original sumps. The need for the modiﬁcation 
was discovered in the analyses, which were started 
based on a foreign operating event.
Ensuring primary circuit integrity
Decision 395/1991 requires that the primary circuit 
of a nuclear reactor shall be designed so that the 
stresses imposed upon it remain, with sufﬁcient 
conﬁdence, below the values deﬁned for structural 
materials for preventing a fast growth crack dur-
ing normal operational conditions, anticipated 
operational transients and postulated accidents. 
The possibility of a primary circuit break due to 
other reasons shall be low, too.
The most important components of the primary 
circuit of Loviisa 1 and 2 are the reactor pressure 
vessel, pressurizer, main circulation piping, primary 
collector and heat transfer piping of the steam gen-
erators, reactor coolant pumps, main isolation valves 
and those piping which have a direct connection to 
the reactor pressure vessel. Requirements for the 
construction plan of the primary circuit components 
are given in Guides YVL 3.1, YVL 3.3, YVL 5.3 and 
YVL 5.4. According to these Guides, the components 
in Safety Class 1 shall be dimensioned as required 
by the standard ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel 
Code, Section III, or in other way resulting in the 
same safety level. The primary circuit components 
of the Loviisa 1 and 2 units have been designed ac-
cording to a Russian standard concerning nuclear 
power plants, except the reactor coolant pump, 
which has been designed according to ASME III. 
As regards brittle fracture assessments, the old 
Russian standard from the year 1973 included 
deﬁciencies. Otherwise these two standards do not 
essentially deviate from each other as regards the 
dimensioning.
During the manufacturing of the Loviisa 1 and 
2 pressure vessels systematic quality assurance 
activities could not be implemented in the way re-
quired by YVL Guides. The licensee tried to ensure 
the quality by compensatory measures. The result-
ing deﬁciencies cause some uncertainties in the 
evaluation of the pressure vessels embrittlement.
The reactor pressure vessel has been manufac-
tured from a low alloy CrMoV-steel, and it has an 
inner cladding made from austenitic stainless steel. 
After the three year operation of Loviisa 1 it was 
noted, based on the examinations of material sam-
ples irradiated inside the pressure vessel that the 
material of the circular weld joint at the level of the 
reactor core became brittle faster than anticipated. 
The observation was made before the commission-
ing of Loviisa 2. Neutron radiation produced in 
the reactor core increases the critical temperature 
around which the ductility of the reactor pressure 
vessel quickly decreases, when the temperature 
drops. During the normal operating temperature 
safety is not endangered. However, in some tran-
sient and accident conditions cold water is injected 
in the primary circuit, and the danger of the sudden 
brittle fracture of the pressure vessel increases, if 
there are cracks in the pressure vessel.
The integrity of the pressure vessel in the condi-
tions mentioned above has been evaluated by means 
of thermo-hydraulic and fracture-mechanical calcu-
lations. For decreasing the dose rate of fast neutrons 
36 fuel assemblies on the perimeter of the reactor 
core have been replaced by steel elements. Several 
modiﬁcations of the plant have been implemented 
for reducing loads and decreasing their probabili-
ties. For preventing a cold pressurisation during 
outages, primary circuit relief valves functioning in 
a low pressure have been installed at the units. In 
addition, the best non-destructive testing methods 
have been used for ﬁnding out possible cracks.
Fortum has made both deterministic and proba-
bilistic safety analyses concerning the Loviisa 1 and 
2 reactor pressure vessels. Both analyses fulﬁl the 
acceptance criteria set for them.
The brittle weld joint of the Loviisa 1 reactor 
pressure vessel was heat-treated during the 1996 
annual outage for improving the ductility proper-
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ties of the welding material. In this connection the 
reactor pressure vessel was subject to thorough 
non-destructive tests. The use of the reactor pres-
sure vessel has been accepted so far until the 2004 
annual outage.
Embrittlement rate has been re-assessed based 
on the new surveillance programme representing 
the critical weld. Analysis results were given to 
STUK for acceptance in the beginning of 2004 and 
Fortum was granted a permission to use the reactor 
pressure vessel until 2012.
Based on the smaller contents of impurities in 
the critical welding material the use of the Loviisa 
2 reactor pressure vessel has been accepted until 
2010. So the service life of the pressure vessel is 30 
years also without a heat-treatment.
Other pressure-retaining components of the 
primary circuits of Loviisa 1 and 2 have been manu-
factured from austenitic stainless steel or carbon 
steel which has an austenitic stainless steel clad-
ding. A safety factor for deformations is at least 1.5. 
So the size of a crack resulting in a sudden break is 
so big that the crack can, with great conﬁdence, be 
detected either as a small leakage or be found out in 
in-service inspections. Based on the material selec-
tions, common corrosion wearing wall thicknesses 
can’t occur in the primary circuit.
The effect of the power increase on the primary 
circuit integrity is very minor, because the operating 
pressure isn’t changed and the operating tempera-
ture is increased only by few degrees. The ﬂow rate 
of the primary circuit remains almost unchanged. 
The power increase raises the fast neutron dose of 
the reactor pressure vessel, and it has been taken 
into account in the safety analyses.
The primary circuit over-pressure protection was 
made more effective in 1996 by installing new safety 
valves which have been demonstrated to function 
both with water, steam, and with a compound of 
water and steam.
Erosion corrosion failures were detected in the 
original feedwater distributors on the secondary 
side of the steam generators. Although the direct 
safety signiﬁcance of these failures is minor, Fortum 
decided to replace the feedwater distributors. The 
new feedwater distributors are of a new type. They 
are located on the pipe assembly of the steam gen-
erator which is a different place than the original 
one. In this connection Fortum has extensively stud-
ied different distributors, as an objective a structure 
which is as undisturbed as possible. As a result of 
the new location of the distributor, heat fatigue may 
be possible in the steam generator pipes during 
some accident situations. This has been exactly 
examined. The ﬁnal design was accepted, and the 
last new distributor was installed in 2002.
The original fatigue analyses of the components 
have been carried out a 30 years service life as a 
basic assumption. The number of different loading 
situations has been evaluated for the analyses 
based on this service life. The frequency of the 
occurred loadings has been essentially smaller 
than anticipated. The ageing control of the primary 
circuit components has been made more effective 
by adopting new plant life management system in 
2002.
Ensuring containment integrity
Decision 395/1991 requires that the containment 
shall be designed so that it will withstand reli-
ably pressure and temperature loads, jet forces 
and impacts of missiles arising from anticipated 
operational transients and postulated accidents. 
Furthermore, the containment shall be designed so 
that the pressure and temperature created inside 
the containment as a consequence of a severe ac-
cident will not result in its uncontrollable failure. 
The possibility of the creation of such a mixture 
of gases as could burn or explode in a way which 
endangers containment integrity shall be small in 
all accidents. The hazard of a containment building 
failure due to a core melt shall also be taken into 
account in other respect in designing the contain-
ment building concept. Detailed requirements are 
given in Guide YVL 1.0.
The Loviisa 1 and 2 units are provided with 
the containment in which the increase of the inner 
pressure caused by steam is limited by ice condens-
ers. The inner spray system of the containment 
and the treatment systems for burnable gases are 
an essential part in the provision for mitigating 
accident situations. The primary, pressure-retain-
ing tight steel containment is surrounded by a 
secondary building with concrete walls. The purpose 
of the double structure is to protect the primary 
containment against external effects, and to enable 
a low pressure in the space between the buildings 
with a ﬁltered ventilation system. Releases to the 
environment, arising from containment leaks, can 
be decreased in this way in accident situations.
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Figure 21 shows the results of leakage measure-
ments of isolation valves and penetrations of the 
containment during the annual outage periods. The 
total leakage is presented as a percentage of the 
leakage budget.
The functioning and tightness of the manholes, 
penetrations and process lines isolation valves of 
the containment are veriﬁed with regular periodic 
tests. The tightness of the primary steel contain-
ment is veriﬁed every forth year with tightness 
tests. A special periodic testing programme has 
been established for testing the functions of the 
auxiliary systems necessary for the overall contain-
ment function.
Based on what is presented above, it can be 
concluded that the containment and to it directly re-
lated auxiliary systems have been designed so that 
the containment withstands reliably pressure and 
temperature loads, jet forces and impacts of missiles 
arising from anticipated operational transients and 
postulated accidents.
The original design bases of the Loviisa 1 
and 2 containment systems have not directly in-
cluded loads arising from severe accidents. Decision 
395/1991 and Guide YVL 1.0 require for a severe ac-
cident management as regards the containment of 
new nuclear power plants. Based on a long research 
and development work Fortum has established a 
strategy for the severe accident management which 
is due to the special features of the plant interna-
tionally considered unique and innovative in many 
respects. The essential parts of the strategy are the 
reliable pressure reduction of the primary circuit, 
the retaining of melt core in the reactor pressure 
vessel by cooling the pressure vessel externally, the 
containment decay heat removal by the external 
containment spray system and the prevention of a 
sudden pressurisation (energetic hydrogen deﬂagra-
tions and detonations) by ensuring with catalytic 
recombiners the controlled oxidation of hydrogen 
released in the core meltdown process. The strategic 
plan also included provisions for instrumentation, 
automation and electriﬁcation which are needed for 
the implementation of these measures and which 
are independent from the other operation of the 
plant. An especially favourable aspect in the Fortum 
‘s overall plan was the aim to take care of the reten-
tion of the containment tightness also during severe 
accidents.
Because the integrity and tightness of the steel 
containment can be retained, the safety signiﬁcance 
of the containment bypass through the process and 
other systems is emphasised. This fact is also seen 
in the results of the level 2 PSA.
The external containment spray system was 
implemented in 1991. The depressurisation capabil-
ity of the primary system through separate severe 
accident depressurization valves was implemented 
in 1996. The plant modiﬁcations needed to ensure 
the reactor pressure vessel external cooling were 
installed in the year 2000 for Loviisa 1, and in 2002 
for Loviisa 2. For the hydrogen control, the installa-
Figure 21. The total leakage rate through the isolation valves and penetrations at the Loviisa NPP compared to 
the leakage budget.
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tion of passive autocatalytic recombiners has been 
completed in 2003. Also, the glow plug igniters 
system, installed originally in the early 1980’s has 
been modiﬁed at the same time. In order to ensure 
efﬁcient mixing of the containment atmosphere 
thereby efﬁcient hydrogen removal, a speciﬁc 
pneumatic system was installed in 2002 which can 
be used for forcing the ice-condenser doors open in 
a severe accident situation.
Ensuring safety functions
Decision 395/199 requires that in ensuring safety 
functions, inherent safety features attainable by 
design shall be made use of in the ﬁrst place. In 
particular, the combined effect of a nuclear reactor’s 
physical feedbacks shall be such that it mitigates 
the increase of reactor power. If inherent safety 
features cannot be made use of in ensuring a safety 
function, priority shall be given to systems and 
components which do not require an off-site power 
supply or which, in consequence of a loss of power 
supply, will settle in a state preferable from the 
safety point of view. Systems which perform the 
most important safety functions shall be able to 
carry out their functions even though an individual 
component in any system would fail to operate and 
additionally any component affecting the safety 
function would be out of operation simultaneously 
due to repairs or maintenance. A nuclear power 
plant shall have on-site and off-site electrical power 
supply systems. The execution of the most important 
safety functions shall be possible by using either of 
the two electrical power supply systems. Safety 
systems which back up each other as well as paral-
lel parts of safety systems shall be separated from 
each other so that their failure due to an external 
common cause failure is unlikely. In ensuring the 
most important safety functions, systems based on 
diverse principles of operation shall be used to the 
extent possible. Detailed requirements are given in 
Guides YVL 1.0, YVL 2.1 and YVL 2.7.
The most important safety functions of a nuclear 
power plant are 1) reactor shutdown, 2) decay heat 
removal from the reactor to the ultimate heat sink 
and 3) the functioning of the containment. These 
functions shall be ensured during normal opera-
tional conditions, anticipated operational transients 
and postulated accidents.
Inherent reactor-physical feedbacks have been 
made use of in the design of the Loviisa 1 and 2 
reactors and their reloading so that each physical 
feedback separately, and thus their combined effect, 
mitigates the increase of reactor power during tran-
sient and accident conditions. This is demonstrated 
analytically as well as experimentally during the 
start-up of the plant after the reloading outages.
Both the control rods and the reactor boron 
systems are available for shutting down the reactor. 
The control rods can be used either by driving them 
into the reactor by means of a electric motor, or by 
dropping them into the reactor by gravitation in 
connection with a reactor scram. If the control rods 
lose the needed electrical power, they drop into the 
reactor and shut down it.
The reloading of the Loviisa 1 and 2 reactors 
have been designed so that the reactor can be shut 
down with the control rods during normal opera-
tional conditions, anticipated operational transient 
and postulated accidents, although the most effec-
tive control rod would not function.
In addition to the control rods, the reactors can 
be shut down with the boron systems. Boron is used 
in the coolant for the long-term power control of the 
reactor. Modiﬁcations in the systems and operation 
mode of the plant have been done for avoiding an 
unintended boron concentration dilution of the 
coolant. For example following modiﬁcations were 
implemented:
• In the beginning of the fuel cycle borated water 
from a dedicated tank is used to dilute primary 
coolant. The boron content of the water is such 
that a possible boron dilution transient does not 
result in a reactivity accident.
• The dilution of the primary coolant will be 
interrupted in case of primary coolant pump 
stopping.
• Borating of the primary coolant will be started 
automatically in case of stopping of 4 or more 
primary coolant pumps.
• Before starting of a primary coolant pump the 
loop will be ﬂushed with the counter-current ﬂow 
through the loop.
The risk of the boron concentration dilution aris-
ing from external reasons has been reduced to an 
acceptable level with these measures. The safety 
signiﬁcance of the inner boron dilution during some 
accident situations has been considered small based 
on Fortum's extensive assessments.
Decay heat is removed from the primary to the 
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secondary circuit by a gravitation-driven inher-
ent circulation in six similar coolant loops. Heat 
transferred into the secondary circuit can be 
further transferred in the sea or to the atmosphere 
by several different systems. In these systems 
active components are needed. The driving power 
of these components is supplied either from the 
diesel-backed power sources or diesel generators. 
The additional emergency feedwater system has 
been equipped with own diesel-operated pumps. The 
system is partly common to both units. The decay 
heat removal by the secondary circuit is ensured in 
a versatile and reliable way.
After a possible break in the primary circuit, 
at the beginning water would be obtained in the 
primary circuit from the safety accumulator tanks 
which discharge without external driving power. 
Later on, decay heat should be removed by means 
of the active components which need electric energy 
as a driving power and which mainly are four- re-
dundant.
If the decay heat removal isn’t possible through 
the secondary circuit, there is an alternative way 
to remove decay heat directly from the primary 
circuit by a so-called feed and bleed method. In this 
case, water is injected in the primary circuit with 
high pressure safety injection cooling pumps. In the 
primary circuit up-heated water is discharged in the 
containment by opening the new safety valves of the 
pressurizer. The valves have a large capacity. Decay 
heat is removed from the containment by circula-
tion through the sumps by means of the emergency 
heat transfer chain.
The emergency sump structures of the contain-
ment have been completely re-designed after a 
foreign operational event indicated that the original 
design had essential deﬁciencies. A sump blockage 
would mean the complete loss of the emergency core 
cooling function. A danger for a blockage occurs, 
when heat insulators around the primary circuit 
pipes are damaged during pipe breaks. Due to 
its characteristics, a damaged insulator material 
disturbs the sump function much more than previ-
ously was believed. The new strainer structures of 
the sumps have been designed to collect the largest 
possible amount of damaged insulators without 
disturbing the emergency core cooling function. 
This amount has been determined based on the best 
current knowledge, taking into account also other 
impurities released simultaneously. In addition, the 
new sump strainers have been equipped with an 
instrumentation and a puriﬁcation system. In this 
way the build-up of a blockage can be controlled and 
when necessary the strainers can be puriﬁed. So the 
long-term function is also ensured.
As a result of the sump modiﬁcation, a need 
has also been noted to evaluate more closely the 
functioning of the high pressure safety injection 
pumps during a sump circulation. The pumps in 
question have been designed only for pumping 
clean water, but during the sump circulation they 
may be exposed to impurity loads, especially at the 
beginning of the circulation. Fortum has examined 
the functioning of the pumps with water including 
insulator-impurities.
Additional tests were performed with a strainer 
element in order to investigate effects of pressure 
loss caused by fragmented paint debris, especially 
with thin ﬁbre beds. Due to increased sump strainer 
area the amount of ﬁbres penetrating the strainer 
system would also increase. Therefore high and low 
head safety injection pumps were tested with ﬁbre 
concentrations higher than those used in previous 
tests. The tests for low pressure pumps were per-
formed with different types of shaft seals.
The low pressure safety injection pumps were 
renewed in 2000–2002. In order to increase the 
delivery head of the low pressure safety injection 
system the new pumps have higher head than the 
original ones. The modiﬁcation of the low pressure 
safety injection system included also an increase of 
the water volume and lowering the pressure of the 
passive safety accumulators. The goal of these modi-
ﬁcations was to improve core cooling by increasing 
the feeding capacity of the system and lengthen the 
injection period of the accumulators.
The intermediate circuit of the emergency heat 
transfer chain has a function to transfer decay heat 
from the emergency core cooling systems to the sea 
water. The intermediate circuit has been re-dimen-
sioned, because the original design included faults. 
According to the revised safety analyses, the sump 
water accumulating on the containment ﬂoor may 
warm up near to the saturated temperature in some 
primary coolant leak situations. This increases the 
heat load to the intermediate circuit, and together 
with the simultaneous high sea water temperature 
results in the temperature level increase of 10 de-
grees in the intermediate circuit. In addition to the 
decay heat transfer, the intermediate circuit has a 
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function to cool almost all emergency, auxiliary and 
support systems important to the plant's safety, and 
their room spaces. The original design temperatures 
of the most cooling objects of this kind would be 
exceeded, when the temperature of the intermediate 
circuit rises. Fortum took immediately measures 
both to make the functioning of the intermediate 
circuit more effective and to develop the systems 
concerned and components to withstand the higher 
functioning temperature. The needed measures 
have been designed and mainly implemented. 
These safety improvements would have been made 
independently of the plant nominal power.
Plant modiﬁcations have been done to ensure 
the reactor core cooling and decay heat transfer 
in the case of leaks from the primary side of a 
steam generator to the secondary circuit. These 
plant modiﬁcations are the construction of a new 
safety injection water tank common for the both 
units, the spray pipelines of the pressurizer from 
the high pressure safety injection pumps and the 
increases of a protection automation. The manage-
ment of the primary–secondary leaks is based on 
the assumption that the steam pipelines integrity 
is maintained. Pressure shocks endangering the 
integrity of the steam piping in this situation were 
evaluated. However, the possibility of the pressure 
shocks of a dangerous magnitude, in the critical 
location of the piping from the viewpoint of the ac-
cident management, can be evaluated to be so small 
that the management of the primary–secondary 
leaks can be considered as acceptable. Emergency 
operation procedures take into account that the 
safety valve of the steam generator may stick open 
in the steam generator collector break.
The functioning of active components is not 
required to keep the containment pressure and 
temperature within the design values at the begin-
ning of any design basis accident. In situations 
during which large amounts of steam leak in the 
containment, the containment inner spray system 
is needed to ensure the integrity and functioning of 
the containment after the melting of the ice in the 
ice condensers. In this kind of situation decay heat 
released from the reactor is separately transferred 
through the emergency core cooling system and 
intermediate cooling system into the sea water 
circuit. The functioning of these systems is based 
on active components which need electric energy as 
their driving power. Decay heat removal from the 
containment is also possible to carry out with an 
external spray system which is directed on the outer 
surface of the containment. The spray pumps get 
their driving power from their own diesel generators 
which are independent of other electric systems of 
the plant. The tightness of the process penetrations 
of the containment is ensured with isolation valves, 
the number of which is mainly two, one is inside and 
the other outside the containment.
The possibility for a preventive maintenance 
during the operation is limited for the systems 
where the number of the redundant components 
is only two. The needed preventive maintenance 
requires, however, that from time to time some com-
ponents are separated from the process. Maximising 
the operability of systems with a well planned 
preventive maintenance is a demanding duty. It is 
subject to Fortum’s continuous attention.
The external electric power supply system of the 
Loviisa plant comprises two 400 kV and one 110 kV 
connections to the Finnish base electrical network. 
In addition to the normal internal electric systems, 
there are four diesel generators per unit for the 
emergency supply of electric power as well as bat-
tery systems. The plant safety systems have been 
divided into two subsystems which are separated 
from each other. Each subsystem is supplied from 
the external electrical network or from two diesel 
generators. Each component is supplied from a bus 
bar connected to a separate diesel generator in 
those plant systems which comprise four redundant 
active components, e.g. low and high pressure safety 
injection pumps.
A 20 kV overhead line connection has also been 
built to the Loviisa plant from the Ahvenkoski 
hydro power station, located at the extent of 20 
km from the Loviisa plant. This connection can be 
coupled instead of any diesel generator.
Many electric component modiﬁcations have 
been done at Loviisa 1 and 2 to ensure safety 
functions. The purpose of these modiﬁcations is to 
ensure the functioning of the safety systems during 
accident conditions, taking into account the require-
ments indicated by the revised safety analyses.
Detailed requirements given in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations guide the operation of the units in 
maintaining continuously the acceptable safety 
level and in ensuring the necessary safety functions. 
The requirements of the Technical Speciﬁcations are 
extensive as regards their number as well as very 
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detailed as regards their content, indicating thus 
the need to compensate system deﬁciencies resulted 
from the design bases with strict administrative 
procedures.
The components needed for the safety functions 
of Loviisa 1 and 2 are not completely well separated 
physically, and so a same external cause may result 
in a failure of redundant components. Therefore, 
after the commissioning of the plant several modi-
ﬁcations have had to be done, mainly as a result of 
the separation requirements for ﬁre protection. The 
physical separation of the systems has been further 
improved based on the results of the probabilistic 
safety analyses concerning ﬁre and ﬂood risks.
In conclusion, the safety functions of the Loviisa 
plant have been ensured according to Decision 
395/1991 except the following deviations: The 
functioning of the safety systems has not fully 
been ensured in case of an individual component 
is inoperable and additionally other component is 
out of operation simultaneously due to repairs or 
maintenance. In addition, the redundant parts of 
the safety systems have not been fully separated 
from each other so that their failure as a result of 
the same external cause would be unlikely.
After the commissioning of the plant, safety func-
tions have been continuously improved by means of 
studies carried out and plant modiﬁcations imple-
mented based on the studies. In addition, the safety 
systems of the Loviisa units are mainly functionally 
exceptionally ﬂexible which compensates the above 
mentioned deﬁciency concerning the reliability of 
the safety functions.
Severe Accident Management 
implementation at Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa severe accident program, which in-
cludes plant modiﬁcations and severe accident 
management procedures, was initiated in order to 
meet the requirements of STUK.
Fortum’s approach for severe accident assess-
ment and management for Loviisa is based on four 
successive levels. The ﬁrst level of the approach is 
to ensure that severe accidents can be prevented 
with high probability. The quantitative targets for 
the overall core damage frequency (CDF) obtained 
from PSA level 1, are 10–4 /reactor year for existing 
plants.
The second level is to show a very low frac-
tion of overall CDF for those classes of accident 
sequences which can be assumed to directly lead 
to a large release. Such sequences are the ones 
with an impaired containment system function, 
high pressure core melt sequences and reactivity 
accidents leading to core damage. The class called 
sequences with impaired containment function con-
sists of containment by-pass sequences (especially, 
primary to secondary leakage accidents), sequences 
with pre-existing openings, containment isolation 
failures, containment pressure suppression system 
by-passes and sequences with induced leakage 
outside the containment.
On the third level of the approach, the focus 
is on physical phenomena capable of threatening 
the containment integrity. The challenge to the 
containment integrity due to any physical phe-
nomena should be excluded either by excluding the 
phenomenon itself as physically unreasonable or by 
showing that the loads caused by the phenomenon 
are tolerable. The phenomena considered include 
in-vessel and ex-vessel steam explosions, hydrogen 
burns, direct containment heating, missiles, slow 
over pressurization due to steaming and generation 
of noncondensable gases, core-concrete interaction, 
recriticality of the degraded core and core debris, 
and temperature loadings of the containment. It 
is obvious that plant speciﬁc studies are needed 
for proper treatment of the individual phenomena. 
Instead of traditional PSA level 2 type of approach, 
in case of Loviisa, Fortum has treated the main 
phenomenological, Loviisa-speciﬁc questions along 
the lines of the ROAAM (Risk Oriented Accident 
Analysis Methodology) approach.
After successful exclusion of the containment 
system and structural failures, the fourth and ﬁnal 
level of the approach is to deﬁne the radioactive re-
leases through containment leakages. The releases 
during the managed accident sequences should 
stay below the acceptable criteria concerning acute 
health effects and land contamination.
For Loviisa, the approach translates to ensuring 
the following top level safety functions:
• depressurization of the primary circuit
• absence of energetic events, i.e. hydrogen burns
• coolability and retention of molten core in the 
reactor vessel
• long term containment cooling
• ensuring subcriticality
• ensuring containment isolation.
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The cornerstone of the SAM strategy for Loviisa is 
the coolability of corium inside the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) through external cooling of the vessel. 
Since the RPV is not penetrated, all the ex-vessel 
phenomena such as ex-vessel steam explosions, 
direct containment heating and core-concrete in-
teractions can be excluded. The only energetic 
phenomena remaining which could have potential 
to threaten the containment integrity are hydrogen 
burns.
In-vessel retention of corium
Some of the design features of the Loviisa Plant 
make it most amenable for using the concept in-
vessel retention (IVR) of corium by external cooling 
of the RPV as the principle means of arresting the 
progress of a core melt accident. Such features 
include
• the low power density of the core
• large water volumes both in the primary and in 
the secondary side
• no penetrations in the lower head of the RPV 
and, ﬁnally,
• ice condensers ensure a ﬂooded cavity in most 
severe accident scenarios.
On the other hand, if in-vessel retention was not 
attempted, showing resistance to energetic steam 
generation and coolability of corium in the reactor 
cavity could be laborious for Loviisa, because of the 
small, water ﬁlled cavity with small ﬂoor area and 
tight venting paths for the steam out of the cavity.
An extensive research program regarding the 
thermal aspects was carried out by Fortum. The 
work included both experimental and analytical 
studies on heat transfer in a molten pool with volu-
metric heat generation and on heat transfer and 
ﬂow behaviour at the RPV outer surface.
Based on experiments, the IVR concept for 
Loviisa was ﬁnalised. The conceptual design was 
submitted to STUK for approval and approval in 
principle was received in December 1995. The con-
cept included plant modiﬁcations at four locations. 
The modiﬁcations were completed in 2002. The most 
laborious one of them was the modiﬁcation of the 
lower neutron and thermal shield such that it can 
be lowered down in case of an accident to allow free 
passage of water in contact with the RPV bottom. 
Other two modiﬁcations included slight changes 
of thermal insulations and ventilation channels 
in order to ensure effective natural circulation of 
water in the channel surrounding the RPV. Finally 
a strainer facility was constructed in the reactor 
cavity in order to screen out possible impurities 
from the coolant ﬂow and thereby prevent clogging 
of the narrow ﬂow paths around the RPV.
Absence of energetic events
Based on plant-speciﬁc features, the only real 
concern regarding potential energetic phenomena 
is due to hydrogen combustion events. The Loviisa 
reactors are equipped with ice-condenser contain-
ments, which are relatively large in size (compara-
ble to the volume of typical large dry containments) 
but have a low design pressure of 0.17 MPa. The 
ultimate failure pressure has been estimated to be 
well above 0.3 MPa. An intermediate deck divides 
the containment in the upper (UC) and lower 
compartments (LC). All the nuclear steam supply 
system (NSSS) components are located in the lower 
compartment and, therefore, any release of hydro-
gen will be directed into the lower compartment. 
In order to reach the upper compartment, which 
is signiﬁcantly larger in volume, the hydrogen and 
steam have to pass through the ice-condensers.
Because of the relatively low design pressure of 
the containment, the hydrogen burns that can cre-
ate a potential threat include not only detonations, 
but also all large-scale combustion events that 
are rapid enough to yield an essentially adiabatic 
behaviour. An additional concern, which is caused 
by the type of the containment, occurs when the 
steam and hydrogen mixture passes through the 
ice-condenser. The steam will be condensed in the 
ice beds, which could potentially lead to very high 
local hydrogen concentrations.
In the 1990’s an extensive research program was 
carried out at Fortum to assess the reliability and 
adequacy of the existing igniters system. One of 
the focus areas in the studies was to determine the 
prerequisites for creating and maintaining a global 
convective ﬂow loop around the containment for 
ensuring well mixed conditions. The global ﬂow loop 
which passes from the lower compartment through 
an ice-condenser to the upper compartment and 
back to the LC through the other ice-condenser is 
necessary in order to bring air into the LC and thus 
to be able to recombine or burn hydrogen in a con-
trolled way already in the LC. The experiments and 
the related numerical calculations demonstrated 
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that the global convective loop will be created and 
maintained reliably provided that the ice-condenser 
doors will stay open.
Based on the studies a new hydrogen manage-
ment strategy for Loviisa was formulated. The new 
strategy concentrates on two functions: ensuring air 
recirculation ﬂow paths to establish a well-mixed 
atmosphere (opening of ice condenser doors) and 
effective recombination and/or controlled ignition 
of hydrogen. Necessary plant modiﬁcations were 
identiﬁed. These included autocatalytic hydrogen 
recombiners, modiﬁcations in the igniters system 
(igniters were removed from the upper compart-
ment and left only in the lower compartment) and 
a dedicated system for opening the ice-condenser 
doors. The modiﬁcations were completed in 2003.
Prevention of long term 
over pressurization
The studies on prevention of long term over pres-
surization at Loviisa started by considering the 
concept of ﬁltered venting, as was done for many 
European NPPs after the Chernobyl accident. 
However, the capability of the steel shell contain-
ment to resist subatmospheric pressures is poor. 
If using ﬁltered venting, it is possible that the 
amount of noncondensable gases after the venting is 
signiﬁcantly less than originally, which later – after 
cooldown of the containment atmosphere – may lead 
to subatmospheric pressures and possibly collapse 
of the containment. Therefore, alternative solutions 
were sought for.
Since the concrete used in the reactor cavity of 
Loviisa does not contain any CO2, the amount of 
noncondensable gases (except for hydrogen) gener-
ated during core-concrete interaction would be prac-
tically zero. Therefore, the overpressure protection 
of the containment could be limited to condensing 
the steam produced. An obvious way of doing this is 
to spray the exterior of the containment steel shell. 
Later on, the concept of in-vessel retention was 
introduced to Loviisa (as discussed above), which 
excludes core-concrete interactions altogether and 
thus ﬁnally ensures that no noncondensable gases 
apart from hydrogen need to be considered.
The system was designed to remove the heat 
from the containment in a severe accident when 
other means of decay heat removal from the con-
tainment are not operable. Due to the ice condenser 
containment, the time delay from the onset of the 
accident to the start of the external spray system is 
long (18–36 hours). Thus the required heat removal 
capacity is also low, only 3 MW (fraction of decay 
power is still absorbed by thick concrete walls). 
The system is started manually when the contain-
ment pressure reaches the design pressure 1.7 bar. 
Autonomous operation of the system independ-
ently from plant emergency diesels is ensured with 
dedicated local diesel generators. The single failure 
criterion is applied. The active parts of the system 
are independent from all other containment decay 
heat removal systems. There are no active parts of 
the system inside the containment.
The both units Loviisa 1 and 2 have their own 
external spraying circuits and spray water storage 
tanks. The cooling circuit of the spraying system 
and the dedicated diesel generators are common for 
both units. The ultimate heat sink is sea water.
Primary circuit depressurization
The primary depressurization is an interface ac-
tion between the preventive and mitigation parts 
of SAM. If the primary feed function is operable, 
the depressurization may prevent the core melt. 
If not, it sets in motion the mitigation actions and 
measures to protect the containment integrity and 
mitigate large releases.
Manual depressurization capability has been 
designed and implemented through motor-operated 
relief valves. Depressurization capacity will be suf-
ﬁcient for bleed & feed operation with high-pressure 
pumps, and for reducing the primary pressure be-
fore the molten corium degrades the reactor vessel 
strength. Depressurization is to be initiated from 
indications of superheated temperatures at core exit 
thermocouples. The depressurization valves were 
installed at the same time with the replacement of 
the existing pressurizer safety valves in 1996.
Implementation
The SAM-strategy described in the previous chap-
ters has lead to a number of hardware changes at 
the plant as well as to new severe accident guide-
lines and procedures.
The containment external spray was imple-
mented at the two units in 1990 and 1991. Primary 
system depressurization capability was installed at 
both units in 1996. The major back ﬁttings related 
to external coolability of the reactor pressure vessel 
and to opening the ice-condenser doors are, for the 
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most part, implemented at Loviisa 1 in 2000 and 
at Loviisa 2 in 2002. The modiﬁcations to ensure 
the hydrogen control were completed in 2003. In 
addition to the mechanical equipment, the imple-
mentation included also a new, dedicated, limited 
scope instrumentation and control system for the 
SAM-systems, a dedicated AC-power system and 
a separate SAM control room which is common to 
both units. These were implemented mainly in year 
2000 for Loviisa 1 and 2002 for Loviisa 2.
In addition to the hardware modiﬁcations, severe 
accidents guidance for the operating crew has been 
implemented. It consists of SAM-procedures for 
the operators and of a so-called Severe Accident 
Handbook for the Technical Support Team. The 
SAM procedures are entered after a prolonged 
uncover of the reactor core indicated by highly 
superheated core exit temperatures. The procedures 
are symptom oriented and their main objective is 
the protection of containment integrity through 
ensuring the top level severe accident safety func-
tions. The most important operator actions after 
the core uncover are the ensuring of containment 
isolation, primary circuit depressurization, opening 
of ice-condenser doors in order to ensure mixing 
of hydrogen, lowering of the neutron shield of the 
lower part of the RPV and, in the long term, start-
ing of the containment external spray. The Severe 
Accident Handbook contains background material 
for the procedures and it should facilitate the sup-
port team in gaining understanding of the progress 
of the accident and of potential means of recovery.
Defence in Depth concept and 
severe accident management 
in the Olkiluoto NPP
Levels of protection in the Olkiluoto NPP
Prevention
Olkiluoto plant has continuously utilised the experi-
ence and data that the plant supplier, Asea-Atom 
AB, gathered in connection with design, construc-
tion and operation of the Swedish plants. The solu-
tions implemented by TVO have, for the most part, 
been similar to the ones in corresponding Swedish 
plants, which have enabled the deployment of 
Swedish plants as a reference also in modiﬁcations 
implemented after the plant construction. When 
different technical solutions have been assessed in 
connection with modiﬁcations, TVO’s policy has been 
to take into use only such systems, whose reliability 
and maintenance can also be assessed on the basis 
of operating experience. Important events such 
as failures of equipment, preventive maintenance 
and deviation from the Operational Limits and 
Conditions cause unavailability of safety important 
components. Figure 22 presents the effect of this 
unavailability to the total accident risk. STUK’s 5% 
goal value was exceeded during 2003 in the plant 
unit 2 because of common cause failures (material 
defects) in the actuators of external isolation valves 
of the emergency core cooling system.
New technology, such as control systems that use 
programmable automation and that don’t come with 
the extensive operating experience that is usually 
Figure 22. Share of the accident risk caused by the unavailability of equipment at the Olkiluoto NPP.
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available for modiﬁcations, has been installed at the 
plant units in connection with the modernisation 
project. Due to the relative meagreness of operat-
ing experience special attention has been paid 
to the design and testing of systems. The biggest 
modiﬁcations, such as the modernisation of the 
electric drives in the main circulation pumps and 
the modernisation of the turbine control system, 
have been conducted in stages at different plant 
units. The modiﬁcations have also, according to pos-
sibilities, been taken into use in stages and by using 
the traditional analogous hardwired technology as 
a backup. According to the experience gained from 
the commissioning, special attention shall be paid 
to the forthcoming design and validation of systems 
that utilise new technology.
Management of operational 
transients and accidents
Olkiluoto plant units are equipped with measur-
ing systems that continuously monitor the state 
of the processes to detect operational transients 
and accidents. An alarm limit, which, when ex-
ceeded, causes a transmission of an alarm signal 
to the control room, has been set for a large part of 
the measurements. When protection limits, which 
have, in addition, been set for the most important 
measurements, are exceeded, the protection system 
monitoring the measurements shuts down the 
reactor or reduces its power. If the measurements 
indicate a leak in the primary circuit, the system 
also starts the emergency cooling of the reactor 
and closes the isolation valves of process pipelines 
penetrating the containment wall. To ensure the 
reliability of functions, the protection system has 
been realised as four independent subsystems, 
where the function of two subsystems is enough to 
initiate the needed protection functions. According 
to the conducted analyses the measuring systems 
and protection systems are adequate for detecting 
transients in the plant operation.
TVO has continuously developed the proc-
ess computer system that is operated by the 
control room personnel and that is responsible 
for gathering information from the measuring 
systems and transmitting it to the control room. A 
big modiﬁcation, from the standpoint of accident 
management, was implemented in 1992, when the 
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), in which 
the main measured variables related to different 
transients are grouped into their own entities, was 
taken into use. TVO implemented the modiﬁcation 
so that the Display System supports the symptom 
based emergency operating procedures used by 
operators as well as possible.
To increase the efﬁciency of transient control, 
modiﬁcations, arising mainly from the changes 
in reactor operation at the new power level, to 
the protection system have been designed and 
implemented in connection with the modernisation 
project. The tightened requirements concerning the 
management of a faulty reactor scram (ATWS) have 
also caused some modiﬁcations to the protection 
and safety systems.
Olkiluoto is currently upgrading the turbine 
automation system to a programmable digital 
system.
To develop the management of severe accidents 
at the Olkiluoto plant units, a containment building 
monitoring system, which is independent from other 
monitoring systems and normal electrical supply, 
has been taken into use. The task of the system is 
to ensure that information concerning the accident 
course is gained even in a situation, where all 
normal measuring systems are lost.
STUK’s review is that the Olkiluoto plant units 
have such systems available, by means of which both 
transients and accidents can be detected and their 
aggravation prevented. Sections 3.6 and 4.5 present 
an review on how TVO meets the requirements 
concerning the probability of a large release.
Mitigation of consequences 
For mitigating the consequences of the postulated 
accidents taken into account in the design of the 
Olkiluoto plant, the plant has been equipped with 
the appropriate safety systems. In addition, TVO 
has taken steps to mitigate the consequences of an 
accident by planning the actions of the control room 
personnel in advance and by drawing up related 
instructions (emergency operating procedures), by 
ensuring the transmission of data from the control 
room to other parts of the organisation and to the 
regulatory body by the means of the process com-
puter and by planning and exercising in advance 
the actions of the entire organisation for emergency 
preparedness situations.
The plant speciﬁc full-scope simulator was 
used in the preparation of emergency operating 
procedures and in the training of operators. The 
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simulator provides a possibility for exercising the 
management of different transient and accident 
situations in realistic conditions. The applicability 
of the emergency operating procedures was also 
assessed in connection with the probabilistic safety 
analyses, when the probability and the consequenc-
es of operator errors were examined.
To ensure the transmission of data also in ac-
cident situations the process computer connection 
has, in addition to the control room, been arranged 
to the commando centre and air-raid shelter of the 
power plant as well as to STUK. The data transmis-
sion connection makes it possible to follow the state 
of the plant almost in real time also from outside 
the control room. The operation, by utilising the 
connection, has been tested in emergency prepared-
ness exercises. Experience shows that an on-line 
connection facilitates the communication between 
the regulatory body and the power company, and 
reduces the risk of acting on false or insufﬁcient 
information.
An emergency preparedness plan, that e.g. 
deﬁnes the emergency preparedness organisation 
with its responsibilities and duties used in accident 
situations and presents detailed instructions on 
how to organise the operation and to inform from it 
in accident situations, has been drawn up against 
accidents. Operation in accident situations shall be 
exercised regularly.
STUK’s review is that TVO has taken proper 
measures to mitigate accident consequences.
Technical barriers for preventing 
the dispersion of radioactive 
materials in the Olkiluoto NPP
The operation of a nuclear power plant produces 
radioactive materials from fuel pellets fabricated 
of uranium dioxide mainly as a result of ﬁssion of 
uranium nuclei. Uranium dioxide matrix as such 
forms the ﬁrst barrier against the dispersion of ﬁs-
sion products. Under normal operating conditions, 
when temperature of the uranium dioxide doesn’t 
become exceptionally high, the majority of ﬁssion 
products remain inside the pellet (in the matrix).
Since a small part of the ﬁssion products, pro-
duced from the fuel, drifts outside the fuel matrix 
even during normal operation, the excursion of 
ﬁssion products outside the reactor core has been 
prevented by enclosing the fuel pellets into a gas-
tight cladding. The cladding material is, due to its 
properties, well suited for the conditions existing in 
the reactor and also meets the exceptional endur-
ance requirements set by the high temperatures. 
According to the operating experience gained from 
the manufacturer and the results of laboratory 
researches, the oxide layer, arising from corrosion, 
on the cladding surface remains within acceptable 
limits and the ductility properties of the material 
remain adequate during the fuel’s operating life. 
These observations were also veriﬁed in inspections, 
directed at spent fuel, that were conducted at the 
plant.
The basis for the design of the plant is that the 
releases to the environment shall remain within the 
set limits, even if approximately one percent of the 
fuel rods (with 500 modern 10×10 fuel assemblies 
there are approximately 45 000 fuel rods in the 
core) contained by the core lose the integrity of the 
cladding during normal operating conditions. The 
water treatment system of the reactor primary 
circuit is equipped with ﬁlters, which allow an con-
trolled gathering and removal of ﬁssion products 
– once released into the cooling water – and corro-
sion products activated by the neutron radiation. 
Operating experience has shown that fuel leakage 
are rare and that systems are adequate for keeping 
the activity concentrations of the primary circuit 
within acceptable limits.
The next barrier, after the fuel (uranium dioxide 
matrix and the surrounding gas tight cladding), 
against the dispersion of radioactive materials is 
the pressure retaining boundary of the primary 
circuit. The reactor pressure vessel is manufactured 
from the low alloyed steel generally used in western 
countries and its inner surface is lined with the 
stainless steel. The pipelines connected to the pres-
sure vessel are manufactured either from stainless 
steel or low alloyed steel. Current requirements 
related to the basic dimensioning of the primary 
circuit are for the essential parts same as during 
the plant construction.
The last barrier, that surrounds the reactor pres-
sure vessel and part of the connected pipelines, is a 
cylindrical, gas tight containment building, built out 
of prestressed concrete, having bottom and upper 
slabs manufactured from concrete and on the top 
also a removable steel dome for opening the reactor 
pressure vessel.
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Ensuring fuel integrity
A starting point in ensuring the fuel integrity is 
that the properties of the fuel are known accurately 
enough, so that the plant operation and manage-
ment of transient situations can be planned with 
the objective that fuel does not fail in any design 
basis situation. To ensure the properties of the fuel, 
maximum limits have been set for e.g. fuel burn-up 
and for the quantity of ﬁssion gases released during 
operation from the fuel pellet inside the rods. The 
limits have been set so that their fulﬁlment can 
be demonstrated already in connection with the 
design by the means of calculation analyses and 
measurements conducted by the fuel manufacturer. 
At Olkiluoto plant the fulﬁlment of the set limits, 
for the part of fuel types used so far, has also been 
demonstrated by measurements performed on the 
spent fuel. Figure 23 presents the number of leak-
ing fuel bundles at the Olkiluoto NPP.
The preservation of fuel integrity, under power 
variation situations that relate to normal operation 
of the reactor, is ensured by limits that concern 
power variation speeds and that are based on re-
search on test reactors and on operating experience 
gained from the Swedish plants and elsewhere.
The effects of the modernisation project to fuel 
integrity in anticipated operational transients 
and accidents have been assessed by calculation 
analyses, which have taken into account the plant 
modiﬁcations conducted at the plant in connection 
with the power uprating. A margin that must be 
maintained between the power obtained from the 
fuel and the maximum cooling capacity that cor-
responds with the operating condition in question, 
is deﬁned on the bases of the analysis results.
During the modernisation project, measures 
have been taken to eliminate the two transients 
that have earlier set the margins for operation: loss 
of electricity of the main recirculation pumps and 
malfunction of the turbine pressure controller.
A transient that is caused by a simultaneous 
tripping of the main circulation pumps – caused 
by a loss of electricity – is mitigated by adding a 
rotating mass to the electric drives, due to which the 
pumps can be run down in a controlled manner. This 
helps to avoid any degradation of the heat transfer 
conditions during the ﬂow coast-down.
In the modernised system, the control of the 
pump coastdown is conducted by means of a pro-
grammable automation system. In addition, there 
is a separate protection logic unit which is based on 
hardwired technology.
Another transient that has before limited the 
power level of the plant is the malfunction of the 
turbine pressure controller. The pressure controller 
controls e.g. the steam ﬂow to the turbine, and so 
the failure of the controller may cause a sudden 
stop in the steam ﬂow to both the turbine and 
the bypass to the condenser. The pressure of the 
primary circuit rises when the ﬂow stops, which 
results in the decrease of the void content in the 
reactor. As the steam void content decreases the 
reactor power tends to rise, and if the operational 
margins between the reactor power and the cooling 
Figure 23. Number of leaking fuel bundles at the Olkiluoto NPP.
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capacity are not adequate, local heat transfer crisis 
may result. Although the cooling becomes adequate 
as the reactor power decreases again, the transient 
may cause fuel failures in a limited part of the 
reactor.
The modernisation of the pressure controller, 
implemented in connection with the modernisation 
project, has aimed at reducing the failure frequency 
of the system, so that the pressure transient caused 
by a failure is no longer an anticipated operational 
transient but a so-called postulated accident, which 
enables the application of milder criteria in provi-
sion for the transient. The failure of the turbine 
pressure controller still remains, however, as the 
event that limits the power level, in spite of the al-
leviated acceptance criteria as to the fraction of fuel 
rods that may undergo heat transfer crisis.
The modernisation of the turbine control and 
protection system, which is also responsible for 
pressure control, has been completed on both plant 
units. According to the operating experience thus 
far, both systems have functioned as intended.
The change of the reactor operating mode may 
cause the stability characteristics of the reactor 
to weaken. Instability causes the reactor power to 
oscillate, possibly even with a growing amplitude. 
To avoid such situations and possible fuel failures 
resulting from them, certain modiﬁcations, that 
have an positive effect on the reactor stability, have 
been made at Olkiluoto 1 and 2. Steam separators 
above the reactor core have been replaced by new 
separators that have a smaller pressure loss. Limits 
have been set for the reactor operation domain in 
such areas of the power-ﬂow map that are the most 
limiting from the standpoint of stability. Limits 
have also been set to the power peaking factors in 
the core. Stability control has also been ensured 
by increasing the efﬁciency of the partial scram . 
Stability is also one of the criteria applied when 
assessing the feasibility of new fuel types for use at 
the Olkiluoto plant units.
The demand that measures must be taken to 
prepare for a complete inoperability of the reactor 
scram system – a situation where control rods can’t 
be inserted into the core by means of the hydraulic 
scram system nor by electric motors – has also been 
taken into account in connection with the mod-
ernisation project. In order to manage the complete 
failure of reactor scram without fuel failures, the 
reactor power must be quickly limited by controlling 
the feed water ﬂow and main recirculation pump 
speed and by pumping boron solution into the reac-
tor. To ensure the power limitation, modiﬁcations 
have been made in the protection system. These 
include automatic depressurization of the reactor 
and modiﬁcations in the operation of the feed water 
system and main recirculation and boron pumps. 
The capacity of the boron system has also been 
improved by going over to the use of enriched boron 
and by increasing the concentration of the boron 
solution and the capacity of the pumps.
The objective is to keep the probability of a 
criticality accident adequately low during the 
outages and the refuelling by strict technical and 
administrative limits. The prevention of inadvertent 
criticality has also been taken into account in the 
fuel storage and handling systems at the plant.
Ensuring primary circuit integrity
The primary circuit of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 includes 
the reactor pressure vessel, the internal main re-
circulation pumps with heat exchangers as well as 
the pipelines and their accessories from the reactor 
pressure vessel down to the outer isolation valves of 
the containment. The components that fall into the 
safety class 1 have been designed according to the 
standard ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 
Section III.
The integrity of the primary circuit in the 
nuclear power plant may be threatened, if there 
is a transient that causes the circuit pressure and 
the loads arising from local thermal expansion of 
material to exceed the values used in design, or if, as 
a result of plant ageing, the structural materials of 
components degrade uncontrollably due to changes 
in structural properties, thinning of wall thickness, 
fatigue of metal or cracking. Figure 24 presents 
the largest uncontrolled leakage from the primary 
circuit during the operation of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
in comparison with the limit value of Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
In addition to the conditions that prevail dur-
ing operation, anticipated operational transients 
and postulated accidents have been taken into 
account in the design of the primary circuit. During 
operation, the circuit is loaded by the temperature 
changes that arise from the start-ups and shut-
downs of the plant units as well as from operational 
transients that cause changes to the stress state of 
the structures and metal fatigue. Loads arising from 
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plant operation are monitored continuously and 
cumulative loads are compared to the values used 
in design. The loads arising from operation thus far, 
have been smaller than designed, and so, making an 
review based on this, the accumulation of primary 
circuit loads does not limit the designed operating 
life of the plant.
Two new safety valves have been installed on 
both plant units to maintain the pressure loading, 
arising from possible operational transients and 
postulated accidents to the primary circuit, below 
the values used in design also after the power uprat-
ing conducted in connection with the modernisation 
project. The new valves are different from the safety 
valves earlier at the plant, and so the modiﬁcation 
has also made it possible to improve the reliability 
of the entire system. The pressure control of the 
primary coolant system has been implemented 
according to the accident and reliability analyses 
in a such manner, that no signiﬁcant risk of circuit 
rupture, resulting from over pressurisation, is 
related to the transient situations.
The properties of the base material and weld 
seams in the primary circuit may degrade during 
operation due to changes in the structural proper-
ties of the material that are caused by neutron 
radiation, thinning of wall thickness caused by 
corrosion or initiation and propagation of cracks 
resulting from e.g. thermal stresses or stress cor-
rosion.
Embrittlement of the pressure vessel is not a 
similar general problem in boiling water reactors as 
in old pressurised water reactors, because the dose 
of fast neutrons directed at the wall of the reactor 
pressure vessel is considerably smaller in boiling 
water reactors than in pressurised water reactors 
due to a longer distance between the core and the 
wall. Due to the character of boiling water reactors, 
a parallel existence of high thermal stresses and 
stresses caused by pressure is also not possible. Due 
to these reasons the embrittlement of the reactor 
pressure vessel does not limit the operating life time 
of the Olkiluoto plant.
Effects of corrosion have been prevented already 
in advance by e.g. material selections during the 
plant construction. The reactor pressure vessel is 
made out of low-alloyed MnMoNi steel that has been 
layered with austenitic stainless steel weld except 
for the pump housing, which has a low operating 
temperature. The heat exchangers of the primary 
circulation pumps, and steam lines with their valves 
are of carbon steel while the other components are 
of high alloyed carbon steel or mostly of austenitic 
stainless steel. Due to the high alloyed steel, dry 
steam or low operating temperature, a general cor-
rosion that reduces the wall thickness is either rare 
or non-existent. The erosion speed of steam lines is 
monitored by measuring the wall thickness of the 
lines regularly. No signiﬁcant thinning has been 
Figure 24. The largest uncontrolled leakage from the primary circuit during operation of Olkiluoto NPP 
units 1 and 2 in comparison with the limit value of Operational Limits and Conditions.
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observed, nor is the corrosion expected to speed up 
during the future operation.
Intergranular stress corrosion, which has oc-
curred in the heat affected zone of the austenitic 
stainless steel base material beside the weld seam, 
is a problem for boiling water reactors. A narrow 
defect or a crack may initiate in a structure even 
if the thickness of the surrounding wall doesn’t 
become any thinner. A stress corrosion mechanism 
like this requires the parallel existence of three 
factors: a high tensile stress, sensitised material 
and aggressive environment. Tensile stresses to 
material are generated by welding, which causes 
residual stresses that could, at the worst, be in the 
same magnitude with the material’s yield strength. 
Welding arrangements can be used to affect residual 
stresses, and this has also been done when pipelines 
have been replaced with materials that have a bet-
ter resistance against stress corrosion. Sensitising 
refers to the degradation of corrosion properties 
of material’s grain boundaries e.g. as a result of 
thermal effect arising from welding. This means 
that a chromium poor zone liable for corrosion, is 
left in the vicinity of chromium carbide precipitates 
at the grain boundaries. The aggressive effect of 
the water at operating temperatures is aggravated 
especially by oxygen, which is always present in the 
water of a boiling water reactor due to radiolysis. 
An environmental effect can also be aggravated by 
other impurities in the water. Strict requirements 
have been set for water purity and the amount of 
impurities is monitored continuously.
The intention has been to design the processes in 
a such manner, that the lines do not become loaded 
uncontrollably, when ﬂows of different temperatures 
get mixed. The elimination of some mixing items was 
not possible and they are under special monitoring. 
The condition of the primary circuit is monitored in 
periodical non-destructive inspections, which enable 
the detection of possible cracks already in their ini-
tiating phase. Furthermore, the material properties 
and the wall thickness of primary circuit lines at the 
Olkiluoto plant are such that instead of a fast break 
a rupture will probably take place gradually, so that 
it can be detected on the basis of measurements as 
a leakage from the primary circuit to the internal 
space of the containment.
STUK’s review, based on the experience gained 
from the ageing of nuclear power plants, is that 
the risk of a primary circuit break, caused by 
degradation of material properties or by growth 
or accumulation of loads, is not likely to increase 
signiﬁcantly in the future. Since, at the moment, 
there is relatively little experience at hand from 
the operation of boiling water plants that are over 
30 years old, the effects of ageing can’t be reliably 
assessed far to the future.
Ensuring containment building integrity
Anticipated operational transients and postulated 
accidents have been taken into account in the 
design of containments for Olkiluoto 1 and 2 by 
dimensioning the structures – according to the prac-
tice applied in the western countries – on the basis 
of loads arising from a sudden and complete break 
of the biggest primary circuit line. To condensate 
the exhausting steam from the primary circuit, the 
containment is provided with a condensation pool, 
where the steam is directed by natural mechanisms, 
and with a spray system that is automatically 
turned on in accident situations. To remove the heat 
that is released from the reactor core during an 
accident, from the containment the plant units are 
provided with the necessary intermediate cooling 
and sea water circuits, by means of which the heat 
can be removed to the ﬁnal heat sink, the sea.
The containments of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 have a 
reinforced concrete structure and their outer walls, 
in addition, have a prestressed structure. The 
leak tightness of the containment in connection 
with a design basis accident is ensured by ﬁtting 
a steel liner, which is, for all parts, protected from 
jet forces and ﬂying objects considered possible in 
accident conditions, inside the containment wall. 
To minimise the releases arising from possible seal 
leakage of the penetrations, the containment has 
been placed inside the reactor building. The reac-
tor building is provided with a ventilation system 
that enables the underpressurization of the reactor 
building in relation to its environment and thus a 
controlled collection and ﬁltering of the radioactive 
substances leaking from the primary containment 
in accident conditions. Figure 25 shows the results 
of leakage measurements of isolation valves and 
penetrations of the containment during the annual 
outage periods. The total leakage is presented as a 
percentage of the leakage budget.
In postulated accidents part of the fuel cladding 
material may become oxidised and cause also a 
hydrogen release. Also the radiation inside the 
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reactor causes the water molecules to break down 
into oxygen and hydrogen. To eliminate the ﬁre 
and explosion risk caused by the hydrogen, the 
containments of the Olkiluoto plant are inerted 
with nitrogen during normal operation at power 
except for short periods of time during start ups 
and shutdowns. Furthermore, the containment is 
provided with a separate hydrogen recombination 
system, by the means of which the hydrogen and 
oxygen released by radiolysis during the accident 
can be controllably recombined back to water.
Design criteria that concern the containment 
and relate to the anticipated operational transients 
and postulated accidents have not changed after the 
construction of the Olkiluoto plant. The uprating 
of reactor powers at the plant units has, however, 
required some modiﬁcations to the containment 
systems. The uprating of the power level affects 
mostly the functioning of emergency heat transfer 
chain, because the magnitude of the decay heat 
power, to be transmitted during the accident, 
depends directly on the normal power level of the 
plant. Due to the power uprating, the capacity of 
the emergency heat transfer chain has been raised 
by increasing the capacity of heat exchangers. 
Nevertheless, the temperature of the condensation 
pool would exceed the earlier values during a pipe 
break accident. The effect that the temperature 
rise has on the functioning of the containment has 
been analysed by calculation means, and according 
to the conducted investigations the temperature 
rise has on the functioning of the containment has 
been analysed by calculation means, and according 
to the conducted clariﬁcations the temperature rise 
doesn’t signiﬁcantly increase the risk of loosing the 
containment leak tightness during an accident.
As the power of the plant increases, also the 
radiation level during an accident increases in the 
reactor, due to which more hydrogen and oxygen 
is released in a design basis accident. In order to 
prevent the growth of hydrogen ﬁre risks due to 
the accelerated generation of hydrogen and oxygen 
during an accident, the limit of the allowable oxygen 
content during normal operation has been reduced 
in the containment. According to the performed 
analyses, the modiﬁcation is adequate for ensuring 
that the contents of oxygen and hydrogen in the 
containment remain below the ignition limit for 20 
hours from the beginning of the accident without 
special measures, and that the capacity of the hy-
drogen recombine system is adequate for preventing 
the initiation of uncontrolled ﬁres from here on.
The effects that the plant ageing has thus far 
had on the containment and its systems have 
been relatively small. In the regularly conducted 
tightness tests of the containment no such increase 
of leaks has been observed that would indicate a 
degradation of sealing materials. The amount of 
preventive maintenance work, concerning mostly 
the sealing of expansion joint between the dry and 
wet well space of the containment, has, however, 
been relatively big, which is why TVO is at the 
Figure 25. The total leakage rate through the isolation valves and penetrations at the Olkiluoto NPP compared to 
the leakage budget.
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moment clarifying the possibility of a structural 
modiﬁcation that would allow the reduction of 
maintenance need for the sealing of construction 
joint, prevention of possible tightness problems 
arising from ageing and possibly the improvement 
of sealing reliability in accidents more severe than 
the original design basis accident.
The starting point for design during the con-
struction of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 was that by di-
mensioning the containments against pipe break 
accidents, their integrity could be ensured by an 
adequate certainty also in accidents, where the re-
actor core suffers substantial damage or even melts 
completely. The Harrisburg accident demonstrated 
that the loads arising from a pipe break accident on 
structures can’t be considered commensurate with 
the possible loads arising from a core melt down ac-
cident especially in containments, where measures 
against the pipe break accidents include different 
steam condensing systems. The Harrisburg accident 
launched several new inspections, whose objective 
was both to clarify the character and magnitude 
of loads arising from a severe accident and to ﬁnd 
means for controlling the loads. The inspections 
led to plant modiﬁcations, whose implementation 
was accelerated by the 1986 Chernobyl accident, 
which concretely demonstrated the importance of a 
functioning containment.
The most signiﬁcant deﬁciencies at the Olkiluoto 
plant containments, from the standpoint of control-
ling severe accidents, have been the small size of the 
containment, which may cause the containment to 
pressurise due to the hydrogen and steam genera-
tion during an accident, and the location of the reac-
tor pressure vessel inside the containment, which is 
such that the core melt erupting from the pressure 
vessel may expose the structures and penetrations 
that ensure the tightness of the containment, to 
pressure loads and thermal stresses. To eliminate 
these deﬁciencies, the containment is e.g. provided 
with a pressure suppression system, by the means of 
which gases that pressurise the containment can be 
removed through a ﬁlter designed for the purpose, 
if the pressure inside the containment threatens to 
increase too much. The part of the containment un-
derneath the reactor pressure vessel can be ﬂooded 
with water in order to protect the containment 
bottom and penetrations from the thermal effect 
of core melt. Some penetrations of the containment 
have been protected from the direct effect of core 
melt also by structural means. To ensure the cooling 
of reactor debris, the plant units are also provided 
with a water ﬁlling system, by the means of which 
the water level inside the containment can be raised 
all the way to the same level with the upper edge of 
the reactor core.
The means for managing severe accidents had 
to be adjusted to the existing design, and so an 
optimal implementation of all chosen solutions was 
not possible.
The cooling of reactor core melt and the protec-
tion of containment penetrations requires that the 
lower dry well of the containment is ﬂooded at such 
an early stage of the accident that if the pressure 
vessel melts through, the erupting core melt falls 
into a deep water pool. When the core melt falls 
into the water a so-called steam explosion, which 
causes a strong and quickly propagating pressure 
wave in the water pool, may occur. A lot of research 
has been done on steam explosions, but it is still 
uncertain, how probable the explosion is, when 
the core melt and water meet, or how powerful the 
explosions may be. Based on inspection results and 
experience gained from e.g. metal industry, the pos-
sibility of a powerful explosion that causes a pres-
sure wave strong enough to rupture the structures 
of containment penetrations or personnel hatches, 
can’t be ruled out. To decrease the risk for loss of 
containment integrity due to loads caused by steam 
explosions, the structures of the lower equipment 
hatch have been enforced.
According to the conception that existed, when 
measures to manage severe accidents more effec-
tively were designed, iodine occurs in the contain-
ment during accidents mainly as aerosols, which are 
effectively absorbed in the condensation pool of the 
containment and in the ﬁlter of the ﬁltered vent-
ing system. The Chernobyl accident and the tests 
conducted after it have, however, demonstrated that 
in unfavourable conditions iodine may also form or-
ganic compounds that are not easily absorbed in the 
containment or in the ﬁlter. Such conditions may 
occur at the Olkiluoto plant, if the water inside the 
containment is acidiﬁed due to chemicals released 
during the accident. Organic iodine may also be 
generated in the primary circuit, if iodine reacts 
with the hydrocarbons that are released, when the 
boron carbide contained in the control rods becomes 
oxidised during the core damage. The possibilities 
for improving the absorption of iodine in the con-
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tainment and in the ﬁltered venting system are still 
being investigated.
Ensuring safety functions
Reactivity control
The Olkiluoto plant reactors and their loading, 
operation and control has been designed and im-
plemented so, that the combined effects of inherent, 
reactor physical feedbacks are always negative or, in 
other words, mitigate the increase of reactor power 
in all operating conditions of the reactor. Due to 
this, disturbances in power will decay even without 
any functioning of active systems. The stability of 
the reactor has also been ensured by means of e.g. 
a partial scram function, which has been designed 
to trip early enough in circumstances in which risk 
for core instability might exist.
The reactor can be shutdown either by the 
control rods that are operated by a pressurised 
nitrogen/hydraulic system and by electric motors, or 
by the boron system, which is used to pump boron 
solution into the reactor. The systems function on 
different principles and are independent from each 
other. Both systems receive automatic commands 
from the reactor protection system, but can also be 
tripped by the operators.
The loading of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 has been 
designed and the reactors ordinarily operated 
so that the reactor shutdown can be carried out 
both hydraulically and electrically, even if the 
most efﬁcient control rod group from the fourteen 
groups is not functioning. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated by analyses that the pressure of the 
hydraulic system is adequate for the shutdown of 
the reactor, even if none of the relief and safety 
valves opened.
Plant modiﬁcations, which ensure that the reac-
tor can be shutdown by the boron system alone, 
have been implemented to prepare for a complete 
inoperability of control rods. The single failure 
criterion has been applied in the design of boron 
system as well.
The shutdown systems of the reactor have been 
designed so that in a situation, where electrical 
operating power is lost, the reactor is shutdown 
by the hydraulic system, which pushes the control 
rods into the reactor core. Control rods alone are 
adequate for keeping the reactor subcritical in all 
other operating conditions except possibly in severe 
accidents.
In a severe accident the control rods melt before 
the fuel rods, and so the reactor may return to 
criticality, if the core cooling during the core damage 
starts to function again. According to the conducted 
analyses, the reactor power exceeds the capacity of 
decay heat removal systems after the reﬂooding of 
the core in the most unfavourable conditions. To 
prevent this from occurring requires that the reac-
tor is kept shutdown by pumping boron solution into 
it. The modiﬁcations made in the boron system, such 
as the increase of boron concentration and pumping 
capacity, improve the capability to control reactivity 
also in severe accidents. The capacity increase is, 
however, still not adequate for ensuring the reactiv-
ity control in a situation, where the reactor core is 
reﬂooded after the control rods have melted and 
the boron pumped into the pressure vessel escapes 
because of leaks or an error in adjustment of the 
reactor water level. It can be assumed that leaks 
underneath the core are produced mostly during the 
maintenance of the main circulation pumps. TVO 
has reduced the core damage risk arising from the 
aforementioned issues by modifying work related 
instructions and the Technical Speciﬁcations. The 
risk arising from the adjustment error of water 
level can, on the other hand, be reduced by ensuring 
the measuring of the surface level. Possibilities for 
improving the reliability of the reactor water level 
measurement are constantly being investigated.
Decay heat removal
The decay heat removal at the Olkiluoto plant has 
been designed so, that the decay heat released in ac-
cident conditions is transferred as water and steam 
from the primary circuit through the pressure relief 
system to the wet well of the containment, which 
can, at an early stage, store all the decay heat re-
leased from the fuel. Sooner or later the heat must 
be removed from the containment with active equip-
ment by circulating the containment water in the 
spray system, from where the heat is transferred 
through the heat exchangers to the intermediate 
cooling system and sea water system and then to 
the ﬁnal heat sink, the sea.
A controlled decay heat removal in accident 
conditions requires that the pressure of the primary 
circuit and the water level in the reactor can be 
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controlled by means of the measurements as well 
as by the feed water, emergency cooling water and 
pressure relief systems. These systems have been 
designed according to a principle that it must be 
possible to carry out a safety function also in a 
situation, where any single device is inoperable and 
simultaneously any other device affecting safety is 
not in use due to repair or maintenance (so-called 
N+2 criterion). This requirement has been fulﬁlled 
by implementing the process and measuring sys-
tems in question as four redundant sub-systems. 
Electrical power is supplied to each subsystem 
from four separate and independent diesel-backed 
alternating current buses. Subsystems are ordinar-
ily situated in different rooms to prevent common 
cause failures. An exception is made in certain 
premises of the reactor building, where two parallel 
subsystems are situated in a same room contrary 
to the requirements set forth in the Guide YVL 1.0. 
The objective has been to locate the systems as 
far from each other as possible and separate them 
with distinct shields in such places, where ensuring 
the separation has been found necessary. In order 
to improve especially the ﬁre safety, TVO has also 
modiﬁed the sprinkler and ﬁre alarming systems of 
the main transformer and plant transformers.
Systems that take part in controlling the pres-
sure and surface level of the primary circuit have 
been designed mainly by following the diversity 
principle, according to which crucial safety func-
tions shall be ensured by systems, whose operating 
principles or technical solutions differ from each 
other. Water level measuring system, where all 
measurements are realized with the same tech-
nique, is an exception. TVO follows the research 
and development work – done in the ﬁeld – whose 
objective is to create a functioning and reliable 
water level measuring system that is based on an 
alternative technique.
Severe accidents were not taken into account in 
the original design basis for controlling the water 
inventory and the pressure of the primary circuit. 
Ensuring the pressure control in severe accidents 
is particularly important, in order to avoid the 
pressure vessel melt-through and the loads arising 
from it to the containment, when the pressure of the 
circuit is high. TVO has made modiﬁcations, which 
ensure that two of the valves of the overpressure 
protection system stay open also in connection with 
severe accidents.
The original design basis for the heat removal 
from the containment did not require the fulﬁlment 
of the diversity principle, and the Olkiluoto plant 
doesn’t fulﬁl the aforementioned requirement at the 
moment. There are no such technical solutions in 
the immediate sight that would make it possible to 
equip the Olkiluoto plant with decay heat removal 
systems that are separate from the current systems 
and that are based on a different functioning prin-
ciple. Continuous research work is, however, being 
done in the ﬁeld to develop new-fashioned active 
and passive systems.
Containment
The task of the containment is to prevent the 
dispersion of ﬁssion products that may escape from 
the fuel during an accident, to the environment. The 
precondition for stopping the dispersion of ﬁssion 
products is that the containment can be isolated 
in an accident situation so that it forms a gas and 
water tight boundary between the fuel and the 
environment, and that the containment maintains 
its leak-tightness during the entire accident.
The containments of the Olkiluoto plant are 
designed so that in an accident the process penetra-
tions going through the containment walls can be 
closed with isolation valves. There are usually two 
isolation valves: one outside and the other inside the 
containment. Certain penetrations that are not con-
nected to the primary circuit or directly to the inner 
space of the containment as well as instrumentation 
lines, where the possibility of a leak is, in addition 
to the isolation valve, also limited by transmitters 
that can endure the pressures and temperatures 
generated in severe accidents, are provided with 
one isolation valve.
Loading mechanisms that may occur during 
severe accidents haven’t been taken particularly 
into account in the original design of containments 
at the Olkiluoto plant units, but the containments 
are dimensioned based on pipe break accidents. 
Due to this there has been and still is, despite the 
performed plant modiﬁcations, some deﬁciencies in 
the design of containments at the Olkiluoto plant 
concerning the preparedness for severe accidents. 
These deﬁciencies have been handled already 
earlier in the section 4.5 in connection with the 
designed plant modiﬁcations.
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Severe Accident Management 
in the Olkiluoto NPP
The provisions for severe accident management 
were installed in Olkiluoto 1 and 2 during the SAM 
project which was ﬁnished in 1989. The measures 
implemented were
• containment overpressure protection
• containment ﬁltered venting
• lower drywell ﬂooding from wetwell
• containment penetration shielding in lower 
drywell
• containment water ﬁlling from external source
• containment instrumentation for severe accident 
control
• Emergency Operating Procedures for severe 
accidents.
Subsequent accident management activities at 
Olkiluoto plant comprise both the development of 
accident management procedures and additional 
plant modiﬁcations. They were initiated mainly 
during the OL1 and OL2 modernisation project.
Emergency Operating Procedures 
for Severe Accidents
Emergency Operating Procedures for Severe 
Accidents have been modiﬁed in order to take into 
account plant modiﬁcations and to enhance severe 
accident management. The containment ﬁltered 
venting system rupture disk line from the upper 
drywell will no more be closed in the beginning of 
an accident. This is a precaution for a possible rapid 
pressurisation of the containment if the generation 
of non-condensable gases is large. The previously 
manual depressurisation of the primary system in 
severe accidents has been replaced by an automatic 
actuation of the depressurisation system.
Containment ﬁltered venting system 
– impact of chlorine in the ﬁlter
In a severe accident, a large amount of chlorine 
could be released, due to irradiation and heating, 
from the synthetic rubbers used as the insulation 
material of the electrical cables. In order to main-
tain the iodine retention capability, the sodium tio-
sulfate concentration of the ﬁlter was increased in 
1999. The iodine retention capability and stability 
of the solution have been experimentally veriﬁed by 
TVO and the Technical Research Centre of Finland, 
VTT.
Containment pH
A large amount of chlorine, which could be converted 
to HCl in the containment, could reduce the pH of 
the water pools and wet surfaces. The chlorine origi-
nates from the synthetic rubbers used as insulation 
in cables. This could lead to a signiﬁcant amount of 
elemental as well as organic iodine. Another source 
of organic iodine could be reactions between boron 
carbide in control rods, steam and iodine in the 
degrading core.
TVO has investigated the possibilities for en-
hancing the retention of iodine by a containment 
pH control system. The solution used would be 
50% NaOH, which is already normally used by 
the water treatment plant. A new NaOH tank has 
been installed. The required NaOH volume was 
analysed by VTT. The required volume is about 
5 m3 according to the calculations. The solution is 
gravity driven into a raw water storage tank near 
ﬁre water outlet nozzles, from where the solution is 
delivered into the containment during containment 
water ﬁlling.
The lower drywell will be ﬂooded from the 
wetwell prior to the NaOH supply and the lower 
drywell water pool pH will be kept above 7. The 
system modiﬁcations were made in 2001.
Energetic ex-vessel fuel 
coolant interactions
TVO has investigated the response of concrete 
structures in the containment to energetic fuel cool-
ant interactions, steam explosions, and the result 
is that they would withstand large steam explosion 
loads. The enforcement of the structures of the 
equipment and personnel access hatch in the lower 
drywell has already been mentioned.
Diaphragm ﬂoor seal
TVO investigates how the diaphragm ﬂoor seal 
would behave in severe accidents. The leak tight-
ness of the seal is important in order to maintain 
the pressure suppression function of the contain-
ment as long as possible. The replacement of the 
ﬂoor seal is being planned, taking into account 
also the requirements set by the severe accident 
conditions.
Reliability of isolation valves
The piping part inside the lower drywell may be 
damaged because of contact with core debris. In 
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order to ensure the isolation function in severe 
accidents, an additional second isolation valve was 
installed in 1998 in the nitrogen system piping lines 
from the lower drywell to the reactor building.
Primary system depressurization 
in severe accidents
To secure depressurisation of the reactor primary 
system in severe accident situations and to prevent 
a new pressurisation of the reactor, two valves of the 
relief system have been modiﬁed. It is now possible 
to keep the valves open with the help of nitrogen 
supply or water supply from outside the contain-
ment. The modiﬁcation was ﬁnished in 1999.
Recriticality
The SIRM detectors will be drawn in the begin-
ning of the accident half a meter below the active 
core to detect possible recriticality. Analyses were 
performed in 1999 to determine how to relate the 
reading of the SIRM monitors to actual reactor 
power.
